Luca Hemmerich

In this article, I argue that instituting a form of economic democracy (ED) may offer a partial remedy to the ongoing ecological crisis. My argument proceeds in three steps. First, I contend that the ecological crisis largely stems from an under-responsiveness of current political and economic institutions to the interests of voiceless beings—in particular, future generations and non-human beings. Second, I draw on theoretical and empirical considerations, such as ED’s deliberative structure and adverse optimization pressures under capitalism, to argue that ED is likely to be more responsive to voiceless interests than capitalism. Furthermore, ED is also more amenable to responsiveness-increasing reforms that directly represent voiceless interests in economic decision-making processes. Third, I explore whether this gives us reasons to subscribe to some forms of ED over others. Models of ED with a broad scope of democratic decision-making and an inclusive demos, I argue, are best suited to protecting the voiceless. Overall, the article provides some pro tanto reasons favoring ED based on its relative responsiveness to voiceless interests. This supplements common defenses of ED that appeal to non-domination, meaningful work, and the firm-state analogy.

The political and ethical status of future generations is commonly discussed within conceptual frameworks like intergenerational justice, rights, or welfare. In this article, I argue that the concept of domination can provide a novel perspective on the philosophy of intergenerational relations. To that end, I first advance and defend a (slightly) revised conception of domination, drawing on Philip Pettit’s neorepublican view. Second, I establish a prima facie case for the existence of intergenerational domination and address four major objections to the claim that the present generation dominates future generations: the non-concurrency challenge, a modified version of the non-identity problem, the inescapability objection, and the problem of historical domination. Finally, I explore some implications and conceptual advantages of the framework of intergenerational domination. As a theoretical foundation of a comprehensive analysis of structures of domination, the proposed framework may contribute to identifying and reducing domination within and across generations.

In this article, I argue against negativism in critical theory. Negativism holds that critical theory should avoid appealing to explicit positive normative standards (“the good”) in its social critique. I distinguish between two types of negativism prevalent in critical theory. While dialectical negativism claims that we can approach the good in a negative way, radical negativism rejects such appeals entirely. I then review three motivations for negativism: that appealing to the good is epistemically precarious, normatively inadequate, and unimportant for the project of critical theory. I contend that the arguments for negativism are largely unsuccessful. Some reliable knowledge of human goods is possible, appeals to the good need not be undemocratic or paternalistic, and positive normative standards are crucial for grounding critique and guiding transformation. I conclude that critical theory’s emancipatory aims are undermined by negativism, and that it should embrace appealing to the good in its social critique.

In this article, I argue that desire-satisfaction theories of well-being face the problem of trivially satisfied desires. First, I motivate the claim that desire-satisfaction theories need an aggregation principle and reconstruct four possible principles desire-satisfactionists can adopt. Second, I contend that one of these principles seems implausible on numerous counts. Third, I argue that the other three principles, which hold that the creation and satisfaction of new desires is good for individuals and can be called proliferationist, are vulnerable to an objection from trivially satisfied desires. They implausibly imply that forming desires that are trivially satisfied is good for individuals. Finally, I argue that trivially satisfied desires may also worsen desire-satisfactionism's classical problem of pointless desires. Together, these claims constitute a challenge to desire-satisfactionism.