I work in practical philosophy, with a focus on moral responsibility and blameworthiness. My dissertation, The Boundaries of Blameworthiness (University of Gothenburg, 2026), develops the Moral Harm Account: a theory of how blameworthiness tracks deserved harm over time, diminishes as wrongdoers receive that harm, and persists and transforms after death. I'm particularly interested in diachronic and posthumous responsibility: how blame and praise evolve as agents age, how they extend beyond an agent's lifetime, and what this reveals about the foundations of moral responsibility and the passage of time.
My research connects to applied domains…
I work in practical philosophy, with a focus on moral responsibility and blameworthiness. My dissertation, The Boundaries of Blameworthiness (University of Gothenburg, 2026), develops the Moral Harm Account: a theory of how blameworthiness tracks deserved harm over time, diminishes as wrongdoers receive that harm, and persists and transforms after death. I'm particularly interested in diachronic and posthumous responsibility: how blame and praise evolve as agents age, how they extend beyond an agent's lifetime, and what this reveals about the foundations of moral responsibility and the passage of time.
My research connects to applied domains including AI ethics and regulation, criminology, and social work. I teach courses on responsible AI and have collaborated with the Lund-Gothenburg Responsibility Project. I'm drawn to questions that sit at the intersection of normative ethics, metaphysics, and policy, especially where philosophical precision can clarify what we owe each other and why.
Current research includes moral responsibility for character, asymmetries between praise and blame, and the role of consequentialist considerations (deterrence, desert, harm prevention) in justifying punishment and accountability practices.
