Ludmila Kryshtop

Kant scholars traditionally trace the origin of Kant’s doctrine of revolution in the disposition to the Pietist teaching on a new birth whose main tenets are most fully set forth in the programmatic works of its founder, Philipp Jakob Spener. However, in spite of some similarities between these teachings there are important differences between them. Chief of them is Kant’s characteristic reduction of the usefulness of religion to its impact on the moral sphere and the search for the possibility of a moral interpretation of all the main Chrisitan dogmas, an approach to religion for which there are no grounds in Pietism. Furthermore, it is impossible, proceeding from the Pietist teaching on a new birth, to explain the transformation of the concept of Gesinnung (disposition), which we find in Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason. There is enough evidence pointing to another influence on Kant in this issue, and that is the philosophical-theological views of Johann Joachim Spalding on conversion and the related radical change of heart, most clearly observed in Thoughts on the Value of Feelings in Christianity (1761). An outstanding representative of neology, Spalding stresses the moral significance of religion and seeks opportunities for a moral interpretation of the foundations of the Christian faith, an approach that is much closer to Kant’s. Furthermore in this work the concept of Gesinnung is used in the meaning similar to that which would later appear in Kant’s Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason. Spalding’s book was well-known to Kant, such that it may well have influenced the transformation of the concept of Gesinnung observed in Kant’s philosophy.

The Camus' philosophical views were greatly influenced by F. Nietzsche. The authors of the research analyze several aspects of this influence. First of all, the article concerns Nietzsche's “death of God” concept and its reflection in Camus's key concept - the concept of absurdity. The authors come to the conclusion that Camus's philosophy of absurdity in a certain sense can be seen as a consistent development of the Nietzsche’s “death of God” concept, as a deducing all the consequences from it. The parallel in the views of the two philosophers can also be traced in two other aspects - in Nietzsche's concept of eternal return and its peculiar embodiment in the Camus’ image of Sisyphus, as well as in the Nietzsche’s idea of three transformations of the spirit and its refraction in the idea of Prometheus' revolt in Camus’ philosophy. The authors conclude that in the case of the first aspect we can speak of a significant similarity and parallelism of the ideas of the two thinkers. But the second aspect - Nietzsche's idea of three stages of spirit and Camus's idea of revolt as represented in the image of Prometheus - shows a serious discrepancy between them. In the third transformation of spirit named “child” the spirit moves from negation all previous values to the creation of the new ones. This process can be characterized as active nihilism and implies uncompromising rejection and destruction of old values, which becomes the basis for the formation of new ones. Such a position inevitably implies the unlimited freedom of the individual, the chosen one, who is able to rise to this height of spiritual development. Such a position is a response to the “death of God”. Camus's revolt is also a response to the absurdity as a parallel to Nietzsche’s “death of God” situation. But it has its origin not in the absolute freedom of the individual, but in a sense of solidarity. It is born out of the desire to help others, to improve their situation. It comes out of the desire for the common good of all people. Such revolt thus cannot be unlimited; on the contrary, it is subject to the law of measure, to the proportionality of destruction and the good to be brought about.

This paper is concerned with the principles of adjudication (diiudicatio, Beurteilung) and execution (executio, Ausübung) in the notes of Kant’s lectures on natural right (“Feyerbend’s Natural Right”). In this manuscript these principles are used as a binary scheme twice, each time in the introduction to the first chapter. To explain the meaning of these concepts I use other cases of their use in Kant’s philosophy. I have established that they are used as a pair only in the notes of various lecture courses and in rough drafts. The majority of these uses occur in the pre-critical period. In the critical period they can be encountered only in the first half of the 1780s. The latest case occurs in “Feyerabend’s Natural Right”. More often than not these terms are used in moral philosophy. Here they have two main meanings: the principle of adjudication corresponds to the objective foundation of volition, whereas the principle of execution points to the objective foundation; to adjudicate moral duty reason alone is enough, to execute it external (divine) will needs to be posited. The research has established that Kant borrows these concepts from the lecture course on logic where their main meaning is different: the principle of adjudication serving to determine theoretical cognition and the principle of execution, practical cognition. The source of the transformation that occurred in transferring these concepts to the sphere of moral philosophy is Meier’s Compendium. The pair is not used in it but the separation of knowledge into theoretical and practical is present. Meier defines practical knowledge as knowledge that can affect volition. “Feyerabend’s Natural Right” reflects all three meanings of the principles of adjudication and execution.

The article concerns history, its origins, goals, and end. The article focuses on two concepts of historical development. One is the concept of the “end of history” by Francis Fukuyama. The article’s authors consider in detail the main provisions of this concept. However, the main emphasis is on the critical reception of this concept within the framework of the philosophy of liberation (represented by Arturo Andrés Roig). Roig’s criticism reveals the Eurocentrism inherent in this concept and shows that it carries the main features inherent in the European worldview and European mentality, which is why it is initially perceived as unsuitable for the Latin American continent. The second concept of historical development analyzed in this article is the earlier concept of the “Axial Age” by K. Jaspers. This concept is often perceived as one of the most striking anti-Eurocentric concepts. At the same time, Jaspers himself is regarded as the founder of the dialogue of cultures and intercultural philosophy and a supporter of civilizational pluralism. The article consistently analyzes three aspects of this concept - the motivation for its creation (presented by Jaspers himself), the criteria for identifying historical and prehistoric cultures (and the associated identification of three centers of the axial period), and the question of the possibility of a new axial age. The article argues that Jaspers’ concept can rightly be called Eurocentric rather than anti-Eurocentric, since both in the initial motivation for creating this concept and in the process of its development and vision of the prospects for the possibility of a new axial age, Jaspers proceeds from the presuppositions characteristic of the European worldview, which is universalized by him and presented as objective and the only correct ones. Ultimately, the study shows that the fight against Eurocentrism is a logical continuation of the latter and carries all the main features of the European mentality.

The article concerns the Axial Period conception of Karl Jaspers. The author states that this conception had a great influence on further development of European philosophy to even greater pluralization and played a great role in the fight with Eurocentrism in different fields – in philosophy as well as in religious consciousness. The author analyzes Jaspers’ critic of claim to the absolute truth which he supposed to be inherent in monotheistic religions and especially in Christianity. It is shown that Jaspers accuses this claim to truth of being the cause of religious conflicts and intolerance. The author analyses the way out proposed by Jaspers and argues this position could be regarded as inconsistent and contradictive. In order to understand better Jaspers’ solution and to estimate it, the wider the wider context of Jaspers’ philosophical writings is researched. It is shown the connection and interaction of the Axial Period conception and the views of Jaspers on religious pluralism and possibility to reach it.

The positions of Christian Wolff and Im­manuel Kant on the possibility of proving the existence of God require some examination. Wolff’s critique of the physical-theological proof and his proposed ways of improving it are here analysed. God is central to Wolff’s philosophical system and the fundamental prerequisite of his theoretical and practical philosophy. Although Wolff insists that the natural law is inherent in human nature and can therefore be comprehended by human reason without turning to divine revelation, in reality God is the creator of this natural law and the cause of its perfection. Accordingly, faith in the true God in Wolff’s philosophy is obligatory for achieving the supreme degree of virtue, whereas pagans and atheists can achieve only its lowest degree. Kant criticises traditional proofs of the existence of God both in his pre-critical and critical periods. The author looks at the role God plays in Kant’s practical philosophy. Comparing the positions of Kant and Wolff, the author finds many similarities between them. Chief of them is that although both thinkers saw the moral/natural law as universal and obligating regardless of a person’s faith in God, in fact faith in God turned out to be an inevitable consequence of the true moral attitude of the individual.

The article concerns the main lines of reception of the philosophical ideas of B. Spinoza. Estimates of the work of this thinker, his role and importance have undergone significant changes in the course of the development of Western European and Russian philosophical thought. It focuses on the study of the transformations occurred in the approach and nature of evaluations of the main philosophical ideas of Spinoza in the Western European philosophical space, primarily in Germany and France. At the same time, we can state that the peak of interest in the philosophy of Spinoza in these national traditions seriously diverges in time. Initially, we can talk about the predominance of interest in Spinoza’s philosophy on the part of German-speaking thinkers. For a long time, Spinoza’s philosophy was characterized as atheistic and, in connection with this, was subjected to fierce criticism. It is the German enlighteners who are credited with reviving interest in Spinoza’s philosophy at a new level. At the same time, the philosophical views of this thinker not only cease to be assessed as atheistic, but are sometimes perceived in the exact opposite way - as imbued with genuine religious faith. F. Schleiermacher can be considered here as a striking example of such an approach to Spinoza’s philosophy. In the future, interest in Spinoza’s philosophy was maintained in the German-speaking philosophical space due to the reception of his ideas by Hegel, Feuerbach, and Neo-Kantians. In French-language philosophy, interest in Spinoza wakes up much later - in the middle-second half of the 20th century, which is associated primarily with such name as Deleuze. However, this “French Renaissance” of Spinoza’s philosophy can be considered as no less significant than the Renaissance of the age of German Enlightenment. It was “French Spinozism” that brought the study of Spinoza’s philosophy to the international level, significantly expanding their conceptual framework.

The article consider the concept of religious pluralism by M. Mendelssohn and some aspects of his theory of knowledge and linguistic theory, lying in the foundation of the pluralism concept. The article shows that Mendelssohn expressed views that are far ahead of his time. His theory of knowledge repeats some lines of Hume's philosophy, which he praised highly, what was not characteristic of the German Enlightenment as a whole. By virtue of this, Mendelssohn can be considered as Kant's predecessor in a positive assessment of Hume. Some of Mendelssohns ideas are further developed in phenomenology. The author argues that Mendelssohns views on the interaction of religions, although they have a number of features that make this thinker related to other thinkers of the Enlightenment, also have a fundamental difference with them. As a result, his religious pluralism concept is close to the modern understanding of religious pluralism. The author also attempts to reveal the reasons why Mendelssohn, despite his great significance for both German philosophy and Jewish culture, was almost forgotten for a long time.

The ethics of Kant and the ethics of Crusius are strikingly similar. This is manifested in a whole range of principles and concepts. Crusius’ moral teaching hinges on the rigorous moral law which has to be obeyed absolutely, and which makes it different from other prescriptions that are binding only to a relative degree. This is very close to the Kantian distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives. Another salient feature of Crusius’ moral teaching is the stress laid on the sphere of internal motives. It is the inner motive that determines the morality of an act, rather than the external form of the act. These and some other features of Crusius’ ethics suggest a possible influence of Crusius on Kant. The possibility of such influence has repeatedly come under close scrutiny. The first works devoted to this problem date to the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Pointers to the possibility of such influence are semantic and structural similarities of the two thinkers’ systems. Besides, it is an unchallengeable fact that Kant was fairly familiar with the main theses of Crusian philosophy. Some scholars proceed from the study of Kantian vocabulary. Some of the terms Kant uses, especially in his early works which later formed the basis of his ethical teaching in the critical period, can be traced to the terms of Crusian philosophy. However, an alternative view is that Kant was primarily influenced by Wolffian philosophy (mainly through Baumgarten), while the direct influence of Crusius remains unproven. I examine both points of view and propose my own solution to the problem.

The article concerns the reception of practical philosophy of Kant in general and the doctrine of the postulates of the practical reason in particular in Russia in the 18th and the first half of the 19th century. Author analyzes the views on Kant’s philosophy of the most representative Russian thinkers and attempts to answer the question why the way practical philosophy of Kant and his postulates of the existence of God and immortality of soul were interpreted in Russia was rather negative and hostile.

The article concerns one of the principal and most important concepts of Kant’s philosophy, namely the concept of postulate. Kant’s understanding of this term differs from the previous tradition. For Kant, postulates are originally subjective propositions necessarily supposed as objective ones. Otherwise, systematic theoretical cognition and compliance with the moral law become impossible. However, this peculiarity of Kant’s terminology is often ignored, which causes misunderstanding of the role and functions of Kant’s doctrine of postulates as a whole.