Lucy O'Brien

What enables me to know that others exist? Nathalie Duddington offers two distinctive, and underexplored, insights into the question. She focuses on our capacity to perceive minds in perceiving animate beings, and on the ways in which we stand to be affected by others in knowing them. I will suggest a way of understanding what it is to see minds in action. I will also argue that ways we stand to be affected by others offers a resource for knowing others that takes us beyond perception, and is one that constitutes an antidote to the solipsist.

The problem at the center of Gomes’ The Practical Self is how the self-conscious reflective subject can come understand herself, and establish, that she is in an objective world. Its proposed solution lies in practically, not theoretically, grounded assent, sustained by our conversation with others. This critical response to the book aims to do three things. First, to encourage people to read it. Second, to scrutinize Gome’s own recommendation for the best route to take in dealing with this problem. Third, to ask whether there is a shorter route.

We take ourselves to learn things from reading novels. Moreover, we do not just take ourselves to learn how to acquire empathy, or feel the right thing in the right way, we also take ourselves to acquire beliefs that are true, and well supported. This is puzzling because authors of novels have an almost unconstrained licence to make things up—their work is not constrained by the truth. This chapter argues that our capacity directly to read off truths from fiction, and the power of the novelist to testify to truths, is limited. It argues that there are, however, more indirect ways of coming to truths through fiction. Nevertheless, even in those cases, the author’s power to manipulate should make the epistemically virtuous person proceed carefully. The chapter concludes by showing that the author can, however, use that power to manipulate to provide the reader with lessons in such care.

Lucy OBrien argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference and self-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. She considers two main questions. First, what account of first-person reference can we give that respects the guaranteed nature of such reference? Second, what account can we give of our knowledge of our mental and physical actions? Clearly written, with rigorous discussion of rival views, this book will be of interest to anyone working in the philosophy of mind and action.

Self-deprecating, self-belittling, stand-up comedy is a staple. Comedians invite their audience to laugh at them, and their failures. If they are successful, they will report on their failure in a way that is amusing, and the audience will laugh. In this paper, I want to think about such invitations. I will try to characterise what the stand-up comedian might be doing when they do that: what are they doing? I also want to ask why they are doing it, and why are they doing it before an audience. I argue that a self-deprecating performance is a highly distinctive form of reflective activity that allows a comedian to ministrate in the philosophical task of exploring, and guiding their audience in, the art of human existential absurdity. Their being able to do this is one of the reasons we value such comedy as the artform it is.

We argue that relating to myself as me provides, as such, a reason to care about myself: grasping that an event involves me, instead of another, makes it matter in a special way. Further, this self-concern is not simply a matter of seeing in myself some instrumental value for other ends. We use as our foil a recent skeptical challenge to this view offered in Setiya (2015). We think the case against self-concern is powered by unwarrantedly narrow construals of three key notions. One is the notion of a first-personal way of relating to oneself. A narrow account of the first person in terms of special epistemic relations to oneself makes it easy to overlook a source of non-instrumental reasons of self-concern, located in the special relation a subject has to herself as agent. Two is the notion of what it is to be a reason. And three is the notion of self-concern itself. We show that the skeptical case rests in part on a slide towards neighbouring but distinct notions of egoism and selfishness. We also argue that Setiya’s notion of self-love, offered to capture the pre-theoretical intuition of self-concern, cannot do it justice.

This paper addresses the question “what connection is there between our answer to the question of what we are, and the question, what our actions are?” Suppose that actions are reflexive changes of agents. On that supposition, there would be a direct connection between the answers to those two questions. An action of mine will be a reflexive change of me, and what I am will fix the nature of those changes. I hold that supposition to be true and consider reasons in favor of believing it. However, the paper is not primarily aimed at defense of that thesis. It rather concerned with exploring what consequences accepting it has for the competing notions of what we are, given what we ordinarily think actions are, and bringing to light a tension between thinking of actions as reflexive changes of agents in this way, and a kind of causal understanding of actions that is prevalent. What emerges is that we should shift where we start our theorizing: we cannot assume that action theory primarily involves the task of characterizing the relation between an agent and changes caused, rather than a characterization of a particular kind of relation between the agent and herself.

We argue that relating to myself as me provides, as such, a reason to care about myself: grasping that an event involves me, instead of another, makes it matter in a special way. Further, this self-concern is not simply a matter of seeing in myself some instrumental value for other ends. We use as our foil a recent skeptical challenge to this view offered in Setiya (2015). We think the case against self-concern is powered by unwarrantedly narrow construals of three key notions. One is the notion of a first-personal way of relating to oneself. A narrow account of the first person in terms of special epistemic relations to oneself makes it easy to overlook a source of non-instrumental reasons of self-concern, located in the special relation a subject has to herself as agent. Two is the notion of what it is to be a reason. And three is the notion of self-concern itself. We show that the skeptical case rests in part on a slide towards neighbouring but distinct notions of egoism and selfishness. We also argue that Setiya’s notion of self-love, offered to capture the pre-theoretical intuition of self-concern, cannot do it justice.

This chapter aims to get away from the ‘psychological attitude’ approach framing current philosophical discussion of delusion. We ask not what kind of attitude a delusion is – a belief or an imagination? Something else? – as if it were already clear what the ‘content’ of a delusion could be. We aim instead to shift attention to the question of the ‘object’ of delusions. What is delusion of? What is the object of this form of thinking? This focus on a delusion’s object, over its attitudinal nature, is partly motivated by a desire properly to connect delusory thought with ordinary forms of fantastical thinking that are ubiquitous in the experiences faced by reflective humans in everyday life. We aim at securing a continuity, in a way that much extant discussion of delusion fails to, between delusory thought with more ordinary forms of thinking present in, for example, fantastical or magical thinking. Exploring familiar expressions of such thinking, especially those involved in love and loss, enables us to bring out the way in which such expressions convey forms of affective self-consciousness – that have the subject and her relations as an object – that are not naturally taken as reports liable to investigation as true or false. This raises the question about what how to think about what someone is doing when they give expression to a delusion should we think of them as expressing an attitude towards a truth or false content, or may they be doing something rather different?

In this paper I want to examine a claim made about the kind of immunity through misidentification relative to the first person (IEM) that attaches to action self-ascriptions. In particular, I want to consider whether we have reason to think a stronger kind of immunity attaches to action self-ascriptions, than attaches to self-ascriptions of bodily movement. I assume we have an awareness of our actions – agent’s awareness – and that agent’s awareness is not a form of perceptual bodily awareness. The issue here is whether agents’ awareness grounds a kind of immunity to error that bodily awareness does not. However, perhaps more importantly, I want to argue that we only get a secure difference in immunity claims if have already decided whether a source of information is essentially first personal or not and made certain, not obviously warranted assumptions, about the transparency of content and about knowledge. If we hold that a subject’s knowledge of her actions is essentially first personal, in a way that a subject’s knowledge of her body through bodily awareness may not be, then we are better off arguing for that claim directly. Or so I will suggest.

It is an extraordinary thing that Descartes' famous Cogito argument is still being puzzled over; this paper is another fragment in an untiring tradition of puzzlement. The paper will argue that, if I were to ask the question the Cogito could provide for a positive answer. In particular, my aim in this is to argue, in opposition to recent discussion by John Campbell, that there is a way of construing conscious thinking on which the Cogito can be seen to provide a non-question begging argument for one's own existence.

My concern is this paper is to consider the nature of obsessive thoughts with the aim of getting a clearer idea about the extent to which they are rightly identified as passive or as active. The nature of obsessive thoughts is of independent interest, but my concern with the question is also rooted in a general concern to map the extent of mental activity, and to defend the importance and centrality of a view of self-knowledge that appeals to agency. I hold that much of our mental lives is active, and that the distinctive knowledge we have of our own minds is in many cases best explained by appealing to agency. Along with many others, I take knowledge of our actions and activities to be distinctive. We know our actions and activities in a way that we do not know anything else, and in a way that is distinctively and essentially self-conscious.