Luis Rodrigues

The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated health resource scarcity in many countries. Due to the shortage of medical equipment, some health workers in Zimbabwe refused to provide health services until these needs were addressed. In this article, we analyse the case of withdrawal of services by health workers in Zimbabwe and contend that they were morally justified in doing this. To forward this thesis, we try for the first time to use the African values of partiality and social harmony to evaluate the morality of health workers striking during a pandemic. The first set of arguments, based on the African ethics of partiality, is divided into two sub-arguments: namely, that the health workers were justified in withdrawing medical services because they held special duties to their families which could be violated if they had provided health services without the use of protection, and that it is psychologically unrealistic to demand that health workers put their families at risk. The second set of arguments upholds that the actions of the health workers are grounded in the idea of Ubuntu/social harmony and, therefore, are morally justified. Finally, we contend that although our thesis implies some hierarchies, not only may these be morally justified, but they are also not necessarily incompatible with the ethical standards of equality, universality, and non-favouritism. Although the case of Zimbabwe serves as an illuminating example, the way we formulate this thesis indicates that the arguments can be generalized to similar settings.

The moral standing of combatants is a fundamental question in jus in bello: do combatants have the same moral standing in battle, irrespective of the side for which they are fighting? While the Zhuangzi does not explicitly address this question, it offers useful philosophical resources for addressing it. The Zhuangzian view contends that although, in principle, just cause would imply that combatants’ moral standing is unequal, they should nonetheless be treated equally in view of the manipulation and knowledge limitations that are characteristic of war.

This piece defends an integrative medicine approach to Medical AI, grounded in a Daoist perspective. Specifically, it draws on the Daoist classic Zhuangzi to argue that algorithms in medical AI should not be restricted to offering diagnoses and treatments from a Western medical perspective alone. Instead, medical AI should be prepared to provide patients with various forms of alternative medicine (such as Chinese medicine). This can significantly benefit public health and address the healthcare needs of a broader population.

This piece defends an integrative medicine approach to Medical AI, grounded in a Daoist perspective. Specifically, it draws on the Daoist classic _Zhuangzi_ to argue that algorithms in medical AI should not be restricted to offering diagnoses and treatments from a Western medical perspective alone. Instead, medical AI should be prepared to provide patients with various forms of alternative medicine (such as Chinese medicine). This can significantly benefit public health and address the healthcare needs of a broader population.

In this article, I argue from a Zhuangzian point of view in favour of using virtual reality to enhance athletes’ morality. I argue that the Zhuangzi implies that (a) transformation is an everyday fact of life, (b) human beings have a limited perspective of reality, and (c) this perspective can be enriched by combining one’s view of the world with others’ views of the world. In turn, I use these arguments to contend that technological moral enhancement with virtual reality in sports is morally justified.

In this article, I argue from a Zhuangzian point of view in favour of using virtual reality to enhance athletes’ morality. I argue that the Zhuangzi implies that (a) transformation is an everyday fact of life, (b) human beings have a limited perspective of reality, and (c) this perspective can be enriched by combining one’s view of the world with others’ views of the world. In turn, I use these arguments to contend that technological moral enhancement with virtual reality in sports is morally justified.

Some philosophers who are sceptical about the value of culture have contended that cultural practices that involve animal cruelty are not morally justified. To forward this position, these philosophers offer arguments grounded in intuition, harm, comparative weight and equality. They contend that cultural practices involving animal harm can be shown to be morally wrong simply by relying on a weak perspective that we should not harm others unnecessarily. In this article, I argue that this weak perspective on animals’ interests is insufficient to prescribe minority practices that involve animal cruelty as more morally relevant than the interest in culture. For their argument to be cogent, these philosophers need to rely on stronger assumptions. I then conclude by suggesting a path for debate that involves taking the claims of cultural groups seriously.

Há uma intuição perene em teoria do conhecimento segundo a qual o conhecimento é analisável. Grosso modo, supõe-se que o conceito conhecimento pode ser elucidado graças a conceitos mais primitivos e mais claros do que o próprio conceito de conhecimento. Esta perspectiva foi recentemente desafiada de forma severa por Timothy Williamson, o qual argumenta que não é possível encontrar-se uma análise conceptual verdadeira do conhecimento e que o próprio conceito de conhecimento é primitivo. Neste ensaio inspeccionamos essa teoria e algumas réplicas, concluindo que os argumentos de Williamson contra o projecto de análise do conhecimento somente colhem à luz de uma interpretação usual mas quanto a nós demasiado rígida do significado de ‘análise’. No final do ensaio submetemos uma interpretação alternativa de ‘análise’ que deixa em aberto a possibilidade de elucidar-se o conceito de conhecimento por essa via. O nosso derradeiro objectivo é mostrar as vantagens teóricas resultantes dessa possibilidade.

A topic in contemporary political philosophy that has received substantial attention recently is whether minorities have the right to mistreat nonhuman animals. Mostly the debate is focused on minority practices in the West, such as Muslim religious slaughtering. However, other minority contexts, especially Iberian ones, have been largely ignored. In this article, I place the Portuguese case study at the center of political philosophy debates and assess whether this cultural practice ought to be banned. I do this by looking at four arguments routinely used in these debates. These arguments are that Portuguese bullfighting ought to be allowed because it has an economic role in the community, it helps address social prejudice, it promotes friendship and, and allowing it is a way to be legally consistent. I reject the four arguments and defend that bullfighting, in the Portuguese case, should be banned.

Digital technology can improve individuals’ lives substantially. Nonetheless, not everyone has access to it. This fact poses the question: is there an obligation to enable access to digital technology for everyone? We respond to this question affirmatively in this article, taking a Zhuangzian point of view. Particularly, we uphold that from a Zhuangzian viewpoint, we have duties towards everyone who shares the same nature; resultantly, there is an obligation beyond borders to bring digital technology to everyone.

For various centuries, the question of whether natural law is normative or not has been posed. In contemporary legal philosophy, the scholar who is considered to be the main defender of natural law is the Catholic philosopher John Finnis. Finnis contends that natural law can provide a good account of normativity. However, is Finnis right? In this article, I aim at answering this question and I contend that, in broad terms, Finnis is correct in affirming that natural law can provide a good account of normativity.

European politicians have recently considered reintroducing conscription and have offered three main reasons for this, arguing that conscription is critical for (1) military readiness and deterrence, (2) respecting the social contract citizens have with their state, and (3) teaching civic values and patriotism. This article analyses these arguments and shows that they are false. While these arguments may have succeeded historically, warfare, conscription, and societies have changed, weakening these arguments.

Angolan Political Thought introduces anticolonial thinkers whose writings on colonialism and liberation have been instrumental in the formation of Angolan identity. It focuses on the political nature of these thinkers and how their work has impacted Angolan political reality. Luís Cordeiro-Rodrigues both introduces and critically analyzes the thought of Queen Njinga, Mário Pinto de Andrade, Agostinho Neto and Pepetela and systematically addresses five important topics in Angolan political thought. Firstly, it gives a general introduction to African political philosophy and explains the place of Angolan political thought in this. Secondly, it explains how different Angolan thinkers have conceptualized colonialism and its effects on the global Black community. Thirdly, the book surveys what key Angolan thinkers have identified as legitimate and effective tools of liberation and resistance from colonialism. For example, it addresses the place of poetry for liberation, as well as the justification for war against colonial powers. Fourth, this book will explain the different theories that Africa and, in particular, African identity, consists of. Finally, it will look at Angolan theories of distributive justice and compensation for historical injustices.

Are the existence of God and evil logically compatible? Philosophers have been dwelling on this question since the era of Ancient Greek philosophy. Most responses to this philosophical problem have come from a Western viewpoint. This article aims to answer this question by considering an African cosmological and ethical groundwork. Working conceptually within this cosmology and ethic, we argue that if the evil in the world is understood as a lesser evil, then a good God can plausibly allow evil to happen. This is the case because God preventing evil will lead to a worse state of affairs which will result in a worse world. Allowing a lesser evil is the best possible outcome. We assert that this view offers a better theory than the theodicy defended by some mainstream Western philosophers according to which a greater good is achieved through evil.

The rapid development of AI in recent years has brought the problem of AI's moral status to the fore. In this article, we combine Afro-communitarian ethics with a cognitive perspective and argue that some AI can hold a moral status to the extent that it can be both a subject and an object of communion. Further, different kinds of AI have different degrees of moral status, depending on their communal capacities. To demonstrate this, we show that AI can engage in moral behavior and be morally disposed to act in certain ways. We defend that this theory deserves consideration along with other theories of moral status.

Onde acaba a mente e começa o mundo? A pergunta solicita duas respostas standard. Alguns aceitam as fronteiras da pele e do cérebro e dizem que o que se encontra fora do corpo está fora da mente. Outros ficam impressionados por argumentos sugerindo que o significado das nossas palavras “simplesmente não está na cabeça”, sustentando que este externismo a respeito do significado leva a um externismo sobre a mente. Propomo-nos seguir uma terceira posição. Defendemos um tipo de externismo muito diferente: um externismo ativo baseado no papel ativo do ambiente orientando processos cognitivos.

There are concerns that participation in open science will lead to various forms of exploitation – of researchers and scholars in low‐income countries and under‐resourced institutions. This article defends a contrary thesis and demonstrates the exact ways the underexplored notions of communal relationships, human dignity and social justice – and the normative principles to which they give rise – grounded in African philosophy can usefully address critical concerns regarding exploitation in the sharing of research resources to facilitate open partnership/collaboration and reuse. Further research is required to study the specific roles different institutions can play in facilitating open practice and contribute towards establishing effective structures that can enhance equity and balance unfavourable power asymmetries.

The Gettier Problem (henceforth GP) is a milestone in contemporary epistemology. Half a century after the philosophical earthquake caused by the well-known Gettier article (1963), solutions continue to appear and the discussion resurfaces. Because we, like many, choose to adopt an optimistic stance towards the possibility of finding a plausible answer to the GP, in this paper we present an unconventional solution to solve it. Crucially, we argue that the only plausible and non-falsifiable definition of the propositional knowledge is the one given by an “open” formula that contains a placeholder or a “variable” – on the third necessary condition – which takes a value according to which, depending on the circumstances, is necessary and sufficient for epistemic success