Christoph Lumer

‚Aggregierung‘ bedeutet in der Wohlfahrtsethik die Bestimmung der moralischen Wünschbarkeit eines Ereignisses oder Zustandes aus den Nutzen der von ihm Betroffenen. Im Utilitarismus werden dazu die Nutzen der Betroffenen addiert. Der Artikel erklärt den Sinn der Aggregation (Bildung einer moralischen Wünschbarkeit von Alternativen für die Entscheidungsfindung z. B. aus der Sicht eines unparteiischen Beobachters oder eines empathischen Subjekts), alternative Arten der Aggregation und die technischen Voraussetzungen. Das Ziel der Aggregation ist letztlich, auf Basis der gewonnenen moralischen Bewertung der Alternativen die beste Alternative auszuführen (Maximierung). Der Handlungsutilitarismus gebietet dann, bei allen Entscheidungen zu maximieren. Der reale Regel- und der reale Normen-, Institutionen- und Instrumenteutilitarismus fordert hingegen begrenzte Optimierungen. Der Artikel schließt mit der Diskussion von Einwänden gegen die Aggregierung und Maximierung.

ENGLISH: In welfare ethics, ‘aggregation’ refers to the process of determining the moral desirability of an event or state based on the utilities of those affected by it. In utilitarianism, the utility of those affected is added together for this purpose. The article explains the purpose of aggregation (forming a moral desirability of alternatives for decision-making, e.g. from the perspective of an impartial observer or an empathetic subject), alternative methods of aggregation and the technical requirements. The ultimate aim of aggregation is to implement the best alternative on the basis of the moral evaluation of the alternatives obtained (maximisation). Act utilitarianism then demands maximisation in all decisions. Real rule utilitarianism and real norm, institution and instrument utilitarianism, on the other hand, call for limited optimisations. The article concludes with a discussion of objections to aggregation and maximisation. ------- GERMAN: ‚Aggregierung‘ bedeutet in der Wohlfahrtsethik die Bestimmung der moralischen Wünschbarkeit eines Ereignisses oder Zustandes aus den Nutzen der von ihm Betroffenen. Im Utilitarismus werden dazu die Nutzen der Betroffen addiert. Der Artikel erklärt den Sinn der Aggregation (Bildung einer moralischen Wünschbarkeit von Alternativen für die Entscheidungsfindung z.B. aus der Sicht eines unparteiischen Beobachters oder eines empathischen Subjekts), alternative Arten der Aggregation und die technischen Voraussetzungen. Das Ziel der Aggregation ist letztlich, auf der Basis der gewonnenen moralischen Bewertung der Alternativen die beste Alternative auszuführen (Maximierung). Der Handlungsutilitarismus gebietet dann, bei allen Entscheidungen zu maximieren. Der reale Regel- und der reale Normen-, Institutionen- und Instrumenteutilitarismus fordern hingegen begrenzte Optimierungen. Der Artikel schließt mit der Diskussion von Einwänden gegen die Aggregierung und Maximierung.

This article presents the epistemic or, more precisely, epistemological theory of argument. According to this theory, the standard aim of arguments is to lead an addressee to an epistemologically justified and acceptable belief in the thesis. The article provides an instrumentalist justification of this approach (arguments are good instruments for guided knowledge acquisition), presents other functions of arguments, and offers an analysis of how arguments work. This analysis then serves as the basis for developing criteria for various good types of argument (deductive, probabilistic, practical, etc.) and for general criteria for epistemologically good arguments. A final outlook provides an overview of contributions from epistemological argumentation theorists on standard topics in argumentation theory: interpretation of arguments, (cooperative) argumentative dialogues, critical thinking, argumentation pedagogy.

Thema des Kapitels ist der dritte Teil einer vollständigen utilitaristischen Theorie, die Theorie der moralischen Gebote (Deontik) und der Realisierung moralischer Werte. Die Probleme der wichtigsten Theorie zu diesem Thema, des Handlungsutilitarismus (‚tue immer das utilitaristisch Beste!‘), werden analysiert. Sodann wird untersucht, wie weit zum Handlungsutilitarismus alternative Systeme (F-Utilitarismen) diese Probleme lösen: idealer und realer Regelutilitarismus, Gewissens- oder Motivutilitarismus, Tugendutilitarismus, Institutionenutilitarismus, progressiver Normenutilitarismus, globaler und skalarer Utilitarismus. Einzig der progressive reale Normenutilitarismus löst alle Probleme. Die Vielfalt der F-Utilitarismen weist aber über eine Theorie der moralischen Gebote hinaus auf eine allgemeine Theorie der Realisierung moralischer Werte, die alle F-Instrumente und noch mehr einsetzt.

The first part of the article (sections 2-6) sketches a general, criterial theory of moral progress. Three types of moral progress are distinguished: 1. ethical progress, i.e. the epistemic and moral improvement of moral theory (ethics), 2. practical-moral progress or moral progress in the narrow sense, i.e. the moral improvement of moral systems and moral action, and 3. mundane moral progress, i.e. the mundane improvement of the world according to moral criteria of social well-being. These concepts are defined and the definitions are justified without circularity. Characteristics of this approach are, for one thing, the inclusion of ethical progress, which is what first brings about the central concept of moral desirability and which can then be used in the definition of moral progress in the narrow sense, and for another thing, that ethical progress, and thus also the justification of the definition of the concept of moral desirability is not moral but epistemic and is based on prudential desirability. Furthermore, epistemic problems of these definitions and criteria are discussed, such as their circle-free justification and self-referentiality (sect. 6). The second part (sect. 7-10) lists examples of the three types of progress, but also corresponding regressions. The appendix (sect. 11) discusses some alternative theories of moral progress.

ENGLISH: This is the first volume of an anthology of important publications from the epistemological approach to argumentation theory, originally published in English, here translated into Ukrainian. The epistemological argumentation theory is one of the comprehensive approaches in argumentation theory. It is a normative philosophical theory that regards rationally justified belief in the thesis as the standard output of arguments and designs criteria for good arguments in such a way that, under adequate conditions, corresponding arguments produce this standard output. In addition to the translator's (Sergii Sekundant) foreword and a general introduction (by Christoph Lumer) to epistemological argumentation theory, which also presents the texts in this volume, this anthology has two parts: I. papers on the general approach of the epistemological argumentation theory by John Biro, Richard Feldman, Alvin Goldman, Christoph Lumer, and Harvey Siegel, II. papers on critical thinking in the epistemological tradition by Sharon Bailin, Mark Battersby, and Richard Feldman. ------- UKRAINIAN. Це перший том антології важливих публікацій з епістемологічного підходу до теорії аргументації, спочатку опублікованих англійською мовою, а тут перекладених українською. Епістемологічна теорія аргументації є одним із комплексних підходів у теорії аргументації. Це нормативна філософська теорія, яка розглядає раціонально обґрунтоване переконання в тезі як стандартний результат аргументів і розробляє критерії для хороших аргументів таким чином, що за належних умов відповідні аргументи дають цей стандартний результат. Окрім передмови перекладача (Сергія Секунданта) та загального вступу (Крістофа Лумера) до епістемологічної теорії аргументації, в якому також представлено тексти цього тому, антологія складається з двох частин: I. статті про загальний підхід епістемологічної теорії аргументації Джона Біро, Річарда Фельдмана, Альвіна Голдмана, Крістофа Лумера та Гарві Сігеля; II. статті про критичне мислення в епістемологічній традиції Шарон Бейлін, Марка Баттерсбі та Річарда Фельдмана.

ENGLISH: This paper is the introduction to an anthology of important texts on the epistemological theory of argumentation and presents this approach to argumentation theory. It consists of the following parts: 1. First, basic ideas of the epistemological theory of argumentation are explained in more detail and placed in their historical context. Such basic ideas are: The standard output of good arguments is a rationally justified belief; good arguments must therefore be designed in such a way that this standard output is produced under adequate conditions. ... 2. Next, several alternative theories of argumentation are criticised from the epistemological perspective (section 2). 3. Subsequently, recent developments in argumentation theory are presented (section 3). 4. Finally, the contributions collected in the anthology are briefly introduced (section 4). -------- UKRAINIAN: Ця стаття є вступом до антології важливих текстів з епістемологічної теорії аргументації та представляє цей підхід у теорії аргументації. Вона складається з таких частин: 1. Спочатку детально пояснюються основні ідеї епістемологічної теорії аргументації та їх історична класифікація. Такими основними ідеями є: стандартним результатом хорошої аргументації є раціонально обґрунтована віра; хороші аргументації повинні бути сконструйовані таким чином, щоб цей стандартний результат був отриманий за адекватних умов. … . 2. Далі з епістемологічної точки зору критикуються деякі альтернативні теорії аргументації (розділ 2). 3. Далі представлено останні досягнення в теорії аргументації (розділ 3). 4. Насамкінець коротко представлено статті, зібрані в антології (розділ 4).

ENGLISH: Prioritarianism and utilitarian egalitarianism are two approaches to welfare ethics which, as an improvement on utilitarianism, incorporate elements of distributive justice into the moral evaluation function: Prioritarianism values improvements for the disadvantaged more highly than improvements for those who are already well-off; and utilitarian egalitarianism rewards distributional equality by deducting from the total utility when evaluating unequal utility distributions. This chapter explains how these two forms of evaluation work and specifies their exact evaluation functions; it defines prioritarianism and egalitarianism, sets out justifications for them, compares the two systems and highlights their differences. --------------------- GERMAN: Prioritarismus und Nutzenegalitarismus sind zwei wohlfahrtsethische Bewertungsweisen, die als Verbesserung gegenüber dem Utilitarismus Komponenten der Verteilungsgerechtigkeit in die moralische Bewertungsfunktion einfügen: Der Prioritarismus bewertet Verbesserungen für schlecht Gestellte höher als Verbesserungen für schon gut Gestellte; und der Nutzenegalitarismus honoriert die Gleichheit von Verteilungen, indem er bei der Bewertung für ungleiche Nutzenverteilungen Abzüge von der Nutzensumme vornimmt. Das Kapitel erklärt die Funktionsweise dieser zwei Bewertungsformen, und präzisiert ihre genauen Bewertungsfunktionen; es definiert den Prioritarismus und Egalitarismus, legt Begründungen für sie dar, vergleicht die beiden Systeme und arbeitet ihre Unterschiede heraus.

ITALIAN: La prima parte dell'articolo (sez. 1-3) delinea una teoria generale del progresso morale. Si distinguono tre tipi di progresso morale: 1. il miglioramento etico della teoria morale, 2. il miglioramento morale dei sistemi morali e della morale e 3. il miglioramento mondano del mondo secondo criteri del bene sociale moralmente giustificati. E i criteri per questi miglioramenti sono nominati. Inoltre, vengono affrontati i problemi epistemici di questi criteri, come la loro giustificazione e l'autoreferenzialità. La seconda parte (sezioni 4-6) elenca esempi dei tre tipi di progresso, ma anche dei relativi regressi. ENGLISH: The first part of the article (sections 1-3) outlines a general theory of moral progress. Three types of moral progress are distinguished: 1. ethical improvement of moral theory, 2. moral improvement of moral systems and morality, and 3. worldly improvement of the world according to morally justified criteria of the social good. The criteria for these improvements are also specified. In addition, the epistemic problems of these criteria, such as their justification and self-referentiality, are addressed. The second part (sections 4-6) lists examples of the three types of progress, but also of the corresponding regressions.

How, in particular how abstractly, should arguments be described in fundamental argumentation-theoretical criteria for epistemically good arguments? In order to answer this question, it is first clarified which conditions must be fulfilled by epistemically oriented, adequate argumentation theories. Then, five differently abstract ways of describing arguments are presented, including argument schemes and characterisations of argument classes. Next, it is shown that theories of argumentation that formulate their fundamental criteria for good arguments in terms of argument schemes cannot be epistemically adequate, whereas theories that use characterisations of argument classes––as epistemological theories of argumentation do––can be. This is a strong argument against argument schema approaches in argumentation theory and in favour of epistemological ones.

(1) Emotions influence decisions in various ways. In particular, they can induce new intrinsic desires. This mechanism is the topic of this paper. (2) After briefly discussing some rival approaches a new theory of such emotional decisions is presented. (3) The general framework into which this theory is integrated is an expectancy-valence or decision-theoretic model of decision, however with a strict distinction between intrinsic and other desires. (4) The specific part of the theory then explains emotional decisions by non-hedonic emotion-induced intrinsic desires that grow and wane with the respective emotion, e.g. when in rage the desire to destroy or hurt the ‘aggressor’. A general approach to the content of these desires is provided, namely that they take up the values inherent in specific satisfying emotions coupled with the present emotion. (5) Finally, some theoretical consequences and advantages of this theory are shown.

In the first part (sections 2-5) an empirical theory of practical reasons is sketched and defended. It consists of: hypotheses about what intentions are, namely optimality beliefs, (2), hypotheses about how intentions are formed on the basis of probabilistic beliefs and intrinsic desires (3), a pluralist theory about intrinsic desires (4) and a theory about motives for moral action (5). In the second part (sections 6-8) it is argued that normative practical philosophy must rely on empirical theories of practical reasons (6). Then it is shown that theories of prudential practical rationality and of morals that are not based on such empirical theories run into problems. And it is sketched how the empirical theory outlined in the first part can be used as a basis for a reconstructive approach to practical rationality and of an internalist approach to morals (7-8).

The article presents the most important systematic philosophical questions and problems regarding altruism, outlines various answers to these, discusses them, develops precise definitions of ‘altruism’ / ‘altruistic’, 'self-interested', 'egoistic', etc. and develops a normative theory of altruism. The starting point is an assumption about the ethical function of the normative concept of altruism, namely that it captures an ideal: acting for the benefit of others beyond one's moral duty. On this basis, the normative concept of altruism is defined. This is followed by an overview of the ethics that explicitly or implicitly advocate altruism. The subsequent discussion of psychological altruism centres on the question of whether and, if so, which human motives may be intrinsically aimed at the good of others. The most important such motive is acting out of empathy. The final section addresses whether and how altruistic action can be rational.

The contribution critically discusses Walton's argumentation scheme approach. On the one hand, its enormous richness and closeness to the empirical argumentation material is appreciated, but, on the other, fundamental conceptual weaknesses are revealed. Although the approach more recently has been declared to strive for “true beliefs and correct choices” it has not systematically developed the proposed schemes in a way that these goals are reached. Accordingly, many proposed schemes are fallacious from an epistemological standpoint.

The article critically discusses Walton’s (and co-authors’) argument scheme approach to good argumentation. Four characteristics of Walton’s approach are presented: 1. Argument schemes provide normative requirements. 2. These schemata are enthymematic. 3. There are associated critical questions. 4. The method is inductive, abstracting schemata from groups of similar arguments. Four adequacy conditions are applied to these characteristics: AC1: effectiveness in achieving the epistemic goal of obtaining and communicating justified acceptable opinions; AC2: completeness in capturing the good argument types; AC3: efficiency in achieving the goals; AC4: justification of the argument schemes. The discussion reveals weaknesses in Walton’s account, including they are neither effective nor truly justified. A better alternative is an epistemological approach based on epistemological principles.

This article discusses Harvey Siegel’s general justification of the epistemological theory of argumentation in his seminal essay “Arguing with Arguments." On the one hand, the achievements of this essay are honoured—in particular, a thorough differentiation of the different meanings of ‘argument’ and ‘argumentation,’ the semantic justification of the fundamentality of arguments as sequences of propositions, and the detailed critiques of alternative theories of argumentation. On the other hand, suggestions for strengthening the theory are added to Siegel's expositions, which make different perspectives within the epistemological theory of argumentation recognisable.

The article honours the contribution of the Ukrainian philosopher Hryhoriy Skovoroda on the occasion of his 300th birthday on 9 October 2022. It begins with an address of solidarity to the Ukrainians and the Ukrainian philosophers in their fight against the Russian invaders who had bombed and destroyed the Skorovoda Museum in Kharkov shortly before this birthday. The article's main part is an analysis of Skovoroda's theory of happiness in his writing "Conversation Among Five Travellers Concerning Life's True Happiness". In the form of a Socratic dialogue, Skorovoda discusses materialistic hedonism, a Christian eudaemonism, satisfactionism and a radical, evangelical Christian eudaemonism. Skorovoda's own position is not entirely clear; it probably lies between the two Christian positions. The critical analysis then shows that Skorovoda's arguments quite well, if not flawless, in the first third of the text and in tune with the times, while after that, with the appearance of the representative of radical Christian eudaemonism, the dialogue moves more and more from the philosophical to the theological, abandons the argumentative style and slips more and more into (repetitive) preaching. Speculations follow as to why this striking change of subject and style occurs.

In seinem Buch Pazifismus. Eine Verteidigung verteidigt Olaf Müller einen relativ strikten Pazifismus, der im Ukrainekrieg keine militärische Hilfe an die Ukraine erlaubt ‐ trotz der Anerkennung, dass es sich um einen verbrecherischen Angriffskrieg handelt. Müller kritisiert die beiden üblichen Begründungen für solch eine Position, den gesinnungsethischen und den verantwortungsethischen Pazifismus, und entwickelt seine eigene Version, den pragmatistischen Pazifismus.Der vorliegende Beitrag diskutiert Müllers Pazifismus kritisch und gibt einen Ausblick auf eine bessere ethische Alternative, nämlich die wohlfahrtsethische begrenzte Optimierung. Müllers Anliegen ist zutiefst human. Seine Begründung ist differenziert, aber langwierig, verwickelt und unklar. Ein Teil dieses Beitrags besteht darin, diese Begründung zu rekonstruieren und auf das Wesentliche zu reduzieren, um dann die essentiellen Elemente gezielter kritisch diskutieren zu k??nnen.

Argumentation as the public exchange of reasons is widely thought to enhance deliberative interactions that generate and justify reasonable public policies. Adopting an argumentation-theoretic perspective, we survey the norms that should govern public argumentation and address some of the complexities that scholarly treatments have identified. Our focus is on norms associated with the ideals of correctness and participation as sources of a politically legitimate deliberative outcome. In principle, both ideals are mutually coherent. If the information needed for a correct deliberative outcome is distributed among agents, then maximising participation increases information diversity. But both ideals can also be in tension. If participants lack competence or are prone to biases, a correct deliberative outcome requires limiting participation. The central question for public argumentation, therefore, is how to strike a balance between both ideals. Rather than advocating a preferred normative framework, our main purpose is to illustrate the complexity of this theme.

The aim of the article is to develop precise epistemic rules for good public political arguments, by which political measures in the broad sense are justified. By means of a theory of deliberative democracy, it is substantiated that the justification of a political measure consists in showing argumentatively that this measure most promotes the common good or is morally optimal. It is then discussed which argumentation-theoretical approaches are suitable for providing epistemically sound rules for arguments for such theses and for the associated premises, rules whose compliance implies the truth or acceptability of the thesis. Finally, on the basis of the most suitable approach, namely the epistemological one, such systems of rules for the required types of arguments are presented that fulfil the conditions mentioned.

The article develops and defends, with a detailed argument, a certain moral-instrumentalist conception of deliberative democracy according to which, so the main thesis, a certain form of deliberative democracy is the best means for the binding realisation of moral values. This conception combines an epistemic component, according to which deliberation serves to determine which measures most serve the general good, with a participatory component, according to which democratic voting serves to give moral insight social power. Because of the dispute about the criteria of the general good, these two components also have the function of continuing the discussion about the criteria of the general good and of deciding, respectively, on the criterion to be implemented in terms of maximum social support.

In this paper, first the term 'prioritarianism' is defined, with some mathematical precision, on the basis of intuitive conceptions of prioritarianism, especially the idea that "benefiting people matters more the worse off these people are". (The prioritarian weighting function is monotonously ascending and concave, while its first derivation is smoothly descending and convex but positive throughout.) Furthermore, (moderate welfare) egalitarianism is characterized. In particular a new symmetry condition is defended, i.e. that egalitarianism evaluates upper and lower deviations from the social middle symmetrically and equally negatively (as do e.g. variance and Gini). Finally, it is shown that this feature distinguishes egalitarianism also extensionally from prioritarianism.

The article develops an internalist justification of welfare ethics based on empathy. It takes up Hume’s and Schopenhauer’s internalistic (but not consistently developed) justification approach via empathy, but tries to solve three of their problems: 1. the varying strength of empathy depending on the proximity to the object of empathy, 2. the unclear metaethical foundation, 3. the absence of a quantitative model of empathy strength. 1. As a solution to the first problem, the article proposes to limit the foundation of welfare ethics to certain types of empathy. 2. In response to the second problem, an internalistic metaethical conception of the justification of moral principles is outlined, the result of which is: The moral value of the well-being of persons is identical to the expected extent of (positive and negative) empathy arising from this well-being. 3. The contribution to the solution of the third problem and focus of the article is an empirical model of the (subject’s) expected extent of empathy depending on (an object’s) well-being. According to this model, the extent of empathy is not proportional to the expected empathy, but follows a concave function and is therefore prioritarian. Accordingly, the article provides a sketch of an internalist justification of prioritarianism.

English: Effective altruism has focused on moral efficiency, i.e. the ratio of the resources used (money, time ...) to the moral benefit achieved, in addition to the extent of our moral commitment, and has called for the maximum efficiency of moral commitment. This raises two questions, among others, which are the subject of this paper: 1. How does one calculate moral efficiency? 2. Is maximum moral efficiency the right moral decision-making criterion? In the article, efficiency calculations of donations for two charitable projects are presented in detail (question 1): distribution of mosquito nets in malaria areas in sub-Saharan Africa and maintenance of a children's village in Guatemala. The result is that the children's village project is clearly less efficient. Should it therefore be abandoned, although it seems to be a very useful project (question 2)?

This is an appendix to the article "Wie effizient sollten Altruisten handeln?" ("How Efficient Should Altruists Act?") The appendix provides detailed moral efficiency calculations for two charitable projects: a children's home in Guatemala for neglected children versus malaria prevention by distributing mosquito nets in malaria areas in sub-Saharan Africa. The exact method of efficiency calculation is explained and applied. At least prima facie, the malaria prophylaxis project is clearly more efficient.

The article develops a general theory of the goals of free moral commitment. The theoretical hook is the discussion of the strict efficiency striving as demanded by the movement and theory of effective altruism. A detailed example shows prima facie counterintuitive consequences of this efficiency striving, the analysis of which reveals various problems such as: merely point-like but not structural commitment; radical universalism; violation of established moral standards and institutions. The article takes these problems as an occasion to develop a general theory of moral investment with moral guidelines and planning instruments of its implementation such as: efficiency; preservation of existing moral standards and obligations, especially also towards those close to one; rooted universalism with adequate consideration of all beneficiaries of one's moral concern through allocation of separate budgets; real efficiency also through inclusion of strategic and organic investments.