Maciej Dybowski

The chapter introduces a distinction between two kinds of concepts used in discursive practices in the area of law: object-concepts and tool-concepts. The distinction, rooted in Brandomian analytic pragmatism, is based on the idea that the vocabulary of tool-concepts is best understood as an element of pragmatic meta-vocabulary relation with regard to the vocabulary of object-concepts in law. The historical part advances the claim that the emergence of fully developed tool-concepts resulted from a revolutionary turn in medieval glossators’ improvement of understanding of their own techniques. The theoretical part of chapter elaborates on the distinction and examines its theoretical benefit of extending the analysis of concepts in law beyond the confines of relations between vocabularies. This offers a shift of focus from words or vocabularies to practices or abilities that the users of such concepts engage in and must possess.

This book engages the field of practice theory in order to consider law as a social practice. Taking up the theoretical concept of practices, the contributors to this volume maintain that law can be fruitfully understood as one among other social practices. Including perspectives from philosophers of language, experts in practice theory, linguists and legal philosophers, the book examines the twin questions of what it means for law to be considered a practice, and what law's place is among other social practices. The book is comprised of three parts. The first provides a broad methodological framework for discussing how the concept of practice is used in the social sciences, and in law. The second deals with specific problems arising from the use of the concept of practice in the legal context, and from the intersection of different social practices. The third part identifies and addresses the consequences of applying insights from practice theory to law. Together, they offer a comprehensive consideration of what is at stake in understanding law as a social practice. This book will appeal to sociolegal scholars, sociologists of law, philosophers of language and action, as well as philosophers of law and legal theorists.

The aim of this paper is to show that the meaning and significance of legal evidence is being constituted throughout the course of a singular instance of legal proceedings. This is to be achieved by describing what legal agents _do_ while appealing to different propositions of fact and inferring from them throughout the course of legal proceedings. The authors claim that the process of applying the law is ultimately rooted in the inferential discursive practices of exchanging reasons on the part of the participants of legal proceedings. Therefore, they set forth a model of legal proceedings that consists of an interplay between three types of reasons, which are exchanged by the participants of legal proceedings: i.e. legal reasons, epistemic reasons and stake reasons. To illustrate this interplay, the authors deploy a metaphor of law as a game, and provide a description of legal proceedings as a particular instance of playing a game of law. The conclusion is that the legal concept of evidence is (at least in part) constituted by the role that evidence plays in affecting which reasons for action the participants to legal proceedings choose to act on. The other final assumption of this paper is metatheoretical: authors want to show that when analyzing what legal evidence is, one should begin from the perspective of a singular instance of legal proceedings, rather than from the perspective of law in general.

Many irreconcilable accounts of ratio legis in legal science, often concerned with legal interpretation, suffer from being disconnected from practical reasoning. Different theories of legal interpretation which result in one-sided views of ratio legis are by-products of one-sided semantics. The first part of the chapter diagnoses this problem by providing a model of three types of one-sided semantics—upstream, midstream and downstream—and explaining how they translate into respective accounts of legal interpretation and ratio legis. The second part of the chapter presents an alternative to one-sided semantics in legal theory. The alternative account which combines semantics and practical reasoning in legal theory is based on Brandom’s inferential pragmatism. The usefulness of inferential pragmatism in legal theory with regard to the problem of ratio legis is tested and followed by extending an inferentialist account of ratio legis provided by Canale and Tuzet. A model of agent’s actions and reasons, and their impact on the reasoning of interpreters and decision-makers is the essential part of this extension.

The book is dedicated to the theoretical problems concerning ratio legis. In the contexts of legal interpretation and legal reasoning, the two most important intellectual tools employed by lawyers, ratio legis would seem to offer an extremely powerful argument. Declaring the ratio legis of a statute can lead to a u-turn argumentation throughout the lifespan of the statute itself – in parliament, or in practice during court sessions, when it is tested against the constitution. Though the ratio legis argument is widely used, much about it warrants further investigation. On the general philosophical map there are many overlapping areas that concern different approaches to human rationality and to the problems of practical reasoning. Particular problems with ratio legis arise in connection with different perspectives on legal philosophy and theory, especially in terms of the methods that lawyers use for legal interpretation and argumentation. These problems can be further subdivided into particular aspects of activities undertaken by lawyers and officials who use the ratio legis in their work, and the underlying theories. In short, this book examines what ratio legis is, what it could be, and its practical implications.

Contemporary analytic theories of law attempt to provide hermeneutic answers to the metaphysical question about the nature of law with intuition playing a pivotal role in these attempts. It is doubtful, however, whether intuition can meet metaphysical and hermeneutic expectations of such theories. The article points out divergent ways of understanding intuition in analytic theories of law. Moreover, such theories face a dilemma of choosing between the „hard” ontology of law, to which intuition would have a privileged epistemic access, and „soft” ontology which entails multiple types of intuition. If collective consciousness, to which the intuitions that constitute the concept of law allegedly belong, is indeed the metaphysical foundation of contemporary analytic theories, they are hardly discernible from empiricism. A promising complementary approach to such a way of theorizing about law—where the vocabulary of intuitions is prioritized—can be provided by analytic pragmatism extending analysis to the practices in which words acquire their meanings.