•  76
    Metacognitions associated with reproductive concerns: A cross-sectional study of young adult female cancer survivors in China
    with Pan Pan Xiao, Si Qing Ding, Ying Long Duan, Yi Zhou, Qin Qin Cheng, Xiang Yu Liu, Jian Fei Xie, and Andy S. K. Cheng
    Frontiers in Psychology 13. 2022.
    ObjectiveCancer and its treatments affect patients’ fertility potential. This study examined the prevalence of reproductive concerns and their relationship with metacognitions among Chinese young adult female cancer survivors.MethodsA total of 318 YAFCS completed an online survey from March to December 2021. Participants reported sociodemographic characteristics, reproductive concerns and metacognitions. Reproductive concerns were measured using the Reproductive Concerns after Cancer scale, and …Read more
  •  47
    Rational beliefs in rationalizability
    Theory and Decision 81 (2): 189-198. 2016.
    In this paper I scrutinize the “rational beliefs” in the concept of rationalizability in strategic games [Bernheim, Pearce ]. I illustrate through an example that a rationalizable strategy may not be supported by a “rational belief”, at least under one plausible interpretation of “rational belief”. I offer an alternative formulation of “rational belief” in the concept of rationalizability, which yields a novel epistemic interpretation of the notion of point-rationalizability.
  •  38
    Conservative Stable Standards of Behavior and φ-Stable Sets
    Theory and Decision 60 (4): 395-402. 2006.
    Within Luo’s (2001, J. Math. Econ. 36, 95–109) framework of a general system, I establish an equivalence theorem for the conservative stable standard of behavior (CSSB for short) developed by J. Greenberg (“The Theory of Social Situation: An Alternative Game-Theoretic Approach,” Cambridge University Press, 1990). It is shown that a standard of behavior for a situation is a CSSB if, and only if, its graph is a φ-stable set for the associated general system
  •  39
    Delay in a bargaining game with contracts
    with Yi-Chun Chen
    Theory and Decision 65 (4): 339-353. 2008.
    In a multilateral bargaining game where a proposer and responders can set up a “principal–agent” relationship by means of binding cash-offer contracts, we show that there is a Markov SPE with a delay in reaching an agreement. We also show that all the individually rational and efficient payoffs can be supported by SPE
  • Marx, "doctoral dissertation," appendix of the religious debate Plutarch, in his "Notes on the philosophy of Epicurus," 2-3 in a more specific and detailed to show. Plutarch refuted Marx on Epicurus and his anti-religious stance is certainly consistent. This paper aims to "notes" of the study, to figure out how Marx relevant text on Plutarch, Plutarch targeted to refute the doctrine of Epicurus particular religion to refute, how to highlight the philosophy of and religious opposition and overcom…Read more
  •  23
    On stability of economic networks
    with Hamid Beladi, Reza Oladi, and Nicholas S. P. Tay
    Theory and Decision 94 (4): 677-691. 2023.
    In the spirit of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (Theory of games and economic behavior, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1944), we introduce a notion of network stability. We study the structure of stable economic networks and their associated stable payoff allocations by analyzing the conditions under which complete networks and star networks (both with desirable property of inclusiveness) are stable. We also address conditions for existence and uniqueness of stable set of networks.