M.m.s.k. Sie

This chapter explores the interrelations between stereotypes, prejudices, and implicit biases, investigates why particular stereotypes and prejudices are harmful, and discusses what this implies for personal responsibility. It argues that the discontinuation of harmful stereotypes and prejudices requires a collective effort. When implicit biases are the probable cause of a collective’s failure to discontinue them, members of that collective have a personal responsibility to compensate for the impact of implicit biases. This is called an account of indirect personal responsibility, because responsibility to compensate for the impact of implicit bias is established regardless of whether we are able to prevent or control such an impact. The chapter concludes with an example inviting people to consider the hypothesis that their behavior might be triggered by disavowed stereotypes and prejudices, and the benefits that allowing for that possibility brings us.

In this chapter, Maureen Sie argues that our nature as loving beings can explain our nature as moral beings. Because love and morality seem to be similar phenomena in many ways, she distinguishes several kinds of loves and explains how they relate to different moral dimensions of our existence, taking as her starting point C. S. Lewis’s work on the subject and renaming his fourth kind of love “kindness.” She argues that recent findings in affective neuroscience suggest that this fourth kind is a natural kind of love. She discusses the dynamics of Lewis’s account, showing that each of the loves that he distinguishes requires the fourth love (kindness) to keep them from taking a nasty turn. She concludes by explaining why this kind of love actually fits the naturalist picture well if the recent finding that oxytocin is involved in our trusting interactions with strangers is correct.

Our everyday language is drenched with terms and labels that refer to the social groups that are distinguished in our world. This influences the way we interact with ourselves and others. In this paper I discuss (1) how closely intertwined this labeling is with our nature as linguistic beings, what we should think (2) of our widespread and deeply entrenched inclination to socially categorize ourselves and others vis-a-vis (3) the harm it does according to an enormous amount of literature that has appeared in the past decades. In my discussion I steer clear of the heated discussion surrounding wokeness and the so-called culture wars, but discuss some of the tensions beneath it. My discussion is aimed at those who do not exactly know how to relate to the increased and omnipresent social categorisation in our daily practices, but would prefer to approach one another outside of those categories, aware of the potential harm it might do. I conclude with a short reflection on the notions of playfulness and symmetry, and how these might help us improve our attitude towards the other.

Basic Desert, Reactive Attitudes and Free Will addresses the issue of whether we can make sense of the widespread conviction that we are morally responsible beings. It focuses on the claim that we deserve to be blamed and punished for our immoral actions, and how this claim can be justified given the philosophical and scientific reasons to believe that we lack the sort of free will required for this sort of desert. Contributions to the book distinguish between, and explore, two clusters of questions. The first asks what it is to deserve to be harmed or benefitted. What are the bases for desert – actions, good character, bad character, the omission of good character traits? The second cluster explores the disagreement between compatabilists and incompatibilists surrounding the nature of desert. Do we deserve to be harmed, benefitted, or judged, even if we lack the ability to act differently, and if we do not, what effect does this have on our everyday actions? Taken in full, this book sheds light on the notion of desert implicated in our practice of holding each other morally responsible. This book was originally published as a special issue of _Philosophical Explorations. _.

Practical reasoning in contemporary Western societies is characterised by an unprecedented degree of idiosyncrasy and demands of personal authenticity. This has resulted from the decline of traditional moral authorities, the rise of individualistic lifestyles, increasing multiculturalism and rapid technological advance.These developments have given rise to reflection on the notion of 'reasons of one's own', an examination of the intelligibility of reasons that are closely connected to a particular agent, and recognised as such by others, although not shared by them.Problems addressed by the contributors include; How to account for the cognitive overtones in moral and motivational language given the apparent 'agent-relativity' of reasons. How to retain the 'agent-relativity' of reasons for action given that they require articulation through a language shared by the community, and how to account for the practical rationality required for co-operation between persons in view of the idiosyncrasy of a person's motivating reasons.In dealing with these issues this book presents a range of investigative essays on the concept of reasons of one's own by leading authors from all relevant philosophical areas of expertise.

What role do celebrities play in our moral lives? Philosophers have explored the potential for celebrities to function as moral exemplars and role models. We argue that there are more ways in which celebrities play a role in helping us navigate our moral lives. First, gossiping about celebrities helps us negotiate our moral norms and identify competing styles of life. Second, fandom for celebrities serves as the basis for the development of distinct moral communities and identities. Third, celebrities possess high levels of epistemic power which can be used to help change and adapt our moral norms. We will then investigate two kinds of problems that arise from using celebrities in this way. Firstly, harm is done to celebrities because they are used in the ways explained in the first part of the article; secondly, celebrity life has a distinctive nature that can affect the moral agency of celebrities. Fame, we suggest, might lead to a morally unhealthy asymmetry in human relationships. We end by discussing the ethical implications of our analysis and conclude that when using stars for moral navigation, we should take into account the harm this does to them and the distinctive nature of their lives.

This chapter discusses the communicative and coordinative role and importance to moral practices of the moral sentiments. A clear understanding of this role enables one to explain why people share responsibility for their moral practices and why changing these practices is a collective enterprise. The chapter thereby affirms the importance of tokens of appraisal regardless of how one answers the question whether, in one sense or another, one deserves them. The chapter elaborates upon two aspects of the practices of moral responsibility: (1) people are enabled to develop certain agential capacities, and (2) they are able to codetermine, consolidate, and fine-tune their normative expectations of one another. Several compatibilist philosophers have observed the first aspect. The second, however, has not received enough attention. This second aspect explains why and in what respect changing and improving one’s everyday practices is bound to be a difficult, painstaking, and above all collective enterprise.

The idea that human beings experience their lives as some sort of story and tend to understand themselves as authors of a narrative has become increasingly popular in philosophy. Some philosophers suggest that narratives are indispensable when it comes to answering the traditional question associated with personal (numerical) identity: what makes it the case that the person considered at time t0 is the same person as the person considered at time t1? They claim that taking a narrative approach to this question allows for avoiding some of the problems that arise when attempting to answer it in terms of biological or psychological continuity. Other philosophers point out that narratives primarily have a unifying role with respect to our actions, experiences, beliefs, desires, and character traits. They take narratives to answer what Marya Schechtman (1996) calls “the characterization” question, in that narratives structure our self-experience and characterize us as unique individuals...

“I demote practical reason from the conductor’s podium on which it is traditionally pictured, leading the performance. I picture practical reason less as an orchestral conductor than as a theatrical prompter — out of sight, following the action in case it needs to be nudged back into an intelligible course.” (David Velleman 2009, p. 4)IntroductionIn this paper I discuss our practice of exchanging explanatory and justifying reasons with one another, that is, reasons with which we explain or justify our actions, choices, and decisions. I argue that the general aim and importance of this practice—as well as the associated ideas of responsibility and free will—is compatible with the finding that we are often, or even most of the time, not deliberatively aware of the reasons for which we act, prior to our acting so. That is, in many cases there are no explicit reasons, considerations we have reflected on and are aware of, that precede our actions. It is in this sense, I argue, that human ag.

Many philosophers ignore developments in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences that purport to challenge our ideas of free will and responsibility. The reason for this is that the challenge is often framed as a denial of the idea that we are able to act differently than we do. However, most philosophers think that the ability to do otherwise is irrelevant to responsibility and free will. Rather it is our ability to act for reasons that is crucial. We argue that the scientific findings indicate that it is not so obvious that our views of free will and responsibility can be grounded in the ability to act for reasons without introducing metaphysical obscurities. This poses a challenge to philosophers. We draw the conclusion that philosophers are wrong not to address the recent scientific developments and that scientists are mistaken in formulating their challenge in terms of the freedom to do otherwise.

Adina Roskies has argued that worries that recent developments in the neurosciences challenge our ideas of free will and responsibility are misguided. Her argument focuses on the idea that we are able to act differently than we do. However, according to a dominant view in contemporary philosophy, the ability to do otherwise is irrelevant to our judgments of responsibility and free will. It rather is our ability to act for reasons that is crucial. We argue that this view is most significantly challenged by the recent discoveries. Those discoveries show that it is not as obvious and uncontroversial that we act for reasons as it seems. Hence, we have to rethink our concept of reasons-responsiveness.

Recent empirical research results in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences on the “adaptive unconscious” show that conscious control and deliberative awareness are not all-pervasive aspects of our everyday dealings with one another. Moral philosophers and other scientists have used these insights to put our moral agency to the test. The results of these tests are intriguing: apparently we are not always (or ever?) the moral agents we take ourselves to be. This paper argues in favor of a refinement of our common perception of moral agency that can accommodate these results; however, it also argues against the suggestion that this refined concept is the result of a radical new understanding of our everyday moral practices.

In this paper it is argued that we can have defensible attributions of responsibility without first answering the question whether determinism and free will are compatible. The key to such a defense is a focus on the fact that most actions for which we hold one another responsible are quite ordinary—trespassing traffic regulations, tardiness, or breaking a promise. As we will show, unlike actions that problematize our moral competence — e.g. akratic and ‘moral monster’- like ones—ordinary ‘wrong’ actions often disclose this competence. Hence, no counterfactual assumption is needed to establish that some of us are sometimes responsible for some of the actions we perform.

Suppose that there is no real distinction between 'mad' and 'bad' because every truly bad-acting agent, proves to be a morally incompetent one. If this is the case: should we not change our ordinary interpersonal relationships in which we blame people for the things they do? After all, if people literally always act to 'the best of their abilities' nobody is ever to blame for the wrong they commit, whether these wrong actions are 'horrible monster'-like crimes or trivial ones, such as cycling on a footpath. This paper offers a skeptical solution, i.e., a solution that does not depend upon the existence of individual responsibility for extreme wrongdoing. I conclude that even in the 'worst case' that skepticism about the distinction between mad and bad is warranted, we are nevertheless justified to treat one another; in general, as morally competent agents who are often to blame for the wrong they commit.

According to some, contemporary social psychology is aptly described as a study in moral hypocrisy. In this paper we argue that this is unfortunate when understood as establishing that we only care about appearing to act morally, not about true moral action. A philosophically more interesting interpretation of the “moral hypocrisy”-findings understands it to establish that we care so much about morality that it might lead to self-deception about the moral nature of our motives and/or misperceptions regarding what we should or should not do in everyday or experimental situations. In this paper we argue for this claim by elaborating on a fascinating series of experiments by Daniel Batson and his colleagues who have consistently contributed to the moral hypocrisy findings since the late nineties, and showing in what way they contribute to a better understanding of moral agency, rather than undermine the idea that we are moral agents.