Lynne Rudder Baker

(1944 - 2017)

Dennett’s has recently attempted to break the “spell” that prevents people from submitting their religious beliefs and practices to scientific investigation. But what spell is being broken? Religion is not a unified phenomenon. By supposing that it is, Dennett is led to adopt an implausible mimetic theory of religious belief, and to mistakenly assume that the presence of a Hyperactive Agency Detection Device would impugn religious belief. More troublingly, although religious beliefs and practices should be studied scientifically, it would be a mistake to treat science as the exclusive arbiter of reality. Dennett makes human beings (persons) seem like aggregates of parts. Such a view seems to have no room for human dignity, except as artifacts of an intentional stance. A plausible theory of human dignity would take people to be ontologically significant unities, who, on my view, have first-person perspectives essentially.

Peter van Inwagen recently published an essay entitled “Three Versions of the Ontological Argument” (Van Inwagen 2012). The three versions he labeled “The Meinongian Version,” “The Conceptual Version,” and “The Modal Version,” respectively. This paper proposes a fourth version, which, for want of a better label, is called ‘The Cognitive-Ability Version’. Van Inwagen says that “Anselm’s argument presupposes, and essentially presupposes, an ontology that is … Meinongian” (Van Inwagen 2012: 8). The paper argues otherwise. If it is right, Anselm’s argument in _Proslogion_ II is of the Cognitive-Ability variety, and not captured by any of van Inwagen’s versions of the ontological argument.

Both Animalism—the metaphysical thesis that “each of us is numerically identical with an animal”—and Constitutionalism—the metaphysical thesis that each of us is identical to a person and constituted by (not identical to) an animal—have argumentative support. For Animalism: (1) an argument from the evolution of the use of the word ‘I’ in animals (Snowdon); (2) an argument from the “Link thesis” that holds that there’s a link between personal identity and human-animal identity (Snowdon); (3) an argument from the “thinking animal” problem for non-Animalists (Olson); (4) an argument from a claim that a “theory of composition would tell us what we are” (Olson). For Constitutionalism: (1) an argument from biotechnological devices—neural implants, sophisticated prostheses; (2) an argument from the possibility of bodily resurrection. The chapter concludes that Constitutionalism is superior to Animalism.

Chisholm held that persons are essentially persons. The Constitution View affords a non‐Chisholmian way m defend the thesis that persons are essentially persons. The Constitution View shows how persons are constituted by‐but not identical to‐human animals. On the Constitution View, being a person determines a person's persistence conditions. On the Animalist View, being an animal determines a person's persistence conditions. Things of kind K have ontological significance if their persistence conditions are determined by their being members of K. On Chisholm's view, persons have ontological significance, but animals do not. On Animalism, animals have ontological significance, but persons do not. After explaining the notion of ontological significance, this article argues that persons do have ontological significance, and hence that Animalism is not true.

This stimulating book critically examines a wide range of physicalistic conceptions of mind in the works of Jerry A. Fodor, Stephen P. Stich, Paul M. Churchland, Daniel C. Dennett, and others. Part I argues that intentional concepts cannot be reduced to nonintentional (and nonsemantic) concepts; Part II argues that intentional concepts are nevertheless indispensable to our cognitive enterprises and thus need no foundation in physicalism. As a sustained challenge to the prevailing interpretation of cognitive science, this timely book fills a large gap in the philosophical literature. It is sure to spark controversy, yet its clarity makes it attractive as a text in upper-level undergraduate and graduate courses in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Saving Belief should be read by philosophers, psychologists, and others interested in the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. Originally published in 1988. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Monotheistic conceptions of an afterlife raise a philosophical question: In virtue of what is a postmortem person the same person who lived and died? Four standard answers are surveyed and criticized: sameness of soul, sameness of body or brain, sameness of soul-body composite, sameness of memories. The discussion of these answers to the question of personal identity is followed by a development of my own view, the Constitution View. According to the Constitution View, you are a person in virtue of having a first-person perspective, and a postmortem person is you if and only if that person has the same first-person perspective. The Christian doctrine of resurrection has three features: a postmortem person is embodied; a postmortem person is identical to some premortem person; and the postmortem person owes existence to a miracle. I show how the Constitution View accommodates these three features.

This chapter deals with a brief word about the Christian doctrine of Incarnation. The doctrine of the Incarnation, which takes Jesus Christ to be a person fully human and fully divine, requires a slight modification of constitutionalism. Constitutionalism seems to have an advantage over mind‐body dualism about Christ's nature: his human nature is wholly material and his divine nature is wholly immaterial. The chapter also focuses on Christian doctrines of resurrection of the dead. Next, it discusses St Thomas Aquinas's views in particular, and points to a few difficulties it has. It shows how constitutionalism can avoid Thomas's difficulties and provides an understanding of the doctrine of resurrection without immaterial souls. Aquinas gives a way to distinguish between Smith's and Brown's souls between death and the general resurrection. Separated souls are individuated by the bodies that they long for. Each separated soul has an affinity for the body with which it was united during earthlylife.

Many Christians who argue against Christian materialism direct their arguments against what I call ‘Type-I materialism’, the thesis that I cannot exist without my organic body. I distinguish Type-I materialism from Type-II materialism, which entails only that I cannot exist without some body that supports certain mental functions. I set out a version of Type-II materialism, and argue for its superiority to Type-I materialism in an age of science. Moreover, I show that Type-II materialism can accommodate Christian doctrines like the Resurrection of the Body, the Incarnation, and the intermediate state (if there is one)

Some philosophers take personal identity to be a matter of self-narrative. I argue, to the contrary, that self-narrative views cannot stand alone as views of personal identity. First, I consider Dennett’s self-narrative view, according to which selves are fictional characters—abstractions, like centers of gravity—generated by brains. Neural activity is to be interpreted from the intentional stance as producing a story. I argue that this is implausible. The inadequacy is masked by Dennett’s ambiguous use of ‘us’: sometimes ‘us’ refers to real human beings, and sometimes ‘us’ refers to selves or fictional characters. Second, I consider Schechtmann’s view that self-narratives create persons in order for there to be a self-narrative. Finally, I offer my own account of persons.