Luca Fiorito

Research in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology (RHETM) is a journal/book series dedicated to an interdisciplinary approach to a broad range of topics related to the history and methodology of economics. Volumes are divided into four parts: a monothematic section dedicated to research articles focused on a particular issue in the journal’s core fields of interest, a section including research articles of a more general nature, a section of newly-discovered archival materials, and a section of review essays on new works in the history and methodology of economics. Founded by Warren Samuels in 1982, Research in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology is one of the oldest publication outlets in the fields of economic methodology and the history of economic thought.

The purpose of this paper is to explicit the possible extension of Speech Act theory to the analysis of sublanguages or Languages for Special Purposes , and to show in particular its relevance to the subset known as English for Special Purposes . I will primarily introduce an outline of LSP-ESP and of the Speech Act theory: then, through a survey on relevant literature, the modalities whereby Speech Acts could be made useful for English for Specific Purposes and, in so doing, I will attempt to make their applicability to ESP explicit and theory-informed, in order to reach a synthesis

Speech Act Theory has proved useful for classifying utterances, because of its seemingly universal application; on the other hand, legal theorists are interested in speech acts for several reasons, the most important being the fact that the theory helps to explain how the law uses language. In legal language there is a large number of speech acts, and most of them fall under the category of performatives: these do not report about doing something, their utterance actually constitutes performing an action. Because performatives are actions, they cannot be considered to be either true or false but only “felicitous” or “infelicitous". Laws could be considered as types of speech acts, as well as contracts and wills. We can say that in, a very general way, speech act theory is helpful because it permits us to understand legal events from a new perspective: in this paper my attempt is to show that a difference exists between "doing something with words" and "doing something legal with words", and that doing something in speaking in the common language is different from doing it in speaking the legal discourse, since in the legal domain we do not speak to do speech acts, but to carry out legal acts