Luke Gelinas

Tom Beauchamp’s work is deeply woven into the field of bioethics. In this article, we honor Professor Beauchamp’s pioneering contributions to research ethics, focusing on his seminal work articulating the key ethical principles that have become central to our understanding of research ethics scholarship and practice. We then examine how Professor Beauchamp’s analytical framework of shared moral principles for research ethics can inform a contemporary ethics challenge: when can the requirements of informed consent permissibly be relaxed for research studies embedded into clinical care? We use this example both to illustrate how conceptual analysis and moral specification can inform the work of investigators, institutional review boards, and others charged with ensuring the ethical conduct of human subjects research, and to highlight where further conceptual work and practical guidance are needed.

Community consultation and public disclosure are key components of exception from informed consent (EFIC) trials, and mandated by the US Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). However, it is not known how demographic characteristics of community members impact their willingness to participate in such studies. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the demographics of community members regarding their attitudes towards participation in an EFIC trial; participation of relatives in such a trial; the need for emergency medical research; and, the execution of the trial in their community. This analysis is focused on the minority of individuals who have unfavorable views towards participation and emergency care research so that we can better understand their needs and concerns. Multinomial logistic regression analysis of responses to a survey distributed as part of the community consultation campaigns for a large, multicenter EFIC trial in trauma patients. The surveys were distributed to community members in the catchment areas of 77 trauma centers. A total of 88,711 responses to four separate survey questions were received and analyzed, along with demographics of the survey respondents. 13,201 of 22,441 respondents (58.8%) indicated they would want to be entered in the trial. 3,625 (16.2%) responded they would not want to be enrolled and 5,615 (25.1%) responded “I don’t know” or “I don’t want to answer”. 19,430 of 22,329 (87.0%) responded they believe that emergency medical research was necessary and 19,555 of 22,324 (87.6%) believed that this study should be done in their community. Individuals who responded “No” or “I don’t know”’ to the questions were younger, female, non-white, had a lower education level, and unknown or lower household income. The pattern was broadly similar for people who responded “I don’t know” or “I don’t want to answer”, albeit with some differences. Community consultation is a key component of establishing trust with the community in which a given study will be conducted. Understanding which individuals, or groups of individuals, are reluctant to engage is important.

Tom Beauchamp’s work is deeply woven into the field of bioethics. In this article, we honor Professor Beauchamp’s pioneering contributions to research ethics, focusing on his seminal work articulating the key ethical principles that have become central to our understanding of research ethics scholarship and practice. We then examine how Professor Beauchamp’s analytical framework of shared moral principles for research ethics can inform a contemporary ethics challenge: when can the requirements of informed consent permissibly be relaxed for research studies embedded into clinical care? We use this example both to illustrate how conceptual analysis and moral specification can inform the work of investigators, institutional review boards, and others charged with ensuring the ethical conduct of human subjects research, and to highlight where further conceptual work and practical guidance are needed.

Background Ethical and scientific principles require that clinical trials address an important question and have the resources needed to complete the study. However, there are no clear standards for review that would ensure that these principles are upheld.Methods We conducted semi-structured interviews with a convenience sample of nineteen experts in clinical trial design, conduct, and/or oversight to elucidate current practice and identify areas of need with respect to ensuring the scientific value and feasibility of clinical trials prior to initiation and while ongoing. We used a priori and grounded theory to analyze the data and constant comparative method to induce higher order themes.Results Interviewees perceived determination of scientific value as the responsibility of the investigator and, secondarily, other parties who review or oversee research. Interviewees reported that ongoing trials are rarely reevaluated due to emerging evidence from external sources, evaluation is complex, and there would be value in the development of standards for monitoring and evaluating evidence systematically. Investigators, IRBs, and/or data monitoring committees (DMCs) could undertake these responsibilities. Feasibility assessments are performed but are typically inadequate; potential solutions are unclear.Conclusions There are three domains where current approaches are suboptimal and in which further guidance is needed. First, who has the responsibility for conducting scientific review, whether it be the investigator, IRB, and/or DMC is often unclear. Second, the standards for scientific review (e.g., appropriate search terms, data sources, and analytic plan) should be defined. Third, guidance is needed on the evaluation of ongoing studies in light of potentially new and evolving evidence, with particular reference to evidence from outside the trial itself.

Background Institutional review board (IRB) expertise is necessarily limited by maintaining a manageable board size. IRBs are therefore permitted by regulation to rely on outside experts for review. However, little is known about whether, when, why, and how IRBs use outside experts.Methods We conducted a national survey of U.S. IRBs to characterize utilization of outside experts. Our study uses a descriptive, cross-sectional design to understand how IRBs engage with such experts and to identify areas where outside expertise is most frequently requested.Results The survey response rate was 18.4%, with 55.4% of respondents reporting their institution’s IRB uses outside experts. Nearly all respondents who reported using outside experts indicated they do so less than once a month, but occasionally each year (95%). The most common method of identifying an outside expert was securing a previously known subject matter expert (83.3%). Most frequently, respondents sought consultation for scientific expertise not held by current members (69.6%). Almost all respondents whose IRBs had used outside experts reported an overall positive impact on the IRB review process (91.5%).Conclusions Just over half of the IRBs in our sample report use of outside experts; among them, outside experts were described as helpful, but their use was infrequent overall. Many IRBs report not relying on outside experts at all. This raises important questions about what type of engagement with outside experts should be viewed as optimal to promote the highest quality review. For example, few respondents sought assistance from a Community Advisory Board, which could address expertise gaps in community perspectives. Further exploration is needed to understand how to optimize IRB use of outside experts, including how to recognize when expertise is lacking, what barriers IRBs face in using outside experts, and perspectives on how outside expert review impacts IRB decision-making and review quality.

Institutional review boards, tasked with facilitating ethical research, are often pulled in competing directions. In what we call the protection-inclusion dilemma, we acknowledge the tensions IRBs face in aiming to both protect potential research participants from harm and include under-represented populations in research. In this manuscript, we examine the history of protectionism that has dominated research ethics oversight in the United States, as well as two responses to such protectionism: inclusion initiatives and critiques of the term vulnerability. We look at what we know about IRB decision-making in relation to protecting and including “vulnerable” groups in research and examine the lack of regulatory guidance related to this dilemma, which encourages protection over inclusion within IRB practice. Finally, we offer recommendations related to how IRBs might strike a better balance between inclusion and protection in research ethics oversight.

Significant attention has been given both to the ethics of Controlled Human Infection Model (CHIM) research and the ethics of payment for research participation. However, comparatively little attention has been given to the ethics of paying for participation specifically in CHIM research. Grimwade et al (‘the authors’) should be commended for thoughtfully addressing this topic and especially for the empirical data collection informing their work, which is too often lacking in discussions of payment for research participation. In what follows I will discuss three relatively subtle factors that, I believe, make a difference to the ethical analysis of paying for research participation and raise what I intend to be constructive questions about the extent to which the survey instrument employed by the authors captures them. The authors focus on payment for risk in CHIM research. They correctly stress that compensating participants for risk is controversial and that “many general guidelines warn against paying for the risk in medical research”. While not all guidance documents share this scepticism,1 compensating for risk raises thorny issues and uncertainty over the topic among IRBs (Institutional Review Boards) and regulatory bodies is likely to hinder the practice. Part of the difficulty in assessing payment for research risks stems from the way in which subtle variances in background assumptions influence the ethical assessment, which also complicates empirical attempts to measure attitudes on the topic. Most importantly, it is crucial to be precise about background assumptions concerning whether participants are protected from bearing the financial burdens of research risks that eventuate in actual harms. Protective mechanisms …

The sudden emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic brought global disruption to every aspect of society including healthcare, supply chain, the economy, and social interaction. Among the many emergent considerations were the safety and public health of the public, patients, essential workers, and healthcare professionals. In certain locations, clinical research was halted—or terminated—in deference to the immediate needs of patient care, and clinical trials focusing on the treatment and prevention of coronavirus infection were prioritized over studies focusing on other diseases. Difficult decisions were made rapidly; flexibility and reconsideration were necessary not only because the intensity and severity of infection varied over time and by locale but also because knowledge of the disease and understanding of its treatment grew. Here we discuss the ethical challenges in decision-making and competing ethical tensions during the pandemic in an effort to advance future preparedness.

The modern ethical framework demands informed consent for research participation that includes disclosure of material information, as well as alternatives. The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic (COVID-19) results in illness that often involves rapid deterioration. Despite the urgent need to find therapy, obtaining informed consent for COVID-19 research is needed. The current pandemic presents three types of challenges for investigators faced with obtaining informed consent for research participation: (1) uncertainty over key information to informed consent, (2) time and pressure constraints, and (3) obligations regarding disclosure of new alternative therapies and re-consent. To mitigate consenting challenges, primary investigators need to work together to jointly promote urgent care and research into COVID-19. Actions they can take include (1) prior plan addressing ways to incorporate clinical research into clinical practice in emergency, (2) consider patients vulnerable with early deliberation on the consent process, (3) seek Legally Authorized Representatives (LARs), (4) create a collaborative research teams, (5) aim to consent once, despite evolving information during the pandemic, and (6) aim to match patients to a trial that will most benefit them. The COVID-19 pandemic both exacerbates existing challenges and raises unique obstacles for consent that require forethought and mindfulness to overcome. While research teams and clinician-investigators will need to be sensitive to their own contexts and adapt solutions accordingly, they can meet the challenge of obtaining genuinely informed consent during the current pandemic.

Ensuring that clinical trials, once launched, successfully complete and generate useful knowledge is an important and indeed ethically imperative goal, given the risks and burdens borne by research participants. Since there are insufficient willing research participants to power all the trials that are currently undertaken,1 addressing underenrolment will require prioritisation decisions that reduce the number of trials competing for participants. While there are multiple levels at which research priority-setting can and does take place, competition between trials often plays out in real time at the institutional or site level, where complex decisions must be made about how to manage overlapping trials in ways that balance different considerations, including the risk of non-completion. We sought to explore what research institutions in particular might ethically do to mitigate the risk that competition between trials will contribute to recruitment shortfalls. Against this backdrop, we appreciate the thoughtful replies to our article and are especially encouraged that all three respondents acknowledge the importance and indeed necessity of setting research priorities in ways that respect the rights and interests of various parties. The key question raised by the commentaries primarily concerns not whether research prioritisation should take place but rather how it is best accomplished. In what follows, we clarify our argument in the original article, and then focus on several points raised in the commentaries regarding the role of institutions in research priority-setting. Our approach is animated by the risk that competition between clinical trials for the same population of participants can be a cause of underenrolment when there are insufficient participants to meet the statistical needs of all open studies. In such situations, one or more of the competing studies will fail to meet recruitment targets, reducing their statistical ability to answer the research question. There are strong ethical reasons to avoid …

It is not uncommon for multiple clinical trials at the same institution to recruit concurrently from the same patient population. When the relevant pool of patients is limited, as it often is, trials essentially compete for participants. There is evidence that such a competition is a predictor of low study accrual, with increased competition tied to increased recruitment shortfalls. But there is no consensus on what steps, if any, institutions should take to approach this issue. In this article, we argue that an institutional policy that prioritises some trials for recruitment ahead of others is ethically permissible and indeed prima facie preferable to alternative means of addressing recruitment competition. We motivate this view by appeal to the ethical importance of minimising the number of studies that begin but do not complete, thereby exposing their participants to unnecessary risks and burdens in the process. We then argue that a policy of prioritisation can be fair to relevant stakeholders, including participants, investigators and funders. Finally, by way of encouraging and helping to frame future debate, we propose some questions that would need to be addressed when identifying substantive ethical criteria for prioritising between studies.

I examine different strategies involved in stating anti-theistic arguments from natural evil, and consider some theistic replies. There are, traditionally, two main types of arguments from natural evil: those that purport to deduce a contradiction between the existence of natural evil and the existence of God, and those that claim that the existence of certain types or quantities of natural evil significantly lowers the probability that theism is true. After considering peripheral replies, I state four prominent theistic rebutting strategies: skeptical theism; Richard Swinburne's view that moral knowledge entails natural evil; the soul-making theodicy; and the natural law theodicy.

The use of social media as a recruitment tool for research with humans is increasing, and likely to continue to grow. Despite this, to date there has been no specific regulatory guidance and there has been little in the bioethics literature to guide investigators and institutional review boards faced with navigating the ethical issues such use raises. We begin to fill this gap by first defending a nonexceptionalist methodology for assessing social media recruitment; second, examining respect for privacy and investigator transparency as key norms governing social media recruitment; and, finally, analyzing three relatively novel aspects of social media recruitment: the ethical significance of compliance with website “terms of use”; the ethics of recruiting from the online networks of research participants; and the ethical implications of online communication from and between participants. Two checklists aimed at guiding investigators and IRBs through the ethical issues are included as appendices.

The view that research with competent adults requires valid consent to be ethical perhaps finds its clearest expression in the Nuremberg Code, whose famous first principle asserts that “the voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.” In a similar vein, the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that “no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.” Yet although some formulations of the consent principle allow no exceptions, others hold that informed consent is not always strictly necessary for ethical research. The U.S. federal regulations known as the “Common Rule,” which govern research with human subjects, lists several conditions for waiving consent. However, neither guidance documents on the ethics of clinical research nor the literature in bioethics contains a general justification of research without consent. The purpose of this paper is to advance a justificatory framework that will explain why research without consent is permissible in paradigmatic cases and that can be useful in analyzing cases about which there is disagreement. We argue that research without consent can be justified on two grounds: if it stands to infringe no right of the participants and obtaining consent is impracticable, or if the gravity of the rights infringement is minor and outweighed by the expected social value of the research and obtaining consent is impracticable