I am currently working on the issues of rationality and decision-making. I approach this issue from a moral epistemology standpoint through the methodology of experimental philosophy, as an interdisciplinary intersection with cognitive psychology, economy, neurosciences and other empirical sciences toward a greater understanding of moral agency and conceptions of "reason".
Predominant in the philosophical tradition, notions of rationality guide several of its debates and concepts. However, overwhelming evidence regarding factors as prejudice, cognitive dissonance, team psychology, gaslighting, besides behavioral studies with individuals wit…
I am currently working on the issues of rationality and decision-making. I approach this issue from a moral epistemology standpoint through the methodology of experimental philosophy, as an interdisciplinary intersection with cognitive psychology, economy, neurosciences and other empirical sciences toward a greater understanding of moral agency and conceptions of "reason".
Predominant in the philosophical tradition, notions of rationality guide several of its debates and concepts. However, overwhelming evidence regarding factors as prejudice, cognitive dissonance, team psychology, gaslighting, besides behavioral studies with individuals with neurological damage, callosal syndrome, or psycopaths, etc., challenge a strong notion of "reason" in action. Thus, I intend to investigate the philosophical consequences of this broader comprehension of our capacities and limitations in moral agency.
This approach emerged from my master's degree research, in which I worked the issue of normativity in moral naturalism. As a descriptivist philosophical position regarding moral action, it contrasts with normative theories for not intending the generation of moral rules or norms, focusing on a deeper - and interdisciplinary - comprehension of the ethical phenomenon.
Other than these, I am interested in general topics in the philosophy of mind, ethics, social epistemology and feminism.
