Luca Pitteloud

Cet article propose une relecture du passage 171a-b du Théétète de Platon à la lumière de la critique platonicienne du relativisme protagoréen. Il examine la structure et la portée de l’argument dit de l’« auto-réfutation » (peritrope), en suivant les analyses de Burnyeat et de Erginel. L’étude montre que cet argument ne consiste pas en une contradiction logique, mais en une réfutation dialectique qui met en évidence l’impossibilité pour le relativiste de défendre rationnellement sa propre position : en admettant la vérité de l’opinion selon laquelle le relativisme est faux, il détruit la validité de sa doctrine. Cette impossibilité dialectique révèle une fragilité constitutive du relativisme : celui-ci ne peut être formulé, transmis ni soutenu sans présupposer un espace commun de discours et des critères partagés de vérité. Dans la dernière partie, une mise en parallèle sera suggérée entre l’analyse platonicienne et les phénomènes contemporains de la post-vérité et du populisme démagogique, qui reposent sur la dissolution de cet espace commun et sur la substitution des faits par des croyances. Platon apparaît ainsi non comme le défenseur d’un dogmatisme archaïque, mais comme le penseur des conditions de possibilité du désaccord rationnel et du monde commun.

This chapter is divided into two parts: first, in order to understand how a geometric atomistic view of reality emerges in the Timaeus, a close look will be given to the structure of Plato’s story about the constitution of the universe. More precisely, the narration of the myth will be distinguished from its doctrinal content. Second, a description of Plato’s geometric atomism will be offered by considering its specific context. To conclude, following the results of the two first parts, I will briefly address three puzzles: the origin of motion, the nature of the Receptacle and the relationship between Plato’s geometric atomism and the Theory of Forms as it appears in the Timaeus.

I aim to suggest in this chapter that it is possible to understand Timaeus’ whole discourse as a kind of thought experiment placing the audience (and the reader) in the footsteps of a diving craftsman. In other words, Timaeus is presenting to us the great experiment of fashioning the whole of the universe , an experiment which needs to be done not only by (deductive and non-deductive) reasoning, but also with the use our imagination. In consequence, the Demiurge will appear to be an epistemological tool allowing this experience to take place in our own minds, which will imply two important claims allowing to understand the originality of the present interpretation in relation to others: 1) it does not seem necessary to attribute to the Demiurge an ontological role and 2) Timaeus’ experiment cannot be “translated” into a purely argumentative account. In other words, and to the contrary to most didactic approaches, Timaeus’s discourse could not be expressed in an abstract treatise of cosmology for experts based on empirical observation and deductive a priori arguments, for the use of imagination is an essential part of the process.

In this article, we provide an analysis of the description of the pre-cosmic chaos and the function of this description within the context of the theory of participation which can be reconstructed in Plato’s Timaeus. More specifically, we will assume that the pre-cosmic chaos represents a counterfactual situation in which the universe is conceived without the action of the intelligible. This counterfactual state will be considered as an initial sequence allowing to visualize in a quasi-spatial way how the phenomenon of participation operates. We will give a detailed analysis of the passage (52d4-53b7) in order to integrate it as a sequence of what we will call the anatomy of participation. In our study, two more questions will be examined: i) the representation of the sensible without the intelligible in Plato’s works (Timaeus, Statesman, Philebus, Parmenides) and ii) the role of world soul as a possible cause of all movements in the universe (Timaeus and Laws).

Plato’s Thought Experiments · In this contribution, we would like to look at the presence of thought experiments in Plato, as well as their relationship to image production in general and myths in particular. To this end, and to circumscribe a very broad field of investigation, we will suggest some answers to the following questions: (i) What is a philosophical thought experiment? Since the debate on this subject is still very lively today, it will be useful to present a brief description of the issues and difficulties surrounding the notion of thought experiment in the history of philosophy; (ii) Is it possible to identify a common pattern that would indicate the presence of thought experiments in ancient philosophy?; (iii) Are there Platonic thought experiments? After having answered to the first two questions, it will be possible to introduce three criteria that should be satisfied to in order to characterize a narrative based on the use of the im- agination as a thought experiment. By applying these criteria to two Platonic pieces of fiction, we will first come up with an analysis of the most well-known Platonic thought experience, Gyges’ ring, and then relativize the identification of the image of the Cave with such a category; (iv) Is it possible to associate the notion of thought experiment with some Platonic myths? With- out entering into a specific analysis, we will suggest, by way of conclusion, that some Platonic myths could also constitute thought experiments. This contribution will seek to offer a basis for what might be a more general study of thought experiments in Plato’s philosophy.

In this article, we provide an analysis of the description of the pre-cosmic chaos and the function of this description within the context of the theory of participation which can be reconstructed in Plato’s Timaeus. More specifically, we will assume that the pre-cosmic chaos represents a counterfactual situation in which the universe is conceived without the action of the intelligible. This counterfactual state will be considered as an initial sequence allowing to visualize in a quasi-spatial way how the phenomenon of participation operates. We will give a detailed analysis of the passage (52d4-53b7) in order to integrate it as a sequence of what we will call the anatomy of participation. In our study, two more questions will be examined: i) the representation of the sensible without the intelligible in Plato’s works (Timaeus, Statesman, Philebus, Parmenides) and ii) the role of world soul as a possible cause of all movements in the universe (Timaeus and Laws).

For Damascius, any attempt to grasp the first principle of all things, the Ineffable, implies the rejection of the principle of non-contradiction (PNC). The reasoning soul, using aporia, is forced to admit contradictory statements as true when it comes to cognising what lies beyond any intelligible being. Damascius shows that it is necessary to postulate a completely transcendent and unknowable Absolute which is the uncoordinated cause of all things beyond the One. This paper examines how Damascius relates the rejection of the PNC and regressive arguments by distinguishing two types of reversal (peritropê) of arguments. This paper begins by analysing: i) Damascius’ first aporia, ii) his characterisation of the first principle as ineffable and iii) its unknowable nature. This leads to some comments about Damascius’ use of predicates and their negations. Finally, the paper distinguishes between regression and reversal to suggest that Damascius’ reversal of the predicates implies that the first principle lies beyond the PNC but does not involve an infinity of first principles.

La plupart des études récentes sur le Lysis de Platon considèrent ce dialogue comme un échec philosophique. Si quelques parties du Lysis ont retenu l’at­tention des commentateurs, il en est peu qui ont essayé, dans leur analyse, de défendre l’idée que ce court texte offre un contenu philosophique construit et cohérent. Terry Penner et Christopher Rowe (P&R) relèvent ce défi dans leur commentaire philosophique de ce dialogue en affirmant qu’une analyse systéma­tique du Lysis est insuffisante e...

This edited volume brings together contributions from prominent scholars to discuss new approaches to Plato's philosophy, especially in the burgeoning fields of Platonic ontology and psychology. Topics such as the relationship between mind, soul and emotions, as well as the connection between ontology and ethics are discussed through the analyses of dialogues from Plato's middle and late periods, such as the Republic, Symposium, Theaetetus, Timaeus and Laws. These works are being increasingly studied both as precursors for Aristotelian philosophy and in their own right, and the analyses included in this volume reveal some new interpretations of topics such as Plato's attitude towards artistic imagination and the possibility of speaking of a teleology in Plato. Focusing on hot topics in the area, Psychology and Ontology in Plato provides a good sense of what is happening in Platonic scholarship worldwide and will be of interest to academic researchers and teachers interested in ancient philosophy, ontology and philosophical psychology.

This paper proposes to pose the question of a possible position of Plotinus with regard to the Argument of the Third Man : first, we will examine if it is possible to attribute to Plotinus a position as regards TMA such as it appears in the Parmenides, in particular with regard to the premise which affirms the self-predication of the Forms. Next, we will briefly consider how the question of the soul-body relationship can, to some extent, provide a better understanding of why Plotinus does not bother to give an explicit objection to TMA. Finally, we will analyze how the theory of two kinds of resemblance strikes a fatal blow to the spirit of TMA.

Dans cet article, j’examinerai la description du modèle (paradeigma) dans le Timée. Après avoir fait quelques commentaires à propos du contexte dans lequel le modèle est introduit en tant que composante de la sphère intelligible, je poserai la question de l’extension exacte de cette sphère dans le Timée. Puis, je suggèrerai que le modèle peut être défini comme la réalisation optimale d’une fonctionnalité. Cela semble être en effet une alternative crédible afin de comprendre ce que sont les Formes dans la métaphysique de Platon. Néanmoins, cette conception n’est pas exempte de difficultés puisque Platon admet également une conception plus substantielle du modèle dans le Timée (ce dernier élément ne sera pas investigué dans cet article). Cela dit, une vision fonctionnaliste du modèle permet de donner une justification satisfaisante à l’idée selon laquelle le cosmos est la meilleure réalisation démiurgique possible

A principal tese que pretendo defender aqui é que, apesar de a Forma da Cama, na discussão da República, ser considerada inteligível, não é intenção de Platão incluir Formas de objetos artificiais em sua hipótese metafísica. A considera-ção do contexto permite entender por que a Forma da Cama é necessária para a argumentação do livro X, ainda que, como tal, não se deva assumir como parte da família das Formas. Em vez disso, sugiro que a crítica das artes imitativas no livro X, em última análise, depende da existência do inteligível como tal e não de certas Formas específicas.

The purpose of this article is to provide an analysis of the World Soul in Plato’s Timaeus. In showing how the description of the World Soul is elaborated in the Timaeus, highlighting the following dimensions, (a) its composition, (b) its mathematical structure, (c) its moving function and (d) its cognitive function, we will establish how this ontological constitution is articulated within the framework of the teleological dimension of the discourse. It will appear that it is the two functions of the World Soul (moving and cognitive) that justify why it possesses the structure of an intermediate mixture constituted from being, sameness and difference. As such, it is the proper cause (aitia), which is exemplified by the Demiurge’s teleological deduction in Timaeus’ discourse, that determines the auxiliary cause (sunaitia), namely, the structure of the World Soul.