Aristotle’s claim in Nicomachean Ethics 3.9 that the active exercise (ἐνεργεῖν) of courage is pleasant only insofar as it attains the end appears to conflict with the account of Metaphysics Θ.6, according to which activity (ἐνέργεια) is an actuality whose end is present at any moment it continues. If activities contain their ends, how could courageous activity fail to attain the end and not be pleasant? I propose we resolve this tension by distinguishing between ‘technical-narrow’ and ‘end-exclu…
Read moreAristotle’s claim in Nicomachean Ethics 3.9 that the active exercise (ἐνεργεῖν) of courage is pleasant only insofar as it attains the end appears to conflict with the account of Metaphysics Θ.6, according to which activity (ἐνέργεια) is an actuality whose end is present at any moment it continues. If activities contain their ends, how could courageous activity fail to attain the end and not be pleasant? I propose we resolve this tension by distinguishing between ‘technical-narrow’ and ‘end-exclusive’ descriptions of activity. In courage, the active exercise characterized without reference to the fine is painful, whereas the technical-narrow activity is necessarily pleasant.
