This chapter addresses several questions pertaining to mindreading such as what constitutes its task-execution, how did human beings acquire this skill, how high is its neural plausibility, and to what extent is its relationship with human cognition. It discusses various models of mindreading, including one of Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan (2000) which categorizes between “social cognitive” and “social perceptual” components. It illustrates how a high-level simulational mindreading works by contrast…
Read moreThis chapter addresses several questions pertaining to mindreading such as what constitutes its task-execution, how did human beings acquire this skill, how high is its neural plausibility, and to what extent is its relationship with human cognition. It discusses various models of mindreading, including one of Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan (2000) which categorizes between “social cognitive” and “social perceptual” components. It illustrates how a high-level simulational mindreading works by contrasting it with theory-theory, as well as a low-level simulational mindreading through emotion mirroring. It also explains the role of imagination in the enactment of mental states, together with mindreading acquisition, its neural basis, and simulation theory's relationship with evolutionary theory.