Luis Gonzalez

We show that Wiredu’s result in [26] is not the doom for connexive set theories, not even for those based in logics similar to CC1, one of the original target logics. For this purpose, we present the necessary assumptions for Wiredu’s proof, making some precisions on the connexive requirements. Then we present a non-reflexive variant of CC1 in which Wiredu’s proof can be blocked. Finally, we discuss the prospects of a connexive set theory based on both the non-reflexive and non-transitive variants of CC1, which, even assuming non-triviality, are not very rosy.

This article investigates the intersection between the medical condition of lovesickness and the social phenomenon of rape. While rape in medieval culture has been studied through the disciplinary lens of gender studies, theology, sociology, and legal theory, the influence of medical epistemology on these reprehensible acts of violence has been overlooked. The advent of the branch of knowledge known as medical humanities allows us to fill in this gap by looking into the clinical treatises that circulated widely in medieval Europe and served as curricula in medieval universities. This article argues that because intercourse with the beloved was recommended as therapy for lovesickness in the medical texts on the disease, such texts did more than inform physicians and natural philosophers about the causes, effects, and treatments for this dangerous condition, but helped normalize the hypersexuality of melancholic, lovesick men and, in so doing, provided hermeneutic tools for defending and justifying sexual aggressions. Under these circumstances, women’s bodies were perceived and treated as mere medicinal objects for healing men’s sickness and saving men’s lives.

Following the strategy in [15] to develop inconsistent models for relevant arithmetics, we formulate a connexive variant of arithmetic by replacing the conditional of RM3 with the Belikov–Loginov conditional. We obtain thus the connexive logic cRM3 which serves as a base logic for arithmetics cRM3$^{i}$, cRM3$^{i\sharp }$, cRM$^{\sharp }$, cRMn$^{i}$, and cRM$^\omega $. We compare these with their counterparts RM3$^{i\sharp }$, RM$^{\sharp }$ and $\mathbf{RM}^\omega$ that extend relevant arithmetic $\mathbf{R}^\sharp$.

Mortensen introduced a connexive logic commonly known as 'M3V'. M3V is obtained by adding a special conditional to LP. Among its most notable features, besides its being connexive, M3V is negation-inconsistent and it validates the negation of every conditional. But Mortensen has also studied and applied extensively other non-connexive logics, for example, closed set logic, CSL, and a variant of Sette's logic, identified and called 'P2' by Marcos. In this paper, we analyze and compare systematically the connexive variants of CSL and P2, obtained by adding the M3V conditional to them. Our main observations are two. First, that the inconsistency of M3V is exacerbated in the connexive variant of closed set logic, while it is attenuated in the connexive variant of the Sette-like P2. Second, that the M3V conditional is, unlike other conditionals, "connexively stable", meaning that it remains connexive when combined with the main paraconsistent negations.

Realist dialetheism is the view that there are contradictions in reality. One argument against this idea says that it is impossible because it has to make room for the possibility of a trivial reality, which is metaphysically impossible. Another argument against it says that the metaphysical structure of reality is such that it is impossible to have contradictions in it. I argue here that both arguments fail to establish the impossibility of realist dialetheism because they are based on a misconception about the notions of negation and contradiction, which leads them, in the first case, to wrongly hold that dialetheism has to be compatible with trivialism, and, in the second case, to assume that the validity of the Aristotelian principle of non-contradiction prevents the existence of dialetheias

Really full blooded platonism (RFBP) is aimed to achieve a complete picture of the mathematical landscape by accepting inconsistent mathematics. I distinguish various senses of completeness relevant to the debate and argue that the move to inconsistency-tolerance might not be enough to achieve a complete picture of the mathematical landscape in any of those senses, for there is positive reason to endorse a richer Platonism with place for trivial parts in the mathematical landscape. © 2017 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

According to common wisdom, the connective tonk defined by Prior trivializes any theory that contains it. However, it should not be forgotten that whether an argument holds or not depends to a large extent on the underlying notion of logical consequence. Logical consequence is usually assumed to be Tarskian, that is, reflexive, transitive and monotonic. However, Belnap had already conjectured that tonk might not be so problematic in a non-transitive logic, which Cook finally proved in 2005. In this paper we improve on Cook’s result in two ways: our hypothesis is simpler (namely, we use fewer interpretations than he did and we do not rely on a disjunctive consequence relation) and it is not ad hoc (namely, our working consequence relation is not designed merely to avoid triviality under tonk).

Científicos del sistema Tierra han demostrado que el planeta es un sistema adaptativo-complejo y que algunos procesos naturales ya no operan en condiciones seguras para preservar la vida. Destaca que poco se ha hecho por explorar las implicaciones en la arena jurídica para responder ante los retos que estas condiciones presuponen para la vida humana y para nuestra supervivencia como especie. Aquí se sostiene que, para mantener el buen funcionamiento planetario, se requiere de una articulación efectiva entre el razonamiento jurídico, su argumentación y la ciencia del sistema Tierra. Al hacer una exploración de la literatura jurídica y del sistema Tierra, este artículo tiene como objetivo exponer el primer esfuerzo sobre cómo debería adaptarse el razonamiento jurídico y su argumentación a un enfoque del sistema Tierra, utilizando para ello diferentes casos de estudio, resoluciones y tesis jurisprudenciales. Al hacerlo, se exhibe la necesidad de erradicar concepciones erróneas subyacentes al antropocentrismo jurídico, para ajustar la interpretación y aplicación del derecho a realidades ecológicas científicamente más precisas.

This article explores medical responsibility and negligence from an ethical and legal perspective within the Colombian context. It highlights causes of negligence such as deficiencies in professional training and organizational problems. The article emphasizes "objective imputation as key to determining the criminal responsibility of the physician" (Alvarado D. 2019). The objectives include analyzing the current legal framework in Colombia and assessing the link between medical ethics and legal responsibility. The methodology builds upon a thorough examination of specialized literature, including peer-reviewed scientific articles in medicine and law, as well as legal documents and ethical regulations. A targeted search was conducted across various bibliographic databases including Google Scholar, Redalyc, Scielo, Dialnet, Biomed Central, Miguel De Cervantes Virtual Library, and BVS virtual health library.

Logic is an excellent tool for reasoning about most philosophical topics, including logical issues themselves. Discussions about the validity or otherwise of certain principles have been widespread throughout the history of logic. This chapter exemplifies that with the analysis of the debate surrounding connexive logics. In connexive logics, certain principles involving mainly negation and implication hold good, whereas they are not valid in most well-known logics. Despite their intuitiveness, the connexive principles quickly lead to contradictions and even to triviality, i.e. to the truth of every proposition. This chapter surveys the main arguments against the connexive principles and discusses some prospects for challenging those arguments and endorsing the connexive principles.

En esta nota crítica (i) se hace una breve descripción de cada uno de los artículos que componen Orayen: de la forma lógica al significado, (ii) se señalan algunas cuestiones que no están claras en ellos o en las réplicas de Orayen y, (iii) en la medida de lo posible, se indica si los autores desarrollan ulteriormente los problemas abordados en sus artículos. The aim of this critical note is threefold: (i) it briefly describes and comments on each of the articles of Orayen: de la forma lógica al significado; (ii) identifies some issues that may not be clear enough or not fully developed whether in the articles or even in Orayen's replies; (iii) as far as possible, it refers to further studies made by the authors themselves on the same, or quite related, subjects addressed by them in their papers

Seen from the point of view of evaluation conditions, a usual way to obtain a connexive logic is to take a well-known negation, for example, Boolean negation or de Morgan negation, and then assign special properties to the conditional to validate Aristotle’s and Boethius’ Theses. Nonetheless, another theoretical possibility is to have the extensional or the material conditional and then assign special properties to the negation to validate the theses. In this paper we examine that possibility, not sufficiently explored in the connexive literature yet.We offer a characterization of connexive negation disentangled from the cancellation account of negation, a previous attempt to define connexivity on top of a distinctive negation. We also discuss an ancient view on connexive logics, according to which a valid implication is one where the negation of the consequent is incompatible with the antecedent, and discuss the role of our idea of connexive negation for this kind of view.

En The paradox of Addition and its dissolution (1969), Mario Bunge presenta algunos argumentos para mostrar que la Regla de Adición puede ocasionar paradojas o problemas semánticos. Posteriormente, Margáin (1972) y Robles (1976) mostraron que las afirmaciones de Bunge son insostenibles, al menos desde el punto de vista de la lógica clásica. Aunque estamos de acuerdo con las críticas de Margáin y Robles, no estamos de acuerdo en el diagnóstico del origen del problema y tampoco con la manera en la que se proponen solucionarlo. En esta medida, en este texto mostraremos cómo la Regla de Adición sí trae problemas semánticos que pueden ser planteados desde diferentes perspectivas contemporáneas, como la extensionalidad del condicional, los principios proscriptivos y la validez conexiva.

Five major stances on the problems of the possibility and fruitfulness of a debate on the principle of non-contradiction (PNC) are described: Detractors, fierce supporters, demonstrators, methodologists and calm supporters. We show what calm supporters have to say on the other parties wondering about the possibility and fruitfulness of a debate on PNC. The main claim is that one can find all the elements of calm supporters already in Aristotle’s works. In addition, we argue that the Aristotelian refutative strategy, originally used for dealing with detractors of PNC in Metaphysics, has wider implications for the possibility and fruitfulness of an up-to-date debate on PNC, at least in exhibiting some serious difficulties for the other parties.