M. J. Garcia-Encinas

ABSTRACT In The Philosophy of Logical Atomism Russell held the view that facts in the world are formally structured complexes, the structure of which matches the logical structure of correspondent propositions. Russell also seems to have denied that there are facts of identity and of diversity. This paper argues that Identity and Diversity can be understood as purely formal structures in Russellian facts. It considers Russell’s possible reasons for denying the existence of facts of identity and diversity and shows how problematic these reasons are. In particular, I argue that identity statements are not tautologies, and their denial does not result into a contradiction. An important consequence of this thesis is that Metaphysics and Logic are not as tied up as Russell took them to be, but nevertheless these are good news for the old formal program for Metaphysics that lies at the very heart of what he called philosophical logic.

This volume rewrites the main talks presented at the SIUCC 2019 on Thomasson’s work at the University of Granada. The SIUCC is an annual conference consisting in three-day workshops organized under the auspices of the Spanish Society for Analytic Philosophy. Its goal is to bring the work of leading international philosophers in the most relevant fields of analytical philosophy to the Spanish philosophical community. Therefore, we proposed to invite Amie Thomasson for her leading and thoroughly original work in the field of metaphysics. Thomasson was first in defending and introducing for the analytic tradition a new ontology which includes the category of abstract artifacts, such as fictions and social objects. These are abstract, but non-Platonic, objects because they are intentionally, contingently, created by people and dependent on social and linguistic practices. Abstract artifacts begin to exist in time, and can disappear. These challenging ideas, and many others, such as her Carnap-inspired views on internal/external questions on existence, or her proposals on modal normativism, are commented in this volume by Juan José Acero, Otávio Bueno, Xavier Donato, Daniel Dohrn, J.L. Falguera, Nemesio García-Carril, Theodore Locke, Irene Olivero, Pablo Rychter and Mirco Sambrotta. Thomasson kindly responds to all of them.

This monographic issue contains a long article bringing together the Lullius Lectures delivered by Professor Sandra Mitchell during the Xth Conference of the Society of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science in Spain, that took place in Salamanca (16-19 November, 2021). The publication of her Lectures is complemented by six original articles that address and examine different aspects of Sandra Mitchell’s contributions to the philosophy of science. In this introduction to the monograph, the editors present the broad outlines of the Lullius Lectures given by Mitchell on the landscape of integrative pluralism. We accompany this overview with a review of some of the fundamental concepts of her philosophy as reviewed and discussed by the original articles included in the monograph on integrative pluralism (Deulofeu & Suarez, 2023; and Van Der Merwe, 2023), emergence (Onnis, 2023), scientific laws (Andersen, 2023; and Plutynski, 2023), and realism (Bertolaso & Sterpetti, 2023).

Transference theorists propose to explain causation in terms of the transference of a physical element. I argue, in two steps, that this is not possible. First, I show that available accounts of ‘transference’ ultimately convey that transference -and, consequently, causation- is the (non-relational) identity over time of the transferred element (a universal, a trope, or even an absolute substance). But, second, I try to defend, it is conceptually impossible that causation is (non-relational) identity.

Singular causation may be best understood within a dispositionalist framework. Although the details of just how a claim that this is in fact the case have not yet been fully worked out, different philosophers have made some positive contributions in this direction. In opposition to such suggestions, I claim that any possible account of singular causation in terms of real, irreducible, dispositions contains unresolvable flaws in its metaphysical foundations.First, I present two main constituents that I take to be necessary for any possible dispositional account of singular causation: (i) the possibility of causation without laws, which is a necessary condition for causal singularism, and (ii) a conception of dispositions as real, irreducible entities or properties. This results in aminimal dispositionalist view of singular causation. Second, I argue that, even if minimal, this view already has to face up to serious difficulties: (i) an ontological problem concerning the individuating conditions for dispositions in causal contexts, (ii) an instance of infinite regress, (iii) the loss of the relational character ofcausation and, as a corollary, (iv) the loss of the asymmetry of causation. Third, I argue that dispositionalists tend to misrepresent causal modality when proposing and solving a modal choice between Humeanism and dispositionalism that is becoming commonplace but which, I claim, is in fact a false choice. Finally, Isketch a possible picture of causality without laws and without dispositions.

This introduction offers an overview of the chapters included in this book to highlight the connections between the different topics addressed. We clarify the different senses in which the objects dealt with in this volume can be regarded as special. The book begins by considering biochemical molecules as a kind of object that, even though it has a very specific material constitution with a defined structure, cannot be characterized solely in terms of it. The next contributions turn to objects that, although material, do not have a clearly constrained structure: artifacts may belong to the same kind despite having very dissimilar physical constitutions, and fictional entities may have different material engagement even if they perform the same narrative function. Then the book considers ontological issues regarding psychiatric and psychological kinds of objects, which have both physical and normative dimensions. The chapters progressively move away from these more material kinds towards the more immaterial realm of the social, the intentional and the notional, paying particular attention to the nature of fictional objects, until they reach the furthest limit in impossible and non-existent objects, raising questions about modality. The closing chapter puts the focus on metaphysical accounts of the remarkably special physical objects found in the quantum realm.

In this chapter I study singular negative existential statements about entities in fiction. I will claim that names in fictional discourse such as ‘Hamlet’ or ‘Holmes’ are fake proper names. They do not refer, but merely pretend to directly refer. Thus, they do not refer to pretended entities, abstract objects, or to possible or impossible entities. It is within fiction that they play their primary semantic role. I will then claim that these ideas allow us to understand why existence does not add conceptual content to thought. Rather, existence and non-existence are transcendental forms of language and thought.

There is the difficult question in metaphysics about the possibility of modal knowledge, that is, the possibility of knowing that some facts are necessary or that some facts are contingent. The question is especially demanding when one agrees, as I will, that there are worldly modal facts, but that modality cannot be learnt by empirical means and it must be given a priori. Here I propose an answer that calls in rational intuition for help. In a line, the claim is that metaphysical modal knowledge can be acquired a priori, by intuition into the categorial structure of empirical facts. This form of rational intuition I call categorial intuition. I will also examine causal knowledge as an exemplary case of metaphysical modal knowledge by categorial intuition.

This book proposes a different perspective on actual queries within the field of ontology. Focusing on non-standard objects, it offers original answers to classic problems in metaphysics, such as individuation, reference, existence and non-existence. The chosen ontological fields are, for this purpose, ontologies that essentially involve human social practices such as intentional objects, fictions, mental illnesses or social entities. Even though the papers can be read independently, readers will discover a number of original intersections that provide fresh points of entry to contemporary metaphysical issues. By dealing with entities that are not so frequently addressed in related works, the book also contributes to broaden their perspective on ontology. Both scholars and students will find it particularly useful to have a survey about non-standard abstract entities that can provide new topics for their research.

Vaidya and Wallner [2021] claim that most relevant theories in recent epistemology of modality, that is, Conceivability-Theory, Counterfactual-Theory, and Deduction-Theory, face what they name “the problem of modal epistemic friction”, in a nutshell, the need to add some relevant information about the nature of the world that is not provided by the theories as such. Their proposal is that essences supply the needed information. In this paper I will agree with Vaidya and Waller’s detection of the problem of modal epistemic friction, but I will importantly disagree with their solution in terms of a metaphysics and epistemology of essences. I will argue that knowledge of essence is neither necessary nor sufficient for metaphysical modal knowledge and claim instead that modal knowledge is firstly grounded in the categories that conform the facts of reality. Categorial knowledge does the job of creating the friction needed in all cases of modal metaphysical knowledge.Moreover, given the structural character of metaphysical categories, intuition is the basic proper form of modal knowledge. In fact, I will contend that intuition is the source of a priori knowledge invoked in Kripkean schemas for a posteriori modal truths.

In The Philosophy of Logical Atomism Russell held the view that facts in the world are formally structured complexes, the structure of which matches the logical structure of correspondent propositions. Russell also seems to have denied that there are facts of identity and of diversity. This paper argues that Identity and Diversity can be understood as purely formal structures in Russellian facts. It considers Russell’s possible reasons for denying the existence of facts of identity and diversity and shows how problematic these reasons are. In particular, I argue that identity statements are not tautologies, and their denial does not result into a contradiction. An important consequence of this thesis is that Metaphysics and Logic are not as tied up as Russell took them to be, but nevertheless these are good news for the old formal program for Metaphysics that lies at the very heart of what he called philosophical logic.

The absence of a necessary connection in singular causation is a key step in the Humean argument against any form of necessity in causation. I argue that Hume's defence of this step is unsuccessful, and that the step could be skipped, accepting the possibility of necessary a posteriori truths. Still this does not suffice to guarantee a necessary connection in singular causation. Necessary a posteriori truths should be backed by necessary a priori truths. Thus, a main object of this paper is to argue that an a priori philosophical concept of causality involves a necessary connection between its terms.

En este artículo pretendo la clarificación conceptual de la idea de propiedad individual. En concreto, defiendo que las propiedades individuales no son compuestos, aunque son naturalezas individuales complejas. Por un lado, no poseen un parte "individuante" que dé cuenta de sus condiciones de individualización: las propiedades individuales tienen su propia identidad numérica primitiva. Por otro lado, no poseen un parte "común," "universalizante" que dé cuenta de su naturaleza: las propiedades individuales son naturalezas individuales. Más aún, la creencia injustificada en que toda naturaleza ha de ser universal, o de algún modo común, está detrás de la falsa necesidad de fundamentar la individualización de las propiedades individuales

Quiero mostrar en este artículo que no hay una metafísica analítica, lo que no significa que no se haga metafísica desde un punto de vista analítico, i.e., desde el análisis conceptual. Para ello, intento ofrecer un muestrario, inevitablemente escaso, de ideas y posiciones metafísicas diferentes que discuten los llamados filósofos analíticos. Mi tesis es que el interés por la ciencia, la lógica y el lenguaje, siempre desde el intento de racionalidad y objetividad en el método de conocimiento, es lo que, quizás, podría unir a todos estos filósofos.I want to show in this paper that there is no analytic metaphysics, which does not mean that Metaphysics is not being done from an analytic point of view, i.e., by means of conceptual analysis. With this object, I offer a necessarily scanty collection of different metaphysical ideas and positions that so-called analytic philosophers discuss. The thesis is that the interest in science, logic, and language, always with an aim of rationality and objectivity for knowledge, is, maybe, what could unite all these philosophers

Al escribir este articulo intento recuperar, para la discusión más contemporánea sobre los universales, al menos una parte de las ideas del lógico y filósofo medieval Pedro Abelardo. En particular, hay ciertas formas de nominalismo, léase, el mentalismo, el nominalismo de conjuntos, y el nominalismo de semejanza(s), que han reaparecido con fuerza nueva en metafísica analítica contemporánea. Abelardo, como nominalista que fue, no sólo argumentó contra tesis de corte realista;, sino que también evaluó y criticó otras formas de nominalismo diferentes a la suya y, en concreto, las mencionadas. Mi objeto principal es confrontar los argumentos de Abelardo con ellas, mostrando cómo sus argumentos aún prevalecen

I argue that the fundamental dogma that all necessary relations are internal is ungrounded. To motivate my argument, I analyse Moore’s classic ideas on internal relations and take them as an illustration of the common form of reasoning that can mislead us to conclude that all necessary relations are internal. That reasoning illicitly smuggles the idea that necessary properties and relations reflect on identity—in the sense that the loss of a necessary property/relation is a loss of identity—into the separate idea that the loss of a necessary property/relation is a loss of essence. Essence, however, is not identity. So the way seems to be open for the existence of necessary properties/relations which do not belong to the essence of entities; that is, the existence of necessary but external relations. I then offer some examples of such relations.

I want to make sense of the view that singular causation involves a metaphysical necessary connection. By this I understand, where A and B are particulars, that ifA causes B then in every possible world in which A (or an A-indiscernible) or B (or a B-indiscernible) occurs, A (or an Aindiscernible) and B (or a B-indiscernible) occur. In the singularist approach that I will favour causal facts do not supervene on laws, causal relata are best understood as tropes, causation is founded on the nature of its terms, and the necessity thus involved does not entail essentialism, determinism, and other usual problems

It was an empirical discovery that Phosphorus is Hesperus. According to Kripke, this was also the discovery of a necessary fact. Now, given Kripke’s theory of direct reference one could wonder what kind of discovery this is. For we already knew Phosphorus/Hesperus, and we also knew that any entity is, necessarily, identical to itself. So what is it that was discovered? I want to show that there is more to this widely known case than what usual readings, and critics, reveal; and I want to show this under the Kripkean pattern that what was discovered is the plain fact of identity that Phosphorus is, and necessarily is, Hesperus. Moreover, I will show how both Kripkean theses, the necessity of identity and the direct theory of reference, should not be kept apart to understand the kind of discovery this is. In particular, understanding the kind of discovery we made will help us see how intuition is displayed in metaphysics, and how metaphysical impossibilities, and metaphysical modality in general, can be discerned by reason and separated from other modalities. The study of this discovery will help us see, in a line, how identity belongs to the inner and most profound structure of reality and to the most profound structure of cognition and language.

This article argues for two related theses. First, it defends a general thesis: any kind of necessity, including metaphysical necessity, can only be known a priori. Second, however, it also argues that the sort of a priori involved in modal metaphysical knowledge is not related to imagination or any sort of so-called epistemic possibility. Imagination is neither a proof of possibility nor a limit to necessity. Rather, modal metaphysical knowledge is built on intuition of philosophical categories and the structures they form