Luke Kallberg

I argue that the separation of conjoined twins in infancy or early childhood is unethical. Cases may be divided into three types: both twins suffer from lethal abnormalities, only one twin has a lethal abnormality, or neither twin does. In the first kind of case, there is no reason to separate, since both twins will die regardless of treatment. In the third kind of case, I argue that separation at an early age is unethical because the twins are likely to achieve an irreplaceably good quality of life—the goods of conjoinment—that separation takes away. Evaluation of this possibility requires maturation past early childhood. Regarding the second type, I point out that with conceivable but unrecorded exceptions, these cases will consistently involve sacrifice separation. I present an argument that sacrifice separation is unethical, but in some cases a moral dilemma may exist in which separation and refraining from separation are both unethical. Perhaps in such cases a decision can be made on non-moral grounds; however, the possibility of such a decision serves not to mitigate but to underscore the fact that the separation is unethical. My conclusion, which applies to all three types of cases, is that it is unethical to separate conjoined twins before their developing personalities give some reliable indication as to whether they desire separation and whether they will achieve those goods of conjoinment.

I argue that apart from special circumstances, works of art cannot be restored since any change to the work’s aesthetic properties entails a change in the work’s identity. I argue that in a “restoration,” the work’s aesthetic properties are changed since the historical and authorial properties of a work are aesthetic properties. But I further argue that it is entirely possible for the new work created in a “restoration” to have greater aesthetic value than did the original work. This is because of the richer aesthetic impact that the work can possess in virtue of the more evocative story attached to it. In such a case, I argue that the damage or deterioration that necessitates the “restoration” is actually redeemed as it is incorporated as aesthetic properties into a greater work than what existed before. I illustrate my arguments and claims with numerous historical examples.