M. Adeel

This chapter begins by introducing some Qur’ānic distinctions relevant to the value problem. It is noted that value of knowledge for the Qur’ān is rooted in its practical value. Relevance of the Qur’ānic view of taqwā as reflective and motivational epistemic conscience for a solution to the value problem is noted. The bulk of the chapter deals with discussions of the value problem between contemporary virtue epistemologists. It is argued that Zagzebsky correctly criticizes the machine-product model of knowledge assumed by process reliabilism. Brogaard’s criticism of Zagzebsky’s position regarding its Moorean conception of value is evaluated and it is argued that the Zagzebsky motive-action model for knowledge effectively addresses the value problem rather than a simple shift to a different (Korsgaardian) model of value as suggested by Brogaard. Pritchard’s criticism of Zagzebsky and other robust virtue epistemologists is evaluated. It is argued that knowledge, while valuable as shown by Zagzebsky’s model, is correctly claimed by Pritchard to be not finally valuable. Kvanvig’s and Pritchard’s positions are combined to underscore why understanding is finally valuable.

This chapter aims at an analysis of the Qur’ānic concept of ignorance in the light contemporary virtue epistemology with its focus on intellectual virtues. In Sect. 2.1 below I give a brief set of introductory remarks about the contemporary emergence of virtue epistemology and the directions in which it is evolving. Sosa’s seminal work for bridging the divide between foundationalism and coherentism through the concept of intellectual virtue is noted along with early work done by Montmarquet and Code on intellectual responsibility and conscientiousness. Sosa’s reliabilist and Zagzebsky’s responsibilist positions are highlighted. This overview sets the stage for casting a careful look in Sect. 2.2 at all the verses of the Qur’ān that talk about remediable blameworthy ignorance in humans with the purpose of deriving from them what the Qur’ān takes to be central epistemic virtues. The analysis brings out various intellectual virtues that mostly seem to be forms of epistemic conscientiousness.

This chapter is a brief overview of the basic theses of the book. It points to the ideas of epistemic responsibility and intellectual virtue as they are presupposed or implied by the Qur’ānic verses. It is noted that analysis of the concept of ignorance and taqwā brings out the centrality of intellectual conscientiousness for the Qur’ānic view of knowledge. The epistemic state of understanding is similarly linked with taqwā or epistemic conscientiousness. Finally wisdom is said to result from the reflection of holistic understanding upon itself for sharpening intellectual and moral conscience or taqwā.

This chapter examines those verses of the Qur’ān which talk about ḥik’mat or wisdom. It is argued that elements of wisdom for the Qur’ān are knowledge, understanding, and best possible ways to argue, as they combine to lead us to overall righteousness. For the Qur’ān wisdom is some form of knowledge and understanding that produce comprehensive righteousness in one’s life. It is a virtuous state that the Qur’ān takes to be a product of knowledge and understanding but also involves best possible argument or reasoning. Wisdom looks like an epistemic or cognitive state, but a state that produces overall righteousness or virtue; hence it might be taken as both a cognitive state and an acquired disposition or virtue. It is noted that understanding as it reflects upon itself to sharpen our taqwā (or epistemic and moral conscience) produces wisdom in us. It strengthens our conscience for living well. This position is elaborated through noting some linkages between episteme and wisdom in Plato and Aristotle as well as through the views of contemporary writers like Sharon Ryan and Jason Baehr.

In this chapter we examine some of the verses about perceptual, intellectual, and revelatory knowledge. It is argued that these Qur’ānic verses are best understood as ways of defining knowledge in terms of certain natural and acquired epistemic dispositions or virtues. Human beings are held accountable by the Qur’ān for the proper use of their perceptual and rational faculties. The Qur’ānic concept of revelation as God’s testimony is highlighted along with the Qur’ānic emphasis on the Prophet’s responsibility for proper communication of the content of revelation. It is argued that knowledge for the Qur’ān seems to involve effective exercise of our natural perceptual, rational, and intuitive faculties as well as acquired dispositions or intellectual virtues. The Qur’ānic verses talk both about proper use of natural faculties and exercise of acquired intellectual virtues for acquisition of knowledge. Hence, it is suggested that the divide between responsibilist and reliabilist camps of virtue epistemology needs to be bridged. Some developments in this direction are noted.

This chapter analyses the Qur’ānic verses that talk about the epistemic state of understanding. It is argued that understanding for the Qur’ān is holistic in nature. Three basic ideas emerge from various functions of understanding mentioned in the Qur’ān: that understanding is gained by grasping the deeper logical or interpretive implications of principles or phenomena or story; that understanding is involved in grasping the ethical and the wiser course; and that understanding is involved with mastery of a language. All three functions presuppose a grasp of interrelations between parts and wholes. It is noted that the Qur’ān sometimes refers to understanding as an ability or disposition and sometimes as the cognitive state attained as a result of the exercise of such an ability or disposition. The views of Zagzebsky, Kvanvig, and Pritchard on understanding are given and compared with the Qur’ānic position.

This chapter carries out an analysis of the Qur’ānic verses that pertain to the concept of taqwā in order to understand the Qur’ānic conception of virtue. It is argued that taqwā appears to be a comprehensive reflective and motivational conscience comparable to similar concepts in Kant and Butler. However, taqwā covers both the moral and epistemic spheres of human life and is constitutive of virtue in general. The chapter discusses the ways taqwā, as a stable acquired disposition for virtue built upon our natural capacity to distinguish right from wrong, is related to specific intellectual virtues that flow from it. Taqwā as the general disposition for virtue functions as a pivot for all specific epistemic and moral virtues. After identifying the basic features of taqwā, the chapter examines additional verses of the Qur’ān to highlight some additional intellectual virtues. The chapter closes by noting the concept of virtue and an overall list of intellectual virtues.

From the foregoing chapters it appears that virtuous cognitive activity is a progressive sequence for the Qur’ān. The central idea is to make a conscientious effort to avoid ignorance and attain knowledge. However, knowledge by itself is not the only epistemic goal and a holistic understanding of various areas of life is the next target. At the third and final stage the goal is the attainment of wisdom. Here knowledge and understanding have to be employed to reinforce and sharpen the intellectual and moral conscience or taqwā. This cognitive activity, wherein knowledge and more particularly understanding works to enhance our ability for living a life of falāḥ or comprehensive success, is the ultimate epistemic and moral goal. At the heart of this progressive epistemic sequence lies the Qur’ānic concept of taqwā, which is moral and intellectual conscientiousness based in a natural ability of the human nafs or self to distinguish right from wrong. This comprehensive reflective and motivational conscience is primarily an acquired stable disposition based in an initial natural ability to distinguish right from wrong. It expresses itself though specific intellectual virtues required for the attainment of the goal of knowledge or understanding or, ultimately, wisdom. In an ideal situation attainment of knowledge in various fields must lead to acquisition of understanding and, in turn, understanding should streamline its insights to sharpen the ability of the reflective and motivational conscience to make appropriate moral and intellectual decisions for living well or wisely. This latter part is a way for the understanding, attained through conscientiousness, to turn upon itself to streamline its own insights for strengthening and sharpening the very conscientiousness which had produced it in the first place. Wisdom, therefore, is a cognitive activity through which our comprehensive conscience strengthens itself by utilizing its own achievements of knowledge and understanding. It is what might be called reflective or meta-understanding, which leads to strengthening of our epistemic and moral dispositions for the right beliefs and actions.

This book examines all verses of the Quran involving knowledge related concepts. It begins with the argument that an analysis of the Quranic concept of ignorance points to epistemic virtues that can pave our way towards gaining knowledge and/or understanding. It deals with the Quranic concepts of perceptual, rational, and revelatory knowledge as well as understanding and wisdom in the light of recent discussions in Western analytic epistemology. It also argues that the relevant Quranic verses seem to involve concept of an epistemic conscience whose proper exercise can yield knowledge or understanding. While not overlooking the Quranic emphasis on revelation as a source of knowledge, the book draws our attention to a remarkable overlap between some strains of contemporary virtue epistemology and Quranic approach to knowledge. It shows that the Quranic verses suggest a progressive sequence from propositional knowledge to understanding to wisdom.

This article looks at some of the salient analyses of moderation in the ancient Greek and the Islamic traditions and uses them to develop a contemporary view of the matter. Greek ethics played a huge role in shaping the ethical views of the Muslim philosophers and theologians, and thus the article starts with an overview of the revival of contemporary western virtue ethics--in many ways an extension of Platonic-Aristotelian ethics--and then looks at the place of moderation or temperance in Platonic-Aristotelian ethics. This sets the stage for an exposition of the position taken by Ibn Miskawayh and al-Ghazali, which is then used as a backdrop for suggesting a revival of the Quran's virtue ethics. After outlining a basis for its virtue ethics, the Quranic view of wasatiyya or moderation is discussed briefly.

This article is focused on some conditions in today’s world of globalized media, which are producing either an uncritical acquiescence or fright in Muslim societies as a result of the interaction between these societies and the contemporary Western powers that represent modernity and postmodernity on the global stage. The rise of fundamentalism, a tendency toward returning to the roots and stringently insisting upon some pure and literal interpretation of them, in almost all the religions of the world is a manifestation of this fright. The central concern of this article is to suggest that fundamentalism is neither the only nor the most reasonable response for Muslim societies in the face of contemporary modernity. Muslims need to adopt an independent and critical attitude toward modernity and reshape their societies in the light of the ethics of the Qur’an, keeping in view the historical link between Islam and science in as much as Islamic culture paved the way for emergence of modern science during European Renaissance. The necessity of a pluralistic or contextualized modernization of Muslim societies is discussed along with the need for the removal of cultural duplicity in the role of the West in relation to Muslim societies. All this leads to an overall proposal for modernization which is given towards the end.

In the General Psychopathology Jaspers famously draws a distinction between the understandable and explainable. Meaningful connections between psychic events, he argues, can only be understood empathetically and cannot be explained causally. The idea behind this distinction, according to some interpreters at least, seems to be that psychic events do not fall under any general causal rules whereas ordinary events do fall under such rules. Also Jaspers distinguishes empathetic understanding of the connection between two psychic events from a mere interpretation of it, which may turn out to be false. Hence, understanding seems to be able to give us the truth about the connection and is factive as well as self-evident in nature. Contemporary epistemologists, such as Linda Zagzebsky, Duncan Pritchard, and Jonathan Kvanvig, for example, distinguish three varieties: propositional, objectual or holistic, and atomistic understanding. They do not agree on factivity and transparency of understanding. What then is the difference between their views and that of Jaspers? This essay compares recent epistemological views of understanding with those of Jaspers and critiques his claims about empathetic understanding as being both factive and self-evident or transparent; to show that empathetic understanding of connections between psychic events needs a public criterion for its individuation.