Maciej Raźniak

The concept of a causally connected set of point-events plays a crucial role in the point-eventistic definitions of a thing and a process formulated by Zdzisław Augustynek. Unfortunately, Augustynek’s approach to causal connectivity is open to a serious objection that has so far gone unnoticed, stemming from the way causal interactions are viewed in contemporary physics. This finding can hardly be considered favorable for an advocate of the ontology of point-eventism. The aim of this paper is, therefore, firstly, to discuss this objection in detail and, secondly, to share some ideas on how to deal with the problem.

The aim of this paper is to propose a new approach to criteria of existence in natural sciences which can be called a diachronic one. In these considerations, we start with a general analysis of criteria of existence and discuss two competing views on this issue: first, the strategy put forward by logical empiricists that emphasizes the importance of empirical criteria of existence and, second, the view presented by Willard Van Orman Quine, who claimed that the only way to accept the existence of certain objects is to apply the theoretical criterion (ontological commitments criterion). Our main idea is to develop an approach to applying criteria so that strategies proposed by Quine and logical empiricists (so-called synchronic models) do not antagonize each other, but also can be considered adequate in some circumstances.

The paper discusses the relationship between the concept of the conical present, originally proposed by William Godfrey‑Smith, and the paradox of causality, commonly considered to be its main problem. This paradox can be summarized as follows. It is well known that our observational cognition is reducible to causal relations. Therefore, if we agree with Godfrey‑Smith, and recognize an event to be present in relation to another event iff the first one is observable from the standpoint of the second, then both can be causally interconnected and at present. At this point, it becomes clear that the concept of the conical present admits the possibility that events are temporally separated from each other but can yet remain at present. This, however, goes against our intuitions and leads to a paradox if we want to sustain the view that the cause always precedes the effect. The aim of the article is to show that the paradox of causality faces several difficulties that weaken its strength. The text proposes two strategies to dismiss this objection. Each of them justifies the claim that, at least, a partial defense of the concept of conical present is possible. The first strategy leads to the conclusion that it is not fair to abandon the concept of conical present because of the paradox of causality, since the concept of the present defined in Classical Mechanics is also subject to this paradox. The second strategy is to show that the consequences of the conical present are not as counterintuitive as the opponents of this view claim, because the strength of this objection depends on how we understand the causality of events.

The discussion on the division into public and private law (ius publicum) and private law (ius privatum) can be summarized by considering two fundamental issues: (α) the justification of the division and (β) the choice of a criterion for dividing law into public and private. When reading the texts of Polish legal philosophers, it is hard to resist the impression that they do not notice the line separating (α) and (β) and, consequently, the scale of differences between these issues. This is an unacceptable state of affairs. Therefore, the main purpose of this article is to distinguish these two problems more clearly. In particular, we want to show that investigations aimed at determining whether the division between ius publicum and ius privatum is justified may abstract from which theory of division deserves to be distinguished. In practice, both problems, which can be justified both theoretically (supported only by definitions and logical means) and empirically (based on examples from legal dogmatics), are autonomous from each other.

There are at least two notions of coincidents: a narrower one — proposed by Zdzisław Augustynek and introduced into the ontology of spacetime – and an adequate one, which — despite the lack of its definition — corresponds to point objects in physics. In this article, we (1) reconstruct the definition of narrower coincidents and (2) discuss their specific types. Next, (3) we draw attention to the problem with this understanding of the term “coincident” and make an attempt to extend the notion of coincident so that its legitimacy comes not from metaphysics but from physics. Finally, (4) we consider the status of coincidents — both narrower and adequate ones – in ontologies other than point-eventism.