M. T. Lu

In this paper, we give a logical analysis of pluralistic ignorance, which is an important social phenomenon. There has been no consensus about the definition of pluralistic ignorance in the literature. From an epistemic point of view, there are at least three definitions of pluralistic ignorance. We choose three definitions among them, which, for us, are natural to explain many classic examples of phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance in the literature of social and behavioural sciences, e.g., (American) college campuses, The Emperor's New Clothes. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no logical study on the three definitions of pluralistic ignorance yet. We take the three operators of pluralistic ignorance induced by the definitions as first‐class citizens and investigate their logical properties, including the similarities, differences and the interactions, where we find some interesting results; in particular, under the assumption that beliefs are consistent and negatively introspective, a group cannot be second‐order pluralistically ignorant, and thus not be any higher order pluralistically ignorant. This contrasts with Fitch's result in “Ignorance of ignorance” (Kit Fine, Synthese, 2018) that under the same assumption, one may be second‐order ignorant, even though under the assumption of the modal system S4 (semantically, the class of transitive and reflexive frames), one cannot know that one is second‐order ignorant.

This qualitative study presents 27 students’ insights about four teachers’ implementation of an immersive Native American history curricular unit designed to equip students with digital skills to critically navigate complex, polarizing social issues. The Digital Civic Learning (DCL) curriculum used Google Suite and Google Classroom or Schoology to provide collaborative slides supporting immersive 2D-graphics, children’s books/resources, immersive activities/artefact-creation, and multimodal tools (e.g., discussion posts, Flipgrid video-essays). Teachers regulated student thinking/behavior towards cohesive outcomes, and encouraged open-ended exploration, operationalizing the design framework as a zone of proximal development (ZPD). The history unit incorporates four cybernetic design features (DF) that enable teachers to steer student-centered collaboration within the curricular unit. The teacher serves four diverse roles (guide, facilitator, modeler, participant observer) mapping onto the DF. Results of focus group interviews with students, which were analyzed based on a theory-informed coding scheme and narrative inquiry, suggest ways for social studies teachers to operationalize the DCL immersive history unit as a cybernetic ZPD by adapting its basic structure to technologies accessible in their schools by adapting its basic structure to technologies accessible in their schools.

In his treatise Han Fei Zi, the Chinese ancient thinker Han Fei proposes a governance structure that emphasizes the institutionalization of legal norms, judicious sovereign intervention, and ministerial obligations. These three core concepts of Han’s legal thinking are informed by both the Taoist law of Nature and the Confucian philosophy as is expounded by Xun Zi. Recognition of the Taoist and Confucian influences brings to light the ethical and normative dimensions of Han’s legal thought, dimensions that, I propose, provide new insights into China’s legal and institutional reforms today.

Both Renaissance Europe and Ming China witnessed an epoch-making declaration of the liberation of the mind, a manifesto that laid the groundwork for the emergence of the modern subjective self. In his Meditations on First Philosophy, René Descartes declares that there is "nothing else to be in me over and above the mind", and "I'm therefore precisely nothing but a thinking thing; that is, a mind, or intellect, or understanding, or reason".1 In defining my self as a thinking thing, Descartes states, "I have taken the being or existence of this thought as the first principle". By thought or cogito, Descartes means "everything that is in us in such a way...

Cet article porte sur l'amitié et la piété filiale dans le néo-confucianisme de l’époque Ming, notamment dans l’enseignement de Wang Yangming. J’avance que les jianghui cultivant la pensée de Yangming offrirent un environnement social idéal pour ennoblir l’amitié. On considérait la véritable amitié comme un vecteur de perfectionnement moral et le moyen de réduire le risque de subjectivisme dans la philosophie inspirée de Yangming. Je reconsidère également la question de savoir si les néo-confucianistes de l’époque Ming ont contesté l’ordre des cinq relations cardinales en faisant de l’amitié la plus importante d’entre elles. À travers l’examen approfondi de la piété filiale dans la culture impériale et l’enseignement de Yangming, je souligne que la piété filiale ne constituait pas seulement la base de l’ordre socio-politique, mais aussi l’essence du vrai moi. L’amitié tire son importance de sa capacité à nous aider sur la voie du perfectionnement moral et de l’amélioration de soi. Néanmoins, elle n’a jamais pu surpasser l’importance que revêt la piété filiale et elle ne vint que compléter l’éthique familiale.

This essay compares Greek and Chinese conceptions of the origin of the world based on the concept of cosmo-metaphysics, by which I mean a philosophical scheme that addresses at once the law of the universe and the primary cause of substance or being. In regarding God or the first mover as both the cosmic and substantial principle of unity, Aristotle spells out a cosmo-metaphysics in his On the Universe and the Metaphysics. Aristotle’s cosmo-metaphysics, I propose, finds a close parallel in the metaphysical system represented in the Laozi 老子, the Daoist classic, and “The Great Commentary” on the Yijing 易經. Both texts articulate a cosmo-metaphysics that integrates the cosmic and substantial principles of unity through the two concepts of the Dao 道 and being versus nonbeing, the Chinese counterparts of Aristotle’s prime mover and being qua being. Chinese and Western metaphysics share not only a fundamental assumption about the origin of the world but also the hypothesis of an ineffable and inactive first mover. Where Aristotle resorts to analogy and metaphor to name and characterize this elusive and passive mover, Chinese philosophers prefer to leave it unnamed and use natural images to illustrate its nature. Despite the different approaches, however, the fundamental assumption about the prime mover as both a substantial and cosmic principle lies at the root of both Chinese and Western metaphysics. The comparative lens centered on the concept of cosmo-metaphysics thus uncovers a distinctive Chinese metaphysics that corresponds closely to that in the West, a correspondence that calls into question some prevailing presumptions about Chinese philosophy.

This article discusses friendship and filial piety in Ming Neo-Confucianism, particularly the Yangming learning. I argue that the Yangming jianghui provided important social settings for elevating the value of friendship. True friendship was considered as a means for moral improvement, and to prevent the risk of moral subjectivism in the Yangming philosophy.I also revisit the question of whether Ming Neo-Confucians did challenge the order of the five cardinal relationships by elevating friendship as the most important one. Through the investigation of filial piety in imperial culture and the Yangming learning, I emphasize that filial piety was not only the basis of socio-political order, but also the essence of the true self. The importance of friendship lies in its capacity to aid moral cultivation and to become a better self. It could never surpass that of filial piety. It remained a supplement to familial ethics.

In the following paper I discuss the under-appreciated role that the concept of the morally serious (spoudaios) person plays in Aristotle’s moral philosophy. I argue that the conventional English rendering of spoudaios as “good” has a tendency to cut us off from important nuances in Aristotle’s consideration of the virtuous person. After discussing aspects of his use of the concept in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics I dismiss a misunderstanding of seriousness as a kind of morally indifferent personality trait. I close by briefly reflecting on how an absence of moral seriousness characterizes much contemporary moral theorizing and produces what Anscombe described as the “corrupt mind.”

In this paper I take up the claims of a number of recent commentators who have argued that there is no rational basis for a moral judgment against cannibalism because no successful argument against it can be articulated within the dominant consequentialist or neo-Kantian deontological approaches in normative ethics. While I think cannibalism is clearly morally repugnant, it is surprisingly difficult to explain why. I argue not only that a rational justification of the moral wrongness of cannibalism can be given in terms of a broadly Aristotelian virtue ethics, but also that this requires a broader conception of moral value, and corresponding moral obligations, than is typical within the dominant approaches.

Notwithstanding Aristotle’s own relative silence on the matter, in this paper I argue that piety is a natural (not supernatural) virtue of the Aristotelian kind. I begin with St. Thomas’s discussion of the virtues of religion and piety in which he shows how they both involve a recognition of human contingency and our radically dependent nature. Building off of this Thomistic analysis, I offer both an account of Aristotelian virtue in general and a phenomenological analysis of piety in particular, in which I situate piety with respect to the other Aristotelian virtues. Finally, I close with a discussion of a few natural objections, including questions about the limits of natural reason as well as considering why Aristotle himself did not explicitly treat piety as a moral virtue.

Alasdair MacIntyre once famously asked “is patriotism is a virtue?” but never quite answered the question. In this paper, I seek to provide a more concrete response by analyzing whether patriotism fits the model of an Aristotelian natural virtue. Since Aristotle himself does not offer an extensive discussion of patriotism as a virtue, I take my inspiration from St. Thomas who does clearly regard something like patriotism as a part of the natural virtue of piety. After exploring the significance of Thomas’s key claim that patriotism is owed to the “sources of our being,” I sketch the structure of moral virtue in Aristotle with an emphasis on his claim that all the virtues are. Finally, I show how patriotism fits the model of an Aristotelian natural moral virtue and conclude by addressing a few natural objections.

Several commentators have noted that “justice has not fared well in the revival of virtue ethics”; it “has become damagingly marginalized” and “no longer has a starring role.” Given its traditional place among the four cardinal virtues this is a remarkable state of affairs and yet exactly this has occurred has not been adequately explored or explained. In this paper, I argue that the particular moral virtue of justice has been largely disregarded by the contemporary virtue theorists primarily because their conception of justice is so different from Aristotle’s. Accordingly, they do not need the virtue of justice to do the kind of explanatory work in their systems that it does in Aristotle’s.

In Book II, Chapter 5 of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle famously identifies the virtues as hexeis. Like so many Greek philosophical terms of art, hexis admits of many translations; recent scholarly choices have included “habit,” “disposition,” “state,” “active condition.” In this paper, I argue that some of these translations have tended to obscure the active and causal role that hexeis play in Aristotle’s theory of moral action. This, in turn, has led at least some critics to misunderstand the Aristotelian virtue ethics tradition and mischaracterize virtue ethics as not properly action guiding. Ultimately, seeing the true significance of Aristotle’s claim that the virtues, both moral and intellectual, are hexeis helps us recognize just how radically different the Aristotelian conceptions of practical reason and moral action are from with those typically held by adherents of the alternative theories of normative ethics.

Over the last several decades many abortion advocates have attempted to spread confusion and doubt concerning the beginnings of human life. A particularly cynical strategy has involved invoking the authority historical thinkers, especially Doctors of the Church, to support the claim that (at least) early abortion does not constitute homicide because the early embryo is not yet fully human. Anyone familiar with context of these historical thinkers should realize that their specific judgments regarding abortion are now obsolete in virtue of their primitive scientific understanding of embryology. In what follows, I summarize the Aristotelian embryology that explains why these historical thinkers held the views that they did. I then explore how we should best understand their broader ethical views in light of our vastly superior contemporary knowledge of human embryology. Unsurprisingly, it turns out that if we apply the contemporary empirical findings of embryology the very same metaphysical and ethical principles informing the thinking of the historical figures supports the prolife position.

In this paper I take a critical look at Judith Jarvis Thomson famous violinist analogy for abortion. I argue that while the violinist example does show that a right to life does not entail a right to be given the means of life, the violinist cast is relevantly different from the pregnancy case. I also argue that Thomson's positive argument in favor of the permissibility of abortion fails because it is based on a false conception of bodily self-ownsership. Finally, I offer an argument against abortion built not on the child's rights, but the mother's obligation to the vulnerable.

Modern philosophers tends to regard morality as intrinsically universalist, embracing universal norms that apply formally to each moral agent qua moral agent, independent of particularities such as familial relationships or membership in a specific community. At the same time, however, most of us think (and certainly act as if) those particularist properties play a significant and legitimate role in our moral lives. Accordingly, determining the proper relationship of these two spheres of the moral life is of great importance, but a fully successful resolution of this tension remains lacking. I believe Dietrich von Hildebrand’s work on love, and specifically his development of the idea of Eigenleben (Subjectivity) in The Nature of Love, offers a fruitful way forward. In this paper I begin by laying out some of the chief features of the universalist character of modern moral theory in both Kantianism and consequentialism. I then articulate some of the ways in which von Hildebrand’s understanding of Eigenleben offers us genuine insights towards articulating a substantive account of the proper relationship of the universal demands of morality and the particularist demands of my own life. Specifically, von Hildebrand’s critique of extreme altruism shows that moral agents cannot be properly understood according to merely formal properties like rationality, because each person’s particular Eigenleben is the only real grounds for moral agency. Von Hildebrand develops a critique of depersonalized universalism similar to Bernard Williams’ later criticisms of Kantian moral thought, while offering a positive account that is in many ways more compelling. Ultimately, von Hildebrand allows us to see that a genuine Subjectivity is the necessary grounds for the possibility of love, including and especially the love of God, which serves as the basis for a genuine morality based on objective values. Building on this insight we can begin to articulate an account of the moral life grounded in answering the call of God that can do justice to both our universalist and particularist intuitions.

The Obama administration’s HHS mandate to force Catholic and other religious organizations to provide insurance coverage for morally objectionable practices has been the source of a great deal of controversy. While the religious liberty question has received the most attention, the mandate reveals a yet deeper problem in the mainstream acceptance of contraception and even abortion as a normal part of medical practice. The author argues that these practices constitute a deep corruption of medicine itself, away from its original meaning as a kind of restorative justice grounded in a substantive understanding of the human good and towards a formalist emphasis on preference satisfaction and patient autonomy.

In this paper I discuss what contemporary virtue ethics can say about abortion by considering both what has been said and what we may further argue from a virtue-focused perspective. I begin by comparing virtue ethics to the two other dominant approaches in normative ethics and then consider what some important virtue ethicists have said about abortion, especially Rosalind Hursthouse. After recognizing the many contributions her analysis offers, I also note some of the deficiencies in her approach, particularly in her attempt to bracket the problems of fetal status and women’s rights. Finally, in light of these criticisms I attempt to extend a virtue ethics analysis to embrace a more robust recognition of the humanity of the fetus and the attendant demand of a near absolute prohibition on abortion.

Some recent commentators have thought that, if updated with the findings of modern embryology, Aristotle’s views on abortion would yield a pro-life conclusion. On the basis of a careful reading of the relevant passage from Politics VII, I argue that the matter is more complicated than simply replacing his defective empirical embryological claims with our more accurate ones. Since Aristotle’s view on abortion was shaped not only by a defective embryology but also by an acceptance of the classical Greek practice of exposure/ infanticide, substituting a more accurate embryology will not straightforwardly generate a strongly pro-life conclusion. In the end, this analysis reveals how different Aristotle’s ethical thought on this matter really is from the contemporary discussion of abortion