Luke Henderson

Whatever else a theory of impeccability assumes about the moral life of heavenly agents, it seems to imply something about the type of actions possible for such agents, along with the quality of their moral characters. Regarding these characters, there are many that have argued impeccable and heavenly agents must also be perfectly virtuous agents. Michael Slote has recently argued, however, that perfect virtue is impossible. Assuming Slote’s argument is successful, a theory of impeccability that relies on the possibility of perfect virtue would be greatly harmed, even to the point of incoherence. My intent here is to defend the coherence of the doctrine of impeccability, at least as it applies to the moral life of heavenly agents.

Traditionally, the Christian doctrine of heaven has implied that the human agents that exist there will be exceptionally moral. More than this, there appears to be a consensus that heavenly agents are so morally upright as to be considered morally perfect. However, there has been some kickback to this idea of moral perfection, and whether it is a possibility for contingently existing agents. The primary goal of this thesis is to defend the view that moral perfection in heaven is possible if understood from an Aristotelian or neo-Aristotelian virtue account. My secondary goals are to show that the process of perfecting agents requires some form of temporal extension, does not require a traditional form of character development to maintain the agent’s free will, and allows for the possibility of moral growth after the status of perfection has been attained.

The focus of this paper is the process of perfecting agents. There are two views that attempt to explain what perfecting an agent looks like, specifically in the context of temporal requirements. One view claims that it is part of Christian orthodoxy that those destined for heaven will be instantaneously changed upon death from imperfect agents to perfect ones. The other view says that it’s impossible to perform an instantaneous change if the agent wants to maintain their personal identity; an instantaneous change from imperfection to perfection would be tantamount to creating a brand-new person, sufficiently causally disconnected from their previous imperfect self. Instead, this view claims that some form of temporal extension is necessary for the process to be successful. I end up in support of the view that says temporal extension is necessary.

The intent of this essay is to examine what most would call an essential component to the theistic notion of a perfected agent in heaven: impeccability. In Part 1 I will attempt to softly defend the Christian dependence on the doctrine of impeccability, followed by an examination of what I believe to be the two basic moral conditions for impeccability: the deontic condition and the virtue condition. In Parts 2 and 3, I will examine the coherence of each of these conditions by proposing recently raised objections to both. Ultimately, my hope for this essay is to further the discussion concerning the theistic notions of a perfected agent, and the coherence of a heavenly afterlife for that perfected agent.

Numerous philosophers in recent decades have argued that a partial explanation for how the blessed in heaven are impeccable while remaining free and responsible is that they have cultivated or developed such a virtuous character prior to heaven that once in heaven they are incapable of acting contrary to their virtuously cultivated characters. Further, because the agents are at least partially responsible for the construction of their characters, they can be considered free and responsible with regard to the choices or actions such virtuous characters allow. In what follows I will argue that the impeccability of the blessed is not achieved through a character-development process performed by the blessed themselves