Luciano Bazzocchi

From Prototractatus to Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The author aims to show that in the notebook in which Wittgenstein composed his Tractatus there is no discontinuity between the part published as ‘Prototractatus’ and the last few pages, not published because quite indistinguishable from the final work. The process by which the propositions are combined is homogeneous, following a rigorously top-down strategy: from the six main propositions on the first page to further levels of commentary and, finally, to the more detailed remarks of the last stages. The puzzling chaos of the manuscript derives from his chronological recording of coherent interventions relating to the most different branches of the logic tree. In the first as in the final stage, these interventions were possible thanks to a ‘twin’ text, possibly organized on separate sheets of paper. Therefore, if we read the Tractatus by progressive levels of commentary, rather than sequentially, we then find the same progression of thought developed by Wittgenstein himself during the three years of compiling his manuscript.

This paper substitutes a structural hermeneutics for the sequential approach to the Tractatus and its manuscript, which leaves the manuscript completely unexplained. All the pieces come together only if we recognise that Wittgenstein's book is a hierarchical object that was composed following a top-down strategy. Therefore, we realise that the “summary on scattered sheets” represents the perspicuous version of the manuscript, the correlations with the Notebooks become obvious and the “supplements” can be reconstructed. A correct dating of the composition allows us to understand how it was possible, without digital technologies except from an ingenious application of the decimal system, to achieve this formal masterpiece.

If we read the Tractatus logico-philosophicus according to the decimal numbering of its propositions, we may understand, finally, the section about the self and the limits of language and world. Proposition 5.64 follows 5.63 (not 5.634); 5.634 follows 5.633 (not 5.6331); and so on. Thus, it becomes clear that the picture of the visual field (TLP 5.6331) cannot be what scholars have always quoted and discussed, i.e. a draft of an eye inside its field of sight. Actually, Wittgenstein’s original drafts depict (to criticise it) the ordinary way of representing the visual field. Following him, the field of vision is ‘without limits’; it does not have a form that implies the existence of an eye, as far as the phenomenological experience does not have a form that implies the existence of an ‘I’. As a result, the current reproductions of the 5.6331 image must be rectified, and all references to this similitude should be radically amended.