Luke J. Davies

Kant's characterisation of honeste vive as an unenforceable duty of right owed to oneself poses two systematic problems: it conflicts with Kant's claims that (a) duties of right concern the external relation between distinct individuals and (b) duties of right are externally enforceable. Both of these claims speak against the possibility of a duty of right to oneself. This article addresses this interpretative problem. Regarding (a) I suggest that while honeste vive is a duty owed to oneself, the content of the duty concerns one's interaction with others. Regarding (b) I maintain that honeste vive is a general duty of right, and such duties are not externally enforceable. This view both allows for an understanding of the structure of obligation in the Doctrine of Right as a whole and forces us to reconsider two central aspects of Kant's concept of right—namely, that all rights are externally enforceable and owed to others. Not only does honeste vive belong to the Doctrine of Right but understanding the way in which it does can illuminate the significance and scope of duties belonging to Kant's political philosophy.

Kant distinguishes between 'active' and 'passive' citizens and holds that only the former are civilly self-sufficient and possess rights of political participation. Such rights are important, since for Kant state institutions are a necessary condition for individual freedom. Thus, only active citizens are entitled to contribute to a necessary condition for the freedom of each. I argue that Kant attributes civil self-sufficiency to those who are not under the authority of any private individual for their survival. This reading is more textually grounded than the dominant reading, which understands civil self-sufficiency in terms of economic relations alone. I further argue that Kant was interested in relations of authority because he was concerned to eliminate certain forms of corruption. This indicates that Kant's contested distinction between active and passive citizens was a response to a key problem of any account of public lawgiving.

This paper examines the morality of medical assistance in dying (MAID) in Kantian ethics. I argue that it is much harder than is often acknowledged to rule MAID out, even given Kant’s prohibition on suicide. Kant’s non-consequentialism entails that providing MAID does not aid the patient’s duty violation. Moreover, Kant’s distinction between public and private reason provides resources for arguing that those who provide MAID are not complicit with that violation either, at least in jurisdictions in which there is a public mandate. On my reading, the ethical permissibility of providing MAID is largely determined by its legal status.

This paper examines the morality of medical assistance in dying (MAID) in Kantian ethics. I argue that it is much harder than is often acknowledged to rule MAID out, even given Kant’s prohibition on suicide. Kant’s non-consequentialism entails that providing MAID does not aid the patient’s duty violation. Moreover, Kant’s distinction between public and private reason provides resources for arguing that those who provide MAID are not complicit with that violation either, at least in jurisdictions in which there is a public mandate. On my reading, the ethical permissibility of providing MAID is largely determined by its legal status.

In § 2 of the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant appears to claim that duties to self have primacy over duties owed to others. This paper critically examines a reading of Kant according to which duties to self have primacy because all duties are self-imposed and a duty is owed to the lawgiver. Instead, Kant is claiming that a feature of duties to self that supposedly makes them contradictory is shared by duties to others. To deny the existence of duties to self on the basis that they possess that feature would therefore also rule out duties to others.

In Kantian ethics, do we wrong someone when our use of them requires that they violate a duty to self, even when they have consented to that use? In this paper, I answer this question in the negative. Consent that constitutes a violation of a duty to self is impermissible yet normatively transformative. But it also matters how consent was obtained. For example, it matters whether consent is solicited or unsolicited, whether our action amounts to complicity with the violation, and how the act of consent is shaped by the broader contours of the relationship the parties stand in to each other. In Kantian terms, we might fail in our duties of respect to others even when our interactions with them are consensual. So many, but not all, consensual interactions in which one person violates a duty to self are also instances in which they are interpersonally wronged.

Kant distinguishes between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ citizens and holds that only the former are civilly self-sufficient and possess rights of political participation. Such rights are important, since for Kant state institutions are a necessary condition for individual freedom. Thus, only active citizens are entitled to contribute to a necessary condition for the freedom of each. I argue that Kant attributes civil self-sufficiency to those who are not under the authority of any private individual for their survival. This reading is more textually grounded than the dominant reading, which understands civil self-sufficiency in terms of economic relations alone. I further argue that Kant was interested in relations of authority because he was concerned to eliminate certain forms of corruption. This indicates that Kant’s contested distinction between active and passive citizens was a response to a key problem of any account of public lawgiving.