Maciej (Maciek) Zając

Fully autonomous weapon systems need to comply with International Humanitarian Law and underlying ethical principles. This requires the ability to recognize not only objects or persons to be targeted but also protected persons or objects. Such sophisticated object classification abilities, if achievable at all, would have to utilize machine learning techniques. These come with well-known limitations to predictability, reliability and explainability. This article argues such limitations could be overcome to a sufficient extent by thorough and realistic testing efforts. These efforts, even if they detected satisfactory performance, could not generate certainty of compliance. Yet they could result in compliance having been achieved becoming the best explanation of empirical evidence and the most reasonable belief to have about the specific AWS model. However, the limitations of this approach – its reliance on quantity and quality of data unavailable to most actors and the fragility and limited durability of positive outcomes – would limit its practical utility. Issues of predictability are thus likely to limit AWS use to a highly restricted, closely supervised kinds of operations analogous to the current use of area-affecting munitions or to environments virtually free of noncombatants.

The thesis offers a comprehensive argument in favor of a regulationist approach to autonomous weapon systems (AWS). AWS, defined as all military robots capable of selecting or engaging targets without direct human involvement, are an emerging and potentially deeply transformative military technology subject to very substantial ethical controversy. AWS have both their enthusiasts and their detractors, prominently advocating for a global preemptive ban on AWS development and use. Rejecting both positions, the author outlines a middle-of-the-road regulationist approach that is neither overly restrictive nor overly permissive. The disqualifying flaws of the rival prohibitionist approach are demonstrated in the process. After defining the core term of autonomy in weapon systems, the practical difficulties involved in applying an arms control regime to AWS are analyzed. The analysis shows that AWS are an extremely regulation-resistant technology. This feature when combined with their assumed high military utility makes a ban framework extremely costly to impose and enforce. As such it is ultimately very likely to fail at the benefit of the most unscrupulous international actors and at a very substantial risk to those abiding with international law. Consequently, to be ethically viable, a prohibitionist framework would need to offer substantial moral benefits impossible to attain through the rival regulationist approach. The remainder of the thesis undertakes to demonstrate that this is not the case. Comparing the considerations of military and strategic necessity to humanitarian concerns most commonly voiced by prohibitionists requires finding a common denominator for all values being referred to. Consequently, the thesis proceeds to show that both kinds of concerns are ultimately reducible to respect for basic human rights of all stakeholders, and so that the prohibitionist and regulationist approach may ultimately be compared in terms of consequences their adoption would generate for basic human rights realization. The author then evaluates both the potential humanitarian benefits, and the potential humanitarian hazards of AWS introduction. The benefits of leaving frontline combat to machines are outlined, with the unique kinds of suffering that would be abolished by such a development being described in detail. The arguments against AWS adoption are then divided into three classes: arguments related to alleged impossibility of compliance with The Laws of Armed Conflict, non-consequentialist and broad consequentialist arguments. This analysis, which comprises the greater part of the entire thesis, shows that the concerns behind compliance arguments are indeed substantial and have to be accommodated via a complex framework of best practices, regulations and localized restrictions on some kinds of AWS or AWS use in particular environments. They do not, however, justify a universal ban on using all the diverse forms of AWS in all environments. Non-consequentialist objections are found either reducible to other classes of arguments or thoroughly unconvincing, sometimes to the point of being actually vacuous. Broad consequentialist concerns are likewise found to be accommodable by regulation, empirically unfounded or causally disconnected from the actions of legitimate actors acquiring AWS, and therefore irrelevant to the moral permissibility of such actions. The author concludes that the proponents of prohibitionism are unable to point to moral benefits substantial enough to justify the costs and risks inherent in the approach. A global ban is, in fact, likely to have a worse humanitarian impact that well-regulated AWS adoption even if the strategic risks are disregarded. On the other hand, the analysis shows that there indeed exists an urgent need to regulate AWS through a variety of technological, procedural and legal solutions. These include, but are not limited to, a temporary moratorium on anti-personnel AWS use, development of internationally verified compliance software and eventual legal requirement of its employment, a temporary moratorium on AWS proliferation to state actors and a ban on their proliferation to non-state agents.

Some proponents of a ban on Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) believe adopting these would lower the threshold for war, and is thus morally undesirable. This paper argues against that thesis. First, removing a single constraint on warmaking does not automatically make war more likely. Analysis of the causal input of other more potent restraints shows this holds true for just a fraction of potential conflicts. Secondly, AWS adoption would also impact other restraints on war in ways that are complex and unpredictable. Without a thorough analysis of these other impacts, AWS’ adoption impact on the incidence of war cannot be said to be significant enough to warrant action. Thirdly, war ethics does not aim to reduce the number of wars simpliciter, but to resist, deter, and thus reduce occurrence of unjustified aggression. Consequently lowering the threshold for defensive war, especially for wars of collective defense and/or humanitarian interventions, would be a good outcome, potentially offsetting a possible negative effect on the incidence of aggressive wars. Last but not least, states that already restrain themselves from aggressive warring by sufficiently robust alternative mechanisms cannot be required to eschew AWS adoption for that reason. Taken together, these arguments prove that the impact of AWS introduction on the incidence of war cannot be discerned through a priori philosophical analysis alone. Consequently ‘lower threshold for war’ argument cannot support calls for an AWS ban.

Autonomous weapon systems (AWS) – military robots able to select and engage targets with lethal force on their own – are a subject of voluminous ethical debates, with many calling for a universal ban on AWS. One of the most prominent arguments for such a ban is based on the threat of anti-personnel AWS – killer robots – to terrorist groups and totalitarian regimes. As these weapons would be ideal for terrorist or oppressive ends, and as having such ends realized is very bad indeed, this would be a disastrous outcome. Although agreeing with this threat assessment, I argue that a universal ban on AW would be neither necessary nor sufficient to stop these outcomes, while the efforts to create a ban divert resources from other more feasible countermeasures. To show this, I critically analyze two most detailed extant accounts of the proliferation threat put forward by ban proponents. Based on that analysis, I propose a number of more specific policy measures that could prevent most dire forms of killer robots’ proliferation while remaining politically feasible and compatible with subsequent pursuit of more ambitious non-proliferation agenda.

Critics of the Ukrainian use of cluster munitions (CMs) fail to acknowledge several key details of the case: Ukraine’s lack of alternatives, use in own, already heavily mined territory, the existential threat the country is facing or the fact the less harmful class of CMs is being used in finite and pre-determined amounts as a stop-gap measure. Given these circumstances, standard arguments against CM use fail to convince. The case of Ukraine’s CM use also showcases several weaknesses of the contemporary prohibition-focused approach to weapons law, such as a failure to deliver alternatives, to acknowledge outlier cases and to be more aware of organizational biases that may affect NGOs and IGOs advocating for new bans and restrictions.

Allowing prisoners of war (POW) to be released on parole ceased to be practiced in early XX century, although for centuries it was quite common in European warfare. In this article I argue there are several powerful moral reasons to reinstate POW parole: the well- being of POW and their families, but also a chance to address the previously intractable problem of surrender to aircraft and autonomous weapons. I also argue that there are no good moral reasons not to allow POW to accept parole, and that the reasons commonly put forward against the practice of parole are usually informed by antiquated and flawed ethical attitudes. I subsequently offer solutions for overcoming the practical obstacles to reinstating the practice of parole utilizing commonly available technology and self-enforcing diplomatic arrangements. I provide a detailed outline of such arrangements, addressing a number of possible objections and testing the model against several hypothetical scenarios.

There are several strong moral reasons for restoring the practice of parole for prisoners of war (POWs), that is, allowing them to spend their POW internment in a neutral country or in their own country provided they abstain from any military activity. This article makes an ethical case for parole, while discussing thoroughly theoretical as well as practical arguments against its reintroduction. The article suggests ways to create a reliable, internationally recognized way of paroling POWs. It concludes that the reintroduction of parole as such is both ethically required and practically possible, and that it would reduce the needless suffering among POWs that exists under a system that does not allow for parole.

The debate on the ethical permissibility of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) is deadlocked. It could therefore benefit from a differentiated assignment of the burden of proof. This is because the discussion is not purely philosophical in nature, but has a legal and security policy component and aims to avoid the most harmful outcomes of an otherwise unchecked development. Opponents of a universal AWS ban must clearly demonstrate that AWS comply with the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). This requires extensive testing of specific models to verify compliance in realistic combat situations; working on appropriate testing regimes is also one of the most important future tasks for AWS ethics. In this context, however, it is easy to refute the claim put forward by prohibitionists that AWS violate LOAC a priori. A state’ s right to ensure security and the protection of human rights through military capacity has a high ethical value. Other arguments against the use of AWS that are not based on LOAC conformity must therefore meet a substantial burden of proof, as they call on governments to abandon a military technology which is at least potentially transformative. None of those objections meet this standard. They include not only culturally or even individually divergent norms and ideas regarding the use of weapons, but also consequentialist (security policy) concerns on the one hand and so-called deontological arguments on the other. While the former at least point to the need for essential regulation, the latter are based on rather dubious premises. For the purposes of solutions beneficial to humanity, prohibitionist should formulate narrower and more specific points of criticism.

Just War Theory debates discussing the principle of the Moral Equality of Combatants involve the notion of Invincible Ignorance; the claim that warfi ghters are morally excused for participating in an unjust war because of their epistemic limitations. Conditions of military deployment may indeed lead to genuinely insurmountable epistemic limitations. In other cases, these may be overcome. This paper provides a preliminary sketch of heuristics designed to allow a combatant to judge whether or not his war is just. It delineates the sets of relevant facts uncontroversially accessible and inaccessible to contemporary professional soldiers. Relevant facts outside these two sets should by default be treated as inaccessible until proven otherwise. Even such a rudimentary heuristic created in this way demonstrates that practical recommendations of MEC-renouncing Just War Theory are not too challenging to follow and still signifi cantly impact a compliant combatant’s behavior.

The ethical Principle of Proportionality requires combatants not to cause collateral harm excessive in comparison to the anticipated military advantage of an attack. This principle is considered a major (and perhaps insurmountable) obstacle to ethical use of autonomous weapon systems (AWS). This article reviews three possible solutions to the problem of achieving Proportionality compliance in AWS. In doing so, I describe and discuss the three components Proportionality judgments, namely collateral damage estimation, assessment of anticipated military advantage, and judgment of “excessiveness”. Some possible approaches to Proportionality compliance are then presented, such as restricting AWS operations to environments lacking civilian presence, using AWS in targeted strikes in which proportionality judgments are pre-made by human commanders, and a ‘price tag’ approach of pre-assigning acceptable collateral damage values to military hardware in conventional attritional warfare. The article argues that application of these three compliance methods would result in AWS’ achieving acceptable Proportionality compliance levels in many combat environments and scenarios, allowing AWS to perform most key tasks in conventional warfare.

The 2016-17 Iraqi offensive that recaptured the city of Mosul from the Islamic State have demonstrated the inability of contemporary armed forces to retake urban areas from a determined and ruthless enemy without either suffering debilitating casualties or causing thousands of civilian deaths and virtually destroying the city itself. The enemy’s willingness to refuse civilian evacuation via a humanitarian corridor and effectively take the inhabitants hostage is all it takes to impose this tragic dilemma on an attacking force. The civilian death toll of the battle of Mosul alone is estimated to have reached between seven and forty thousand, with almost one million people internally displaced and large portions of the city levelled. Avoiding another such tragedy should be a priority for all practitioners and theorists of urban warfare. Indeed, confronting and defeating this challenge may be the most important task for ethics, theory and practice of urban combat in the coming decade. I argue that the only viable way of escaping the hostage siege dilemma consists of incorporating large numbers of unmanned and autonomous weapon systems into the blue force structure and using these to substitute for artillery and aerial fires presently being used to overpower defenders. While other measures may be used to marginally improve the outcome of hostage city assaults, only the automatization of the assault can dramatically change the calculus and in result either discourage rogue actors from creating hostage city dilemmas or defeat them decisively while suffering unequivocally proportional casualties. I proceed as follows: first, I provide an account of the 2016-17 Coalition assault on Mosul, giving special attention to the events and features relevant to the hostage city dilemma. I then use this case study to introduce the theoretical concept of the hostile city and the ethical dilemma it creates, discussing possible objections and making the case that the circumstances of the Battle of Mosul are bound to repeatedly transpire in the future. This generates a duty to find a way out of the hostage city dilemma. I argue that widespread use of unmanned and autonomous weapon platforms constitutes a viable way of assaulting hostage cities in a manner that assures respect for the ius in bello principles, proposing several ways in which such weapons may be designed and used to drastically limit both military and civilian casualties. Concluding that it may be not only permissible but morally required to employ autonomous weapons in the hostage city scenario, I briefly discuss the implications of this conclusion for a wider debate concerning the moral feasibility of autonomous weapons.

Efforts to ban Autonomous Weapon Systems were both unsuccessful and controversial. Simultaneously the need to address the detrimental aspects of AWS development and proliferation continues to grow in scope and urgency. The article presents several regulatory solutions capable of addressing the issue while simultaneously respecting the requirements of military necessity and so attracting a broad consensus. Two much stricter solutions – regional AWS bans and adoption of a no first use policy – are also presented as fallback strategies in case achieving AWS’ compliance with the Laws of Armed Conflict proved elusive. Together, the solutions presented form an outline of a flexible regulatory strategy able to adjust to different technological outcomes and providing a sensible compromise to solve the current deadlock on the AWS issue.

In his recent JME article Daniel Restrepo argues that both legal and ethical rules should protect the so-called Naked Soldiers, combatants engaged in activity unrelated to military operations and unaware of the imminent danger threatening them. I criticize this position from several angles. I deny the existence of any link between vulnerability and innocence, and claim ignorance of deadly threats does not give rise to a morally distinguished type of vulnerability. I argue that actions not contributing to the war effort are nevertheless an inherent part of fighting a war, and that combatants do not signal intention to abandon their commitment to the war effort by undertaking these. I show that by granting hors de combat status to Naked Soldiers, we would unjustly disadvantage their opponents and engender significant and manifold practical difficulties that the proponents of the view fail to solve or even anticipate. Finally, I demonstrate that Restrepo’s general project of “making killing in war difficult to legitimately justify” regardless of why, how and by whom the killing is done is incompatible with just war theory’s basic assumptions. That project is in fact pacifist in nature and as such redundant in light of pacifism’s broader and stronger implications.

Arguments from human dignity feature prominently in the Lethal Autonomous Weapons moral feasibility debate, even though their exists considerable controversy over their role and soundness and the notion of dignity remains under-defined. Drawing on the work of Dieter Birnbacher, I fix the sub-discourse as referring to the essential value of human persons in general, and to postulated moral rights of combatants not covered within the existing paradigm of the International Humanitarian Law in particular. I then review and critique dignity-based arguments against LAWS: argument from faulty targeting process, argument from objectification, argument from underappreciation of the value of human life and the argument from the absence of mercy. I conclude that the argument from the absence of mercy is the only dignity-based argument that is both valid and irreducible to another class of arguments within the debate, and that it offers insufficient justification for a global ban on LAWS.