Luigi Perissinotto

This book explores Wittgenstein's conception of ethics, religion and philosophy. It aims at providing us with the tools necessary for assessing to what extent the Austrian philosopher can be considered an anti-Enlightenment thinker. The articles collected in this volume explore the relationship between Wittgenstein's thought and that of several authors who were, in various ways, key to the counter-enlightenement, authors such as Hume, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Tolstoy, James and Pierce. One of the central issues examined here is Wittgenstein's opposition to the Cartesian method of doubt a cornerstone of the enlightened movement against prejudice and superstition."

The essay has as its main theme proposition 6.5 of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-philosophicus and, in particular, its second paragraph "The riddle does not exist". In the first section, the notion of riddle is compared with that of problem, emphasising, among other things, the great relevance that, for Wittgenstein, the distinction between problems of philosophy and problems of natural science has; in the second, an attempt is made to clarify the meaning that Wittgenstein assigns to the word “riddle”: a riddle would be a question “in the void”, without any “direction”, that is, so to speak, a question that does not know what it is asking. This means that, even if it presents itself as a question, the riddle is a non-question. The third section highlights how the denial that there is the enigma is complementary to the denial, so characteristic of the Tractatus, that there are a priori true thoughts or propositions.

This essay analyses some remarks of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty in which Wittgenstein compares human behaviour to that of animals and says he wants to consider man as an animal. The essay’s main purpose is to show that these remarks are essentially understood as part and parcel of what Wittgenstein calls “conceptual investigations” and that, consequently, they give little support to On Certainty’s naturalistic interpretations. A second purpose of the essay is to show that Wittgenstein does not intend to combat the use of “I know” in contexts such as those evoked by Moore; rather he wants to draw attention to the different ways in which we say or can say “I know.”

The article sheds light on some points of convergence between Rorty’s theoretical proposal to reject systematic and foundational philosophy favoring a “post-Philosophy” and Gargani’s idea of knowledge without foundations. In particular, the article argues how Gargani’s interpretation of Rorty’s thought is in line with Gargani’s critique of universal and ahistorical rationality in favor of naturalized anthropology, expressing in a praxis that, although without foundations, is not an expression of irrationality. The last part of the article highlights some differences between Gargani and Rorty on the possibility of adopting some different facets of Heidegger’s thought.

This chapter serves as an introduction to a carefully planned research and mutually curated volume on the relationship between Pop art initiator Eduardo Paolozzi and celebrity philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. Mantoan and Perissinotto argue that this peculiar encounter between an artist and a philosopher—both as a man and as far as his philosophy is concerned—was a “kind of happening”, which took place years before the generation of future conceptual artists had even entered art school. Not only was Paolozzi the first and perhaps still is the only artist who devoted a substantial part of his oeuvre to the Austrian philosopher, but his works also impress even a philosophically qualified audience for the level of expertise and intuitiveness with which the writings of Wittgenstein are handled. Hence, Mantoan and Perissinotto pursue a twofold aim: on the one side, to present the artist Paolozzi as a precursor in reading Wittgenstein in the field of contemporary art, influencing or forestalling the then upcoming generation of conceptual artists; on the other side, to demonstrate how the reader Paolozzi may even be seen as a precursor as regards the interpretation of Wittgenstein’s philosophy.

This chapter argues that Wittgenstein wasn’t a mere pretext for Paolozzi and that it is impossible to fully understand the artist’s work without considering his relationship to the Austrian philosopher. Furthermore, Paolozzi—as an artist—recognized various aspects of Wittgenstein’s thought and let them come to light in a period when they were still concealed to the majority of interpreters with a philosophical background. In this sense, Perissinotto demonstrates that Paolozzi’s work fully belongs to the general story of Wittgenstein’s critical reception. In order to do so, the chapter attempts a reconstruction of the cultural environment where Paolozzi met Wittgenstein, meant both as the general philosophical reception of Wittgenstein in the 1950s and 1960s, as well as Paolozzi’s direct testimony on his encounter with the Austrian philosopher. Eventually, Perissinotto systematically analyses several “wittgensteinian” works of Paolozzi to understand how much of these works is borrowed from Wittgenstein, but also what of Wittgenstein and which Wittgenstein lives and acts in them.

This impressive edited collection investigates the relationship between British Pop Art pioneer Eduardo Paolozzi and the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. At this time, when Paolozzi’s oeuvre is in the process of being rediscovered, his long-time fascination with Wittgenstein requires thorough exploration, as it discloses a deeper understanding of his artistic production, further helping to reassess the philosopher’s actual impact on visual arts and its theory in the second half of the 20th century. With 13 diverse and comprehensive chapters, bringing together philosophers and art historians, this volume aims at retracing and pondering the influence of Wittgenstein on the idea of art in Paolozzi, thus giving an unprecedented insight into Wittgenstein’s philosophy as employed by contemporary artists.

_ Source: _Volume 6, Issue 2-3, pp 143 - 164 In §513 of _On Certainty_ Wittgenstein asks “What if something _really unheard-of_ happened?” But with this question he is not asking us to make a forecast, a prediction, or some sort of empirico-psychological prophecy about our possible reactions. As I will attempt to show, the question regarding the unheard-of is part of Wittgenstein’s philosophical method—which is to say, it is one of the instruments with which he combats what he sees as the principal source of the confusions of philosophy: mistaking the grammatical for the empirical or, as he also says, the conceptual for the factual. In this sense the question regarding the unheard-of can shed some light on the grammatical status of what he calls “hinges.”

In some sections of On Certainty, Wittgenstein uses the term “persuasion,” pitting it, on the one hand, against “giving reasons”, and comparing it, on the other, to conversion, while, finally, defining it as “giving someone one's own picture of the world.” In this essay, I analyse these sections, in an effort to fit them into the broader context of On Certainty, and to clarify the meaning and the limits of the comparison between persuasion and conversion. My aim is to show that persuasion as Wittgenstein understands it here is quite similar to what we could call “re-education.”