Luis Vega-Reñón

Leaving aside the usual approach to deliberation as a private or simulated weighing, based on the traditional model for practical reasoning, normative logic and argumentation schemes, we aim to characterize deliberation as a particular instance of discursive interaction in the public arena in which information, options and preferences are evaluated and handled in order to achieve a decision or a practical resolution in a responsible and reasoned way; a crossroads between epistemic-discursive conditions and ethical-political programs.

In recent times, there have been different attempts to make an interesting use of the concept of script (as inherited from the fields of psychology and cognitive sciences) within argumentation theory. Although, in many cases, what we find under this label are computerized routines mainly used in e-learning collaborative proceses involving argumentation, either as an educational means or an educational goal, there are also other studies in which the concept of script plays a more theoretical role as the kind of commonly human cognitive structure that could account for the way in which argumentation might develop in ordinary language and ordinary settings. We aim at exploring these latter possibilities, differentiating between the global ascription of the script concept to argumentation practices as procedural and regulated actions from the somewhat more suggestive association between socially shared scripts (expected narratives, plausible sequences, customary experiences, etc.) and the way some enthymemes work from an interactive, rhetorical perspective. The concept of script could help us understand some more procedural than propositional aspects of the cognitive sets shared by arguer and audience and account for the communicative success of apparently defective argumentation

I propose to read Rhetoric as a presentation of the art of public discourse. I believe that in this sense its conception rests on three capital ideas, namely rhetoric is an antistrophos to dialectic; its function is not to persuade but to contemplate the available means of persuasion in each case; rhetoric is like some offshoot of dialectic and of ethical study which is rightly called politics. and vindicate the condition and quality of rhetoric as a fully entitled art of speech; places it in the realm of deliberative public discourse. Finally, a few notes about the topicality of some Aristotelian ideas in the debate on democracy and collective deliberation will lead to the conclusion that Aristotle, without being one of us, is one of ours.

En este artículo me propongo dos tareas. (1) Mostrar la singularidad de los paralogismos según Vaz Ferreira dentro de la tradición de las falacias, debida no sólo a su peculiar marco �psico-lógico� de planteamiento, sino a su concepción del paralogismo como un proceso o estado de confusión y una fuente de errores mentales y cognitivos antes que discursivos. (2) Trasladar esta idea al campo actual de la argumentación para aprovechar su poder de sugerencia, pues la contribución de Vaz Ferreira no se limita a la lúcida exploración e ilustración del paralogismo como una dimensión del discurrir falaz, antes de él apenas entrevista. Además abunda en propuestas dignas de tenerse en cuenta en nuestras discusiones actuales en torno a la argumentación falaz

The main aims of this paper are two: first, to show that the current situation of History of Logic is far from being satisfactory, and second, to put forward a programme for its improvement. To this end it is as well, I think, to take into account a new conceptual and historiographical approach to growth of Iogic as a discipline, some basic notions in this regard -e.g., the notion of being a contribution to develop ment of Iogic-, and some others compIementary aspects, commonly neglected by the History of Logic scholars.

Hoy estamos asistiendo a un creciente interés por la retórica argumentativa debido a su estrecha relación con el discurso público. Tienen especial relieve dos puntos a este respecto: 1, la contribución de la retórica a la revisión crítica de los programas en curso de la llamada “democracia deliberativa”; 2, la lectura de la Retórica de Aristóteles en la línea de estos propósitos críticos. Mi artículo se propone desarrollar este segundo punto a través de un examen de la concepción aristotélica de la retórica y de su vindicación de la deliberación pública

En el curso de la segunda mitad del siglo XX diversos movimientos, dentro de ámbitos tanto disciplinarios (Filosofía, Derecho) como interdisciplinarios (análisis del discurso, ciencias de la comunicación, humanidades, etc.), han determinado el despegue y desarrollo de los estudios sobre la argumentación. Hoy este campo de estudio se presenta como un nuevo trivium de lógica, dialéctica y retórica, con nuevas posibilidades analíticas, en la línea de una lógica sutil de la pragmática discursiva, y con incitantes retos de constitución teórica o de justificación crítica. Es, en todo caso, la lógica que debería saber una persona educada y, en particular, todo practicante de la Filosofía. Así pues, propongo introducir e implantar en los estudios de Filosofía esta lógica informal o «teoría» de la argumentación, no sólo por la implicación de la propia Filosofía en la práctica de la argumentación o por la necesidad de integrar y dar sentido a los estudios de Lógica y al análisis lógico en ese mismo marco filosófico, sino por la deseable proyección de la «teoría» de la argumentación en la línea de una lógica civil, pendiente de la índole y la calidad de los usos públicos del discurso común -proyección no tan novedosa si se recuerda una tradición guadiana de nuestra propia lógica informal, interesada en los usos de la razón, «así en lo que pertenece a las ciencias, como en lo que toca a los negocios»( P. Simón Abril, 1587)

Let’s agree in calling “classical demonstration” a deduction that enables us to know the rational necessity that something is the case and cannot be otherwise. I propose to take seriously actual instances of this notion, e.g. some mathematical proofs, and explore certain discoursive and epistemic implications of their existence. Then I will look at questions about characterizing, rigorizing and acknowledging this kind of conclusive proof. Finally, some remarks on the meaning of Provability Logic in this context will be made.

The main aims of this paper are two: first, to show that the current situation of History of Logic is far from being satisfactory, and second, to put forward a programme for its improvement. To this end it is as well, I think, to take into account a new conceptual and historiographical approach to growth of Iogic as a discipline, some basic notions in this regard -e.g., the notion of being a contribution to develop ment of Iogic-, and some others compIementary aspects, commonly neglected by the History of Logic scholars