Luis Lopez-Farjeat

This chapter presents the similarities and differences between human and nonhuman animals in order to provide a proper characterization of what it means to be a human being according to two major Islamic philosophers, Alfarabi and Avicenna. The first section explains the characteristics of sense perception and intellectual knowledge, introducing a relevant aspect that will serve to distinguish between human and nonhuman animals, that is, self-awareness (_al-shuʿūr bi-al-dhāt_); the second section deals with the capacity to articulate language among human and even some nonhuman animals; the third section discusses the characterization of human beings as _zôon politikon_ (_hayawān madanī_), defining in which sense this feature is essential to human nature. Finally, the chapter offers some concluding remarks regarding the notion of “human being” in the Islamic philosophical tradition.

The _Book of Job_ remains one of the most profound and unsettling texts in religious and philosophical thought, raising timeless questions about suffering, justice, and the human relationship with the divine. _Philosophical and Theological Perspectives on the Figure of Job_ brings together a diverse collection of essays that explore Job’s narrative from multiple perspectives—philosophical, theological, comparative, and literary—without reducing its complexity or imposing a singular interpretation.

En su conocida obra sobre Filón de Alejandría, Harry A. Wolfson sostiene que la filosofía filónica es el preámbulo de las “filosofías religiosas” de las tres tradiciones abrahámicas. Entre varias coincidencias y similitudes entre Filón y cada una de las filosofías religiosas, Wolfson destaca una particularmente importante: las tres tradiciones vieron en sus respectivas Escrituras dos significados, uno literal ( ῥητή o φανερά ) y otro oculto (ὑπόνοια). Cada una de estas tradiciones filosóficas buscó —a su manera— un método alegórico de interpretación. Dicho método lo aprendieron los Padres de la Iglesia directamente de Filón. Y de los Padres habría sido transmitido, según Wolfson, al islam y al judaísmo. La versión más difundida entre los historiadores e historiadoras de la filosofía ha sido que, en realidad, ni el islam ni el judaísmo tuvieron contacto directo con Filón. Podría hablarse en todo caso de una influencia indirecta. A pesar de las ambigüedades al respecto, este artículo pretende elucidar las posibles similitudes entre las nociones de ῥητή o φανερά y ὑπόνοια y sus equivalentes árabes, _ẓāhir _y _bāṭin_.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Averroes on Intellect: From Aristotelian Origins to Aquinas’s Critique by Stephen R. OgdenLuis Xavier López-FarjeatStephen R. Ogden. Averroes on Intellect: From Aristotelian Origins to Aquinas’s Critique. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. Pp. 296. Hardback, $90.00.Stephen Ogden’s book is a remarkable contribution to one of the most controversial topics within the tradition of interpreters of Aristotle’s De anima. As is well known, Aristotle defines the intellect (nous) as “the part of the soul by which it knows and thinks” (DA III.4, 429a9– 10). This doctrine of the intellect becomes rather obscure in DA III.5, where Aristotle states that there is a passive intellect that needs to be actualized through an active intellect. This passage contains, perhaps, the most debated statement in Aristotelian psychology. Aristotle argues that the passive or potential intellect is the part of the soul that, in a sense, becomes all things as it knows them. The intellect, however, has another aspect: in a sense, it makes all things. This is what Aristotle calls the “active” or “agent” intellect. This characterization is fairly ambiguous: it is separable (chôristos), separated (chôristheis), not passive (apathês), unmixed (amigês), and it is essentially an activity (têi ousiai energeia); furthermore, it is immortal (athanaton), eternal (aidion), and always thinking.According to Alexander of Aphrodisias’s interpretation, Aristotle holds that since the human intellect is in potency, its actualization needs the intervention of an intellect that is always thinking, namely, the active intellect. Alexander associates the active or agent intellect (poiêtikos nous) with the divine intellect and divine intellection as it appears in Aristotle’s Metaphysics XII.9, 1074b33–35, another famous passage where Aristotle describes the first mover as thought thinking itself. A long tradition of interpreters and commentators, both ancient and medieval, discussed whether Aristotle held that the actualization of the potential intellect came from an external intellect—be it God (as Alexander thought) or another kind of separate intellect (as was the case for Islamic philosophers such as al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Averroes), or whether Aristotle was referring to two aspects within a single human intellect (as Thomas Aquinas held, for instance).As its title indicates, Ogden’s book focuses on Averroes, a Muslim philosopher who proposed one of the most puzzling interpretations of the Aristotelian doctrine of the intellect. It is puzzling, perhaps false, and even absurd, because it holds that “the intellect that understands intelligible concepts is a single, separate, eternal substance shared by [End Page 659] all humanity”(1). Strange as it may seem, this position—which Ogden calls the “unicity thesis” (1)—was among the most debated in the Jewish and Christian traditions throughout the medieval period and the Renaissance. But beyond detailing the mere reception and historical assimilation of Averroes’s doctrine, Ogden takes on the task of arguing for its philosophical coherence. It is not a simple task. One might think that, rather than helping to clarify Aristotle’s theory, Averroes made it more complicated. If it is already difficult to understand the Aristotelian definition of the active intellect and to decide whether it is a separate intellect or part of the soul, Averroes seems to make things worse by arguing that the active or agent intellect (in Latin, intellectus agens or intelligentia agens; in Arabic, ‘aql al-fa“āl) and the so-called material or possible intellect (intellectus materialis; ‘aql hayūlānī) are both single, separate, and eternal intellects.As is well known, and as Ogden himself explains, Thomas Aquinas criticized the idea of two separate intellects (passive and active) and provided an account that is in principle satisfactory, according to which the two intellects are intellectual powers of each person’s soul. There is an enormous amount of scholarly literature evaluating the merits of Thomas Aquinas’s refutation of Averroes and his followers. But as Ogden notices, few scholars— among them, Richard C. Taylor, Jean-Baptiste Brenet, Deborah Black, and Josep Puig—have pointed out that the two philosophers begin their discussions with different assumptions. In my view, one of the greatest merits of Ogden’s book is that, as far as I...

This article explores the tensions between different conceptions of “citizenship.” On the one hand, we point out the virtues and limitations of cosmopolitan citizenship in the terms in which Seyla Benhabib understands it in The Right of Others…; on the other hand, we delve into another notion of citizenship, namely, the localist, in a version that could be at odds with some cosmopolitan values, that is, localism as understood by some Mexican autonomous communities, particularly the Zapatistas. Although Benhabib’s cosmopolitan federalism is inclusive in spirit, it is conceived within a preponderantly global perspective and ends up being asymmetrical. While her proposal has some positive aspects, it faces some difficulties in the case of Mexican autonomous communities. In this article, we shall introduce the notion of democratic confederalism as a form of sociopolitical organization that seeks to strengthen the self-organization of social actors and to recognize the practice of citizenship in the terms in which autonomous communities exercise it. We propose that democratic confederalism could be an alternative for decreasing tensions between global citizenship and the idea of citizenship within autonomous communities.

La noción de Witz tiene su origen en Shafiesbury y, posteriormente, en Kant y en Fichte. El genio es el puente de unión entre la aparente contradicción de la naturaleza con la libertad y, gracias a esta importante función es el único que logra conciliar la armonía helénica con la desarmonía romántica. Desde este planteamiento el autor intenta mostrar: primero, la configuración del genio desde las nociones de naturaleza y libertad (Kant); segundo, la posible conciliación efectuada por el genio entre el espíritu helénico y el espíritu romántico, que no es otra cosa que la esencia de la poesía moderna (Schlegel, Goethe); tercero, una conciliación aparente que culmina, más bien, con la frustración y el desengaño del genio, que se vuelve, según la terminología hegeliana, "conciencia infeliz" (Hegel).

In In I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, aa. 1-3 Thomas Aquinas deals with divine simplicity and the predication of the divine attributes. There, he seems to take some distance from Avicenna, specifically when Avicenna avers that God lacks a quiddity. However, in the Summa theologiae Aquinas assumes, as he previously does both in In I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 1 and in De ente et essentia, that there is an identity between the essentia/quiddity and the esse in God, while this statement would also be held by Avicenna. I will show how back to the Commentary on the Sentences Aquinas has detected the existing tension between the two thesis held by Avicenna, and I will also analyze the way in which he addresses both these theses.

The aim of this article is to revisit Clement of Alexandria’s Paedagogus 2.5.45-8 discussing whether Clement holds a moderate position οf laughter or, like most early Christians, tends to an “antigelastic” position. Some scholars, such as Stephen Halliwell and Laura Rizzerio, have concluded that Clement holds an intermediate position between an optimistic approach to laughter and its condemnation. However, in this essay we argue that while Clement’s position is not a straightforward antigelastic one, his apparent acceptance of laughter is so narrow that his moderate view ends up being compromised. Ultimately, he is strongly inclined to condemn laughter and to prescribe an ascetic life devoid of laughter.

La Epístola sobre los sueños (Risala al-Manamiyya) es un breve tratado donde Avicena se ocupa de algunas consideraciones relevantes acerca del modo en que se suscitan la profecía y la adivinación a través de los sueños. La teoría que aparece en dicho tratado ilustra con precisión cuán intrincada es la teoría de la profecía de Avicena y, al mismo tiempo, aporta varias pistas para reconocer el origen de dicha teoría tal como aparece en tratados mayores como fī al-Nafs e Ilahiyat de la Šifa’. La Risala al-Manamiyya también nos permite reconocer el impacto de varias influencias provenientes de la tradición griega, principalmente de Aristóteles, Galeno, Plotino, y otros Neoplatónicos. Este artículo explica las teorías de la adivinación a través de los sueños y de la profecía tal como aparecen en la versión árabe del De divinatione per somnun, un tratado donde pueden encontrarse los orígenes de la teoría de la profecía de Avicena. Además, muestra el impacto que la teoría contenida en este trabajo tuvo en la Risala al-Manamiyya. Finalmente, expone algunas consideraciones concernientes a la transmisión y adaptación de los planteamientos metafísicos que aparecen tanto en el De divinatione como en la Risāla al-Manāmiyya, aludiendo al impacto que ambas obras tuvieron en las teorías de la profecía que encontramos en los tratados mayores de Avicena.

Se discute cómo pueden dos filósofos islámicos sostener que la generación del cuerpo es necesaria para que se origine el alma y, al mismo tiempo, afirmar que ésta puede separarse del cuerpo, ya sea transformándose en un intelecto inmaterial ‒en el caso de al-Fārābī‒, o bien en un alma individuada e inmortal ‒en el caso de Avicena. El primero es cercano al hilemorfismo peripatético; el segundo adopta un dualismo robusto. Se argumenta que la integración de la cosmología, la biología y la noética conduce, en ambos casos, a una reconciliación coherente entre el origen natural del alma y su inmaterialidad.

La propuesta sobre el objetivo supremo del ser humano ofrecida por Avempache —filósofo y comentador aristotélico—, consiste en la unión absoluta de ambos: el intelecto-alma del sujeto y el intelecto agente, éste caracterizado por ser uno, separado, eterno, además de que contiene en sí las formas espirituales universales de todas las cosas. Por esta razón la inmaterialidad del alma así como su inmortalidad están garantizadas, debido a la absoluta espiritualidad del intelecto. Es por la corrupción dada en las sociedades y prácticas políticas que el objetivo final es alcanzado mediante la mejor manera de vivir, la cual consiste en soledad y reflexión; sólo de esta manera se adquiere la más alta perfección. Después de comprender la relevancia que Avempache asigna al intelecto agente, Alberto Magno negó la posibilidad de la unión con el intelecto mencionado, debido a la abolición de toda pluralidad así como la disolución de toda individualidad.

El presente número de Tópicos se ha dedicado al intercambio cultural y filosófico entre árabes y latinos. Los artículos que aquí se reúnen pretenden introducir al lector a la filosofía árabe-islámica en la que destacan no sólo la traducción y glosa de Aristóteles sino también una filosofía verdaderamente propia. Algunos de los artículos que aquí se ofrecen tratan sobre lo que los árabes-islámicos entendían por filosofía; otros, sobre la psicología de Averroes, Avempache, y Al Farabi, entre otros, fuertemente influenciada por el estudio crítico del De Anima.

El autor ofrece una interpretación hegeliana de Metafísica XII, 7, 1072b 18-30, pasaje con el que concluye la Enciclopedia de las Ciencias Filosóficas. Se trazan aquí las relaciones y similitudes que existen entre el Motor Inmóvil de Aristóteles y el Absoluto de Hegel. Para comprender en qué puntos coinciden ambos pensadores al describir el pensamiento divino, resulta de suma importancia analizar las nociones de pensamiento, movimiento, potencia, acto, concepto, objeto, sustancia material, sustancia formal y sustancia suprasensible. El giro interpretativo que hace Hegel de la Metafísica y la lectura comparada que aquí se ofrece, apuntan hacia una mejor comprensión de la naturaleza del Motor Inmóvil y el Absoluto.

Esta introducción explica el impacto que las tradiciones judía e islámica tuvieron en la fi losofía medieval, así como el intercambio intelectual que existió entre las tradiciones abrahámicas. El papel de la tradición islámica fue particularmente importante, ya que las teorías e ideas fi losófi - cas de pensadores como Avicena, Averroes, Avempace, y otros, fueron discutidas y con frecuencia reinterpretadas, adaptadas y adoptadas por muchos teólogos y fi lósofos cristianos y judíos, quienes recurrieron a ellas para utilizarlas de distintas formas y en discusiones diversas, tal como se muestra en la presentación de cada uno de los artículos que conforman este volumen.

The Arabic tradition knew Alexander’s treatises On Fate and On Providence. Alexander criticizes the Stoic determinism with some peripatetic arguments. In those treatises we can find, at least, two positions: the peripatetic and “libertarian” position represented by Alexander, and Stoic determinism. A very similar discussion can be found in Islamic tradition. As S. Van den Bergh has insisted, Islamic theological schools had some Stoic influences. One of the issues in which we can find some common views is, precisely, the problem of determinism and free will. The aim of this paper is to show that the kasb (acquisition)doctrine of the Islamic theologians Asharites is very similar to Stoic determinism in its compatibilist version: both, Stoics and Asharites, conceive a causal network established by the fate or the providence. From this point of view we have to discuss which is the true agent of the natural and human acts that happen in this world. If the providence guides every act, the natural causality and the free will should be denied. On the one hand, I will present some arguments from the most representative Asharite theologian, al-Ghazali, to support a kind of compatibilist determinism; from the other hand, I will evaluate Averroes peripatetic arguments against determinism. Is Averroes more consistent than Alexander or do we have to conclude that al-Ghazali and the Asharites have stronger arguments in order to support the kasb doctrine?

In Albert’s De anima III, 3, chapters 6–11 there is a discussion on whether the human intellect is able to apprehend only forms abstracted from matter or whether it is possible for it to know something separated from magnitude. If the human intellect is able to understand separate forms, this would mean that some forms are not apprehended with phantasms and magnitude but by the conjunction of the possible intellect and the separate intellect. This matter is quite problematic since it is not clear enough whether separate forms are known through the perfect conjunction of the possible intellect and the agent intellect or by means of the agent intellect which acts both as efficient and formal cause of these forms. Here, I focus on chapter 8 where Albert criticizes Avempace’s doctrine of the intellect, and chapter 11 where he states a resolution to the problem, which is very close to that of Averroes. This exploration illustrates the complexity of the relationship between the philosophies of Albert and Averroes.

Resumen: En De interpretatione Aristóteles distingue entre voces articuladas e inarticuladas. Mientras que la voz articulada se compone de una combinación de vocales y consonantes, la voz inarticulada equivale a cualquier sonido emitido por animales no humanos. Sin embargo, al-Fārābī cuestiona esta visión. En su Gran Comentario a De Interpretatione, corrige la postura de Aristóteles y desarrolla una argumentación que toma en cuenta algunas consideraciones sobre el comportamiento de los animales no humanos en algunos de los tratados de Aristóteles sobre los animales. Tras presentar la postura de al-Fārābī en torno al "lenguaje" en los animales no humanos, discuto brevemente hasta qué punto las capacidades de los animales no humanos para expresarse y comunicarse amplían nuestra comprensión de lo que podríamos entender por lenguaje.: In De Interpretatione Aristotle distinguishes between articulate and inarticulate voices. While articulate voices are a combination of vowels and consonants, inarticulate voices would be any sound uttered by non-human animals. Nevertheless, al-Fārābī debated this view. In his Long Commentary on the De Interpretatione, he amends Aristotle's position and develops an argumentation that takes into account some considerations regarding nonhuman animals' behavior found in Aristotle's treatises on animals. After presenting al-Fārābī's views concerning the "language" of non-human animals, I briefly discuss to what extent the capacities of non-human animals to express and communicate themselves broadens our comprehension of what we might understand by language.

The Arabic philosophical tradition played an important role in the formation of theological, philosophical and scientific thought in medieval Europe subsequent to the translations from Arabic into Latin in the 12th and 13th centuries. The influence of that Arabic classical rationalist tradition in works by al-Farabi, Avicenna, Averroes and the Liber de causis is evident in the thought of Thomas Aquinas, though the breadth and depth of that influence is often insufficiently noted and explained by scholars of Aquinas. This course focuses on the metaphysics, epistemology and psychology of Aquinas in the development of his philosophical conceptions of soul and intellect in the context of his use of sources in Aristotle and works by philosophers of the Arabic tradition, particularly Avicenna and Averroes. Readings are selected from writings from each of the four major periods of his career starting with his first major work, the Commentary on the Sentences. The course was planned to be taught at Marquette, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and the Universidad Panamericana as a hybrid course. That is, it was taught using online tools and resources and also in the classroom with face-to-face meetings once per week. And it was taught at Marquette, KU Leuven and the Universidad Panamericana simultaneously. On Thursdays students met online with video and audio for questions and discussion with Profs. Taylor, Robiglio and López-Farjeat and the student groups in Milwaukee, Leuven and Mexico City live.

This thematic introduction to classical Islamic philosophy focuses on the most prevalent philosophical debates of the medieval Islamic world and their importance within the history of philosophy. Approaching the topics in a comprehensive and accessible way in this new volume, Luis Xavier Lopez-Farjeat, one of the co-editors of The Routledge Companion to Islamic Philosophy, makes classical Islamic philosophy approachable for both the new and returning student of the history of philosophy, medieval philosophy, the history of ideas, classical Islamic intellectual history, and the history of religion. Providing readers with a complete view of the most hotly contested debates in the Islamic philosophical tradition, Lopez-Farjeat discusses the development of theology and philosophy during the ʿAbbāsid period, including the translation of Aristotle into Arabic, the philosophy and theology of Islamic revelation, logic and philosophy of language, philosophy of natural science, metaphysics, psychology and cognition, and ethics and political philosophy. This volume serves as an indispensable tool for teachers, students, and independent learners aiming to discover the philosophical problems and ideas that defined the classical Islamic world. Key Features - Offers readers a broad, thorough view of the history of Islamic philosophy by using a thematic approach. - Traces the dialogues between philosophers and theologians about important and controversial topics. - Offers both historical descriptions of the key debates in classical Islamic philosophy and current interpretations by contemporary scholars. - Includes extensive lists for further reading at the end of each chapter, directing curious students to the best avenues for further research.