Luca Possati

This paper develops a hermeneutic technology assessment of quantum technologies. It offers a “vision assessment” of quantum technologies that can eventually lead to socio-ethical analysis. Section 2 describes this methodological approach and in particular the concept of the hermeneutic circle applied to technology. Section 3 gives a generic overview of quantum technologies and their impacts. Sections 4 and 5 apply the hermeneutic technology assessment approach to the study of quantum technologies. Section 5 proposes distinguishing three levels in the analysis of the creation and communication of social meanings to quantum technologies: (a) fictions, (b) popularization, and (c) scientific journalism. Section 6 analyzes the results and defines some lines of action to increase social acceptance and trust in quantum technologies. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate on quantum technologies by enhancing the reflection on them and their potential, as well as illustrating the complexity of technological innovation and the need to shape it.

This paper intends to address social robotics from the Actor-network theory (ANT) perspective. Starting from the critique of Seibt’s approach and the distinction between anthropomorphing and sociomorphing, the paper proposes a new methodological approach based on ANT and negotiation concepts. This approach allows us to: a) assume a more symmetrical ontology in which robots are considered as social agents, like humans; b) consider all the interactional elements as of equal importance; and c) overcome the dualistic limit that is often imposed on social robotics studies, i.e., the tendency to consider only the one-to-one relationship, one man-one robot, inside the laboratory. Anthropomorphing and sociomorphing are the results of a negotiation process that cannot be reduced to a series of degrees of simulation, but must be understood as a complex interactional process between many agents and material mediations.

Most of human-robot interaction (HRI) research relies on an implicit assumption that seems to drive experimental work in interaction studies: the more anthropomorphism we can reach in robots, the more effective the robot will be in 'being social.' The notion of 'sociomorphing' was developed in order to challenge the assumption of ubiquitous anthropomorphizing. This paper aims to explore the notion of sociomorphing by analysing the possibilities offered by actor-network theory (ANT). We claim that ANT is a valid framework to re-think the conceptual couple anthropomorphizing / sociomorphing and answer the following question: What kind of negotiation process and social practices can be developed in HRI, given the notion of sociomorph interactional networks?

Luca M. Possati, Jean Grondin, Paul Ricoeur ; Aurore Dumont, François Dosse et Catherine Goldenstein, Paul Ricoeur: penser la mémoire ; Paul-Gabriel Sandu, Gert-Jan van der Heiden, The Truth of Language. Heidegger, Ricoeur and Derrida on Disclosure and Displacement ; Paul Marinescu, Marc-Antoine Vallée, Gadamer et Ricoeur. La conception herméneutiquedu langage ; Witold Płotka, Saulius Geniusas, Th e Origins of the Horizon in Husserl’s Phenomenology ; Delia Popa, Annabelle Dufourcq, La dimension imaginaire du réel dans la philosophie de Husserl ; Maria GyemantDenis Seron, Ce que voir veut dire. Essai sur la perception ; Christian Ferencz-Flatz, Hans Friesen, Christian Lotz, Jakob Meier, Markus Wolf, Ding und Verdinglichung. Technik- und Sozialphilosophie nach Heidegger und der Kritischen Th eorie ; Bogdan MincăLarisa Cercel, John Stanley, Unterwegs zu einer hermeneutischen Übersetzungswissenschaft. Radegundis Stolze zu ihrem 60. Geburtstag ; Denisa Butnaru Johann Michel, Sociologie du soi. Essai d’herméneutique appliquée ; Ovidiu Stanciu, Jan Patočka, Aristote, ses devanciers, ses successeurs. Trad. fr. Erika Abrams ; Mădălina Diaconu, Emmanuel Alloa, Das durchscheinende Bild. Konturen einer medialen, Phänomenologie.

This paper intends to contribute to the emerging literature on the ethical problems posed by quantum computing and quantum technologies in general. The key ethical questions are as follows: Does quantum computing pose new ethical problems, or are those raised by quantum computing just a different version of the same ethical problems raised by other technologies, such as nanotechnologies, nuclear plants, or cloud computing? In other words, what is new in quantum computing from an ethical point of view? The paper aims to answer these two questions by (a) developing an analysis of the existing literature on the ethical and social aspects of quantum computing and (b) identifying and analyzing the main ethical problems posed by quantum computing. The conclusion is that quantum computing poses completely new ethical issues that require new conceptual tools and methods.

This paper concerns the role of the unconscious in technology. The central thesis is that there exists an experience of non-acceptance and failed incorporation of technology, which (a) does not depend on the technical engineering dimension of the artifact but (b) instead concerns the relationship between the human unconscious and the artifact. This thesis is supported and developed through the analysis of a case study – that is, the creation and development of the first version of Google Glass. The failure of the first version of Google Glass is explained in terms of the non-acceptance of this technology. This paper presents an analysis of users’ experiences and comments as a basis for interpreting the relationship between the unconscious and technology. Their non-acceptance of this technology is explained and further clarified from a postphenomenological point of view, utilizing the concept of “technological uncanny.” The analysis suggests that antimediation can be understood as a form of noise. In fact, as non-acceptance, antimediation directly concerns the relationship between contingency and control.

Cet ouvrage traite de la question de l'analogie chez Paul Ricoeur. L'hypothèse majeure est qu'une philosophie de l'analogie inachevée traverse toute l'oeuvre du philosophe. L'analogie se présente comme une fonction décisive qui se déroule sur plusieurs plans, mais qui ne vient jamais à la lumière en elle-même. L'effort archéologique - qui va des premiers écrits des années 30 et 40 jusqu'à la philosophie de la volonté et aux oeuvres majeures de "l'herméneutique de l'homme capable" - montre que la démarche analogique ricoeurienne tient ses racines dans la réponse du théologien protestant Kart Barth au défi de l'analogia entis. Une telle réponse se configure, dans son ossature la plus essentielle, comme un refus de la doctrine de l'analogia entis auquel correspond une reprise de celle-ci en termes pratiques et intersubjectifs. L'herméneutique répète ce geste fondamental. Le détour théologique ouvre non seulement une nouvelle image, très unitaire, de l'oeuvre de Ricoeur, mais aussi un terrain philosophique inexploré : les analogués de l'analogie. Ainsi, l'exercice exégétique se transforme peu à peu en une conversation triangulaire entre Ricoeur, Barth et Derrida.

This book develops an original theoretical framework for understanding human-technology relations. The author's approach, which he calls technoanalysis, analyzes artificial intelligence based on Freudian psychoanalysis, biosemiotics, and Latour's actor-network theory. How can we communicate with AI to determine shared values and objectives? And what, ultimately, do we want from machines? These are crucial questions in our world, where the influence of AI-based technologies is rapidly growing. Unconscious dynamics influence AI and digital technology and understanding them is essential to better controlling AI systems. This book's unique methodology- which combines psychoanalysis, biosemiotics, and actor-network theory-reveals a radical reformulation of the problem of the human mind. Technoanalysis views the mind as a hybrid network of humans and nonhuman actants in constant interaction with one another. The author argues that human unconscious dynamics influence and shape technology, just as technology influences and shapes human unconscious dynamics. He proceeds to show how this conception of the relationship between the unconscious and technology can be applied to social robotics and AI. Unconscious Networks will appeal to scholars and advanced students interested in philosophy of technology, philosophy of artificial intelligence, psychoanalysis, and science and technology studies.

The thesis of the paper is that semiotic processes are intrinsic to computation and computational systems. An explanation of computation that does not take this semiotic dimension into account is incomplete. Semiosis is essential to computation and therefore requires a rigorous definition. To prove this thesis, the author analyzes two concepts of computation: the Turing machine and the mechanistic conception of physical computation. The paper is organized in two parts. The first part (Sects. 2 and 3) develops a re-interpretation of the Turing machine starting from Peirce’s semiotics. The author shows how this reinterpretation allows overcoming the dualism between a purist and a realist version of the Turing machine. The second part of the paper (Sect. 4) shows how a mechanistic explanation of physical computation such as the one developed by Piccinini is incomplete without considering semiotic relations. The paper intends to be a contribution to the philosophical debate on computation.

The central thesis of this paper is that human unconscious processes influence the behavior and design of artificial intelligence (AI). This thesis is discussed through the case study of a chatbot called Replika, which intends to provide psychological assistance and friendship but has been accused of inciting murder and suicide. Replika originated from a trauma and a work of mourning lived by its creator. The traces of these unconscious dynamics can be detected in the design of the app and the narratives about it. Therefore, a process of de-psychologization and de-humanization of the unconscious takes place through AI. This psychosocial approach helps criticize and overcome the so-called “standard model of intelligence” shared by most AI researchers. It facilitates a new interpretation of some classic problems in AI, such as control and responsibility.

This article discusses the relation between software and human experience. I argue that software-based experiences are based on a radical discrepancy between the code and “lived experience.” This break is different than the so-called “opacity” of technology. I start analyzing a case study: the video game Assassin’s Creed Odyssey. Video games are one of the most profound digital experiences humans can have. When I play a video game I do not see the code. However, the code is the source of my experience. I claim that the code’s concealment is the necessary condition of the digital experience. I discuss the ontological definition of software as an entity. Software, I claim, is a complex object, composed of many different levels, whose unity is problematic. In the last part of the essay I argue that the break between lived experience and code is recomposed by imagination through the act of design.

Digital media and technologies have significantly transformed the ways we relate to the world, in the triple sense of Selbstwelt, Mitwelt, and Umwelt. Think of the quantification of the self, the number of followers and likes on social media, or using Google maps and similar tools to orient ourselves in a city, to find and choose a good restaurant, and so on. One might say that digital media and technologies have actually transformed our interpretation, understanding, and access to the world. Now, if hermeneutics is the philosophy of interpretation, then we might suppose that hermeneutics should pay attention to these transformations. For us, digital hermeneutics is the study of the ways digital media and technologies mediate between humans and the world. It is also the study of the ways digital media and technologies are embedded in non-technological relations between humans and the world – psychological, social, cultural, and so on.

The aim of this paper is to contribute to understanding software from a “continental” perspective. I argue that Paul Ricoeur’s philosophical hermeneutics can help in developing a new understanding of the nature of software, thus fueling the philosophical debate on digital technology. The core of the paper is the application of the Ricoeur’s notion of text to software. A hermeneutic understanding of software allows us to explain those aspects of software that escape a strictly technical definition, such as the relationship with the user, the human being, and the social and cultural transformations that software produces, the same way that any text does. The hermeneutic understanding of software considers software as a social and cultural product.

Quels sont les rapports entre l’éthique et la politique chez Paul Ricoeur? Le Cogito herméneutique est-il un sujet du droit? Chez Ricoeur, le passage de l ’éthique à la politique se révèle paradoxale. D’une part, le politique réalise la visée éthique d’une vie bonne : c ’est donc une partie de l ’éthique, un prolongement de celle-ci. De l’autre, le rapport de la politique au pouvoir bouleverse l’éthique : il existe une violence qui ne peut pas être réglée par la morale. Le rapport entre l ’éthique et le politique se configure ainsi à la fois comme une identité et une différence. Ricoeur nous propose la voie d’un kantisme post-hégélien qui trouve sur le plan de la reconnaissance mutuelle et de la logique du don la médiation nécessaire entre éthique et politique. Ainsi, le paradoxe politique assume un nouveau sens créatif.What is the relationship between ethics and politics in Paul Ricoeur? Is the hermeneutic Cogito the subject of rights? In Ricoeur, the passage from ethics to politics is paradoxical. On the one hand, the politics achieves the ethical aim of a good life: it is therefore a part of ethics, an extension of it. On the other hand, the relationship between politics and power destroys ethics: there is a kind of violence that cannot be settled by moral rules. The relationship between ethics and politics is configured as both identity and difference. Ricoeur o ffers us the path of a post-Hegelian Kantianism which finds the necessary mediation between ethics and politics in mutual recognition and in the logic of giving. Thus, the political paradox takes on a new creative meaning.

The noema is one of the most daring and controversial concept of the Husserlian theory of intentionality. It was first introduced by Husserl in 1912, within some research manuscripts, but was only fully developed in Ideen. In this paper I claim that the noema is an ambiguous notion, the result of a theoretical operation, the epoché, whose aim is contradictory. In an effort to keep open the epoché, and therefore maintain distance with respect to every transcendent object, Husserl is forced to multiply intentional objects and complicate the notions of sense and noema. Given that, I propose to overcome the paradoxes of noema through the language of game theory. Game theory offers a very fruitful descriptive model that allows us to save the original Husserlian approach without the contradictions of the epoché. For this reason, I propose to re-interpret intentionality as social game, and the noema as Nash equilibrium. By replying to possible objections, I will show that this approach gives us many theoretical advantages. The general aim of the paper is a global reformulation of the phenomenalogical method.

This article proposes a reading of Ricoeur and Deleuze from their respective interpretations of Spinoza's thought. Ricoeur and Deleuze are placed in the center of the Spinoza-Renaissance that took place in France in the Fifties and Sixties. However, Ricoeur's Spinozism is still largely unknown. The first two parts of the article concern Spinoza's concepts of conatus and essentia actuosa, emphasizing their importance for Ricoeur's hermeneutics of symbols, especially in relation to his reading of Jean Nabert. The following three sections concern Deleuze and the role of Spinoza's thought in the genesis of rhizomatic ontology in Mille plateaux. The last part of the article seeks to explore the possibility of a dialogue between Ricoeur and Deleuze. Normal 0 false false false EN-US JA X-NONE

Cet article présente une reformulation générale de l’analogie du texte et de l’action de Paul Ricœur. Mon hypothèse de travail est qu’une telle reformulation nous aide à mieux contextualiser des tensions qui traversent toute la philosophie pratique de Ricœur, tout d’abord la tension entre le social et l’institution. Il s’agit de montrer que la philosophie ricœurienne est une philosophie tensionnelle parce qu’elle se fonde sur le principe d’analogie. Cela, bien sûr, ne revient pas à réduire sa pensée à un simple effet de ce principe. This paper reformulates the analogy between text and action in Paul Ricœur’s philosophy. My hypothesis is that such a reformulation better contextualizes the tensions in Ricœur’s practical philosophy, specifically between the social and the institutional. The aim is to show that Ricœur’s philosophy is tensional because it’s based on the principle of analogy. In order to think about this tension, we must grasp its true horizon: the analogy of text and action. After outlining this analogy’s genesis, we will see that each of these terms—text, action, analogy—is determined by a “grammar of analogy,” which conditions all of Ricœur’s speeches and has its roots in his interpretation of intentionality.