Lya Bulov

In this article, the author tries to find the best strategy for defining scientific and semiscientific concepts in philosophy. In the first part of the article, the main types of definitions are analyzed. The author delved into the details of each of them and found explicative and ameliorative definitions to be best suited for scientific and semiscientific concepts. The ameliorative method, however, appears to be slightly more preferable because it provides us with more theoretical tools for philosophical analysis. The second part of the article demonstrates the advantages of the ameliorative method using the «innateness» concept as an example. The author has chosen «innateness» because it has plenty of various definitions in science and philosophy today. If such a complex case can be solved with the ameliorative method, then we may conclude that this method is productive. The author found the ameliorative analysis of «innateness» to be a rather fruitful method of work with the mentioned concept. Therefore, the ameliorative approach to formulating definitions is concluded to be the most appropriate for philosophers and scholars when working with scientific and semiscientific concepts.

The article is devoted to answering the question “What is innateness regarding cognitive functions?” To answer this question, we decided to formulate the most plausible definition of “innate”. This aim can be reached by adopting S. Has­langer’s amelioration and/or R. Carnap’s explication as a definition-forming technique. This strategy of defining presupposes certain criteria for a good definition: 1) a definition has to meet the set of requirements (consistency, prac­ticality, etc.); 2) a definition has to be appropriate for the set of picked areas of knowledge; 3) a definition has to be applicable for the set of picked tasks. First, we described the relevant areas of knowledge and tasks for “innate”. Then, we examined the poverty of the stimulus approach to the problem of innateness on whether the definitions that we can deduce from it meet the mentioned criteria. As we found out, the definition of “innate” that was deduced from the poverty of the stimulus approach meets these criteria. Hence, we can conclude that this def­inition of “innate” can be efficiently used for solving scientific and philosophical problems concerning innate cognitive functions. Finally, we answered some possible criticisms.

In the current article, using the concept “freedom” as an example, we examine how the choice of an approach to the theory of concepts influences the resulting description of normative concepts. Two primary approaches to the psychological nature of concepts are considered: the representationalist and the abilitist. According to the former, concepts are mental representations, while according to the latter, they are cognitive abilities. First, we characterize each of these approaches, and then we give an illustration of how each of them characterizes normative concepts. This analysis allows us to show how the abilitist approach sheds light on certain aspects of normative concepts, particularly their motivational charge and their practical orientation.

The article is an overview of the contemporary approaches to the metaphysics of concepts. We have attempted to show the complexity of the discussion about the metaphysics of concepts, as well as the diversity of modern philosophical positions on this issue. Representationalism and Fregeanism are still the most popular ap­proaches to the metaphysics of concepts. In the first part we discuss the main ideas and possible drawbacks of the mainstream views – representationalism and Fre­geanism. Representationalist view considers concepts as mental representations, whereas Fregeanism states that concepts are Fregean senses. In the second part we briefly discuss the less popular approaches: the mixed view, eliminativism and abilitism. According to the mixed view, concepts are mental representations typed in terms of the Frege’s senses they express. Eliminativism is in favor of eliminat­ing the term “concept”. The abilitism supporters suppose that concepts are mental ca­pacities.

Abilitism is an approach to the metaphysics of concepts according to which each concept consists of a managing cognitive ability coordinating other abilities (cognitive and non-cognitive) and a set of subordinate abilities associated with this managing ability. As I argue here, if we accept the abilitist approach, we can efficiently solve such puzzles in the metaphysics of concepts as the partial possession problem, the concept pluralism problem, etc. However, there are some possible objections to abilitism, concerning the abilitist explanation of compositional properties of concepts, knowledge-that, an extension/intension of concepts, and the idea that concepts are constituents of thought. As I demonstrate here, these objections can be answered.

The innate knowledge problem is a classical problem in philosophy, which has been known since the classical antiquity. Plato in his dialogues Meno and Phaedo formulated the doctrine of innate ideas and proposed an early version of the poverty of the stimulus argument, which is the most frequently used argument in innate knowledge debates. In the history of philosophy there was also an opposite view. This approach is often associated with J. Locke’s philosophy. Locke thought that all our knowledge about the world is a product of the universal learning mechanisms whose functioning is based on perception. The question about the presence of innate ideas in the human mind still remains relevant. New findings in cognitive science and neurosciences and also some recent arguments from philosophers contribute to the contemporary discussion between the spokesmen of the rival approaches to this problem. The paper presents the investigation of one of the approaches to solving the problem of innate concepts, which is called a “concept nativism.” It highlights the outstanding characteristics of the concept nativism: (a) domain specificity position, (b) belief that domain-specific mechanisms of learning are innate and (c) belief that at least some concepts are innate. The article also proposes an analysis of notions “innateness” and “idea” which is important for understanding nativists’ approach to innate ideas theory. And finally, it describes the most popular nativists’ arguments: (a) references to empirical studies using the preferential looking technique, (b) the poverty of the stimulus argument and (c) the argument from animals.

In January 2019 the Faculty of Philosophy of the Lomonosov Moscow State University held the round table “Problems of Consciousness: Research Opportunities.” It was dedicated to problems of interdisciplinary studies of consciousness. Many famous Russian specialists whose academic interests include consciousness, brain and mind took part in this event: K.V. Anokhin, D.I. Dubrovsky, T.V. Chernigovskaya, M.A. Piradov, A.A. Potapov, V.Y. Sergin, V.V. Vasil’ev, Z.A. Zorina and others. At the round table, the following problems were discussed: the specificity of consciousness problem, its relevance in various academic disciplines, contemporary research possibilities for consciousness studies to solve the problems that specialists actually face. Much attention was paid to the problems of neurobiology, empirical research of consciousness. Nonetheless, participants showed in their speeches that the problem of consciousness is also a philosophical problem. Hence it requires thoughtful consideration of philosophers. Participants decided that to progress in solving this problem researches from various disciplines have to cooperate.