Maciej Sendłak

The aim of this paper is to point out the limitations of Hybrid Modal Realism as a general theory of modalities, i.e. one that gives an analysis of possibilities as well as impossibilities. To do so we will firstly sketch the goals that theories of impossible worlds should achieve. Secondly we will briefly present the two most popular accounts of impossibilities—Extended Modal Realism and Extended Ersatzism. We will focus on the aspects of both theories which became the motivation for a hybrid view. In the last part of this paper we will analyze Francesco Berto’s Hybrid Modal Realism and present reasons why this account is an insufficient tool for analyzing impossibilities.

This book argues for the importance and commonness of reasonings concerning impossibilities. Its aim is twofold – descriptive and constructive. Since hypothetical reasoning about impossibilities calls for explanation, the book provides a comprehensive guide through popular semantic theories of conditionals. Each is examined from the perspective of the question of impossibilities and the logic and metaphysics surrounding them. This provides the ground for a further aim. In the final chapter, I endeavor to combine the best features of the existing theories and explore the possibility of a novel hybrid account.

The subject of this paper is the relation between three views: noneism, Meinongianism, and allism. The first one has it that ‘some objects do not exist,’ the second that ‘there are objects that do not exist,’ and the last one that ‘every object exists.’ While noneism is commonly considered to be close to Meinongianism and very distant to allism, this arrangement has been lately questioned. Consequently, some claimed that the difference between noneism and allism is based merely on the choice of words. The aim of this paper is to argue that the disagreement between noneism and allism is substantial and not merely verbal, and its subject is the domain of objects.

The aim of this chapter is to propose a dependance account of counterfactuals—DAC, for short. The exposition of DAC is somewhat unorthodox, because a large part of this chapter may seem to be more about explanations than about counterfactuals (Sect. 5.1). This, however, should shed some light on how one can think about subjunctive conditionals. The second sub-section (Sect. 5.2) contains a proper presentation of DAC together with some consequences concerning the problem of counterfactuals. This includes a brief comparison between DAC and views that were discussed in previous chapters.

This chapter is dedicated to one of the most popular approaches to the question of counterfactuals. The core of this view is that the truth of a conditional is grounded in the inference between the antecedent and the consequent. The main problem is establishing the nature of this inference. In the first section, I discuss the Nelson GoodmanGoodmanNelson’s metalinguistic theory and the problem of cotenability (Sect. 2.1). The second section is dedicated to a more liberal theory, proposed by Roderick ChisholmChisholmRoderick (Sect. 2.2). Finally, based on more recent currents in the inferentialist tradition, I sketch a modern inferentialist view on counterfactuals (Sect. 2.3). I argue that despite the plausibility of inferentialism’s core, each type of this approach faces similar problems with vicious circles.

The subject of this chapter is the most popular analysis of counterfactuals, i.e., possible worlds semantics. The chapter begins with a general characterization of this semantics, along with the key question of the philosophy of modality (Sect. 3.1). This aims to provide a basis for the analysis of counterfactuals in terms of possible worlds. In virtue of the standard (so-called ‘orthodox’) approach, every counterpossible is vacuously true. This motivates introducing a modification that results in extending the domain of worlds to include impossible worlds. Section 3.2 provides the details of the modified view, i.e., the semantics and metaphysics of impossible worlds. It also shows how the extension of the domain of worlds affects the analysis of one of the key notions of possible worlds semantics for counterfactuals, i.e., the notion of similarity between worlds. Since some advocates of orthodoxy have argued that the problem of counterpossibles should be shifted from the semantic question of truth-value to the pragmatic question of assertability, Sect. 3.3 examines these arguments and provides arguments against a pragmatic-oriented approach to counterpossibles.

This chapter concerns an analysis of counterpossibles in terms of truthmaker semantics. The basic notions of truthmaker semantics, such as states, exact, inexact, and loose verifiers are explained both from a formal and informal point of view (Sect. 4.1). The second subsection (Sect. 4.2) is dedicated to an analysis of counterfactuals in terms of truthmaker semantics, along with the question of impossible states and so-called possible outcomes. This section is meant to provide a model of truthmaker semantics for counterpossibles along with a critical analysis of it. Finally, Sect. 4.3 develops an account of the metaphysics of truthmakers. It is partly inspired by the works of Alexius MeinongMeinongAlexius, and it aims to address a popular criticism of the metaphysics of truthmakers.

This chapter aims to justify the importance of the semantics of counterpossibles. This is done by explaining why conditionals are an inherent aspect of our intellectual life, and how counterpossibles are related to that fact. The chapter explains why the problem of conditionals is a subject of interest to philosophers, psychologists, and linguists. Further (Sect. 1.2), it provides a description of counterfactuals as a particular type of conditional, along with properties that allow them to be contrasted with indicative conditionals. Finally (Sect. 1.3), the question of counterpossibles is introduced. The chapter closes with a general characterization of a variety of approaches to the analysis of conditionals and justifies narrowing the number of approaches that are included in this monograph (Sect. 1.4).

If you are reading this, there is a good chance that you are interested in conditionals. Also, depending on how deep your interest is, you may recognize the first sentence of this paragraph as an example of a conditional statement. If you did not recognize this, you should know that conditionals are complex expressions of the form “If A, then C” (formally, “A > C”). We often use them to indicate a connection between two states of affairs, expressed by the antecedent A (or if-clause) and a consequent C (or then-clause). For example: “If you ever lose your credit card, immediately inform your bank”, “If there is an action, there is an equal and opposite reaction”, “If the river were to rise another two feet, the subway system would be flooded”. By asserting statements like these, one usually suggests a relationship between two states, such that one affects the other. In other words, the second somehow obtains under the condition of the first [...].

The common view has it that there are two families of approaches towards the logical structure of impossible worlds – Australasian and North American. According to the first, impossible worlds are closed under the relation of logical consequence of one of the non-classical logics. The North American approach is more liberal, allowing for impossible worlds where no logic holds. After pointing out the questionable consequences of each view, I propose a third one. While this new perspective allows for worlds where no logical consequence holds, it also imposes some constraints on what worlds are built upon. This renders the proposed view not as restrictive as the Australasian approach and not as liberal as the North American approach. Due to its intermediary nature, I have named this perspective ‘the Pacific’ approach.

In this paper, I discuss one of Peter van Inwagen’s charges against the Meinongian thesis, which states that some objects do not exist. The charges aimed to show that the thesis either leads to a contradiction or that it is obscure. Both consequences support the opposite Quinean thesis, which states that every object exists. As opposed to the former, the latter ought to be consistent and clear. I argue why there is no contradiction in the Meinongian thesis and why the Quinean thesis is not clear.

This paper aims to introduce Meinongian Abstractionism (MA), i.e. a view on the metaphysics of truthmaking and modality. This approach is based on the notion of objectives—one of the key elements of Alexius Meinong’s Theory of Objects. In the light of it, worlds are interpreted in terms of sets of subsistent and non-subsistent objectives. This—along with Meinong’s characterization of objectives—provides a ground for possible as well as impossible worlds. One of the consequences of Meinongain Abstractionism is a reformulation of the relation of truthmaking in modal terms. Importantly, this reformulation avoids the problem of too-coarse grained analysis of truthmakers. This makes MA a metaphysically–oriented supporter of the so-called ‘hyperintensional revolution.’

The aim of this paper is to argue in favor of the view that some counterpossibles are false. This is done indirectly by showing that accepting the opposite view, i.e., one that ascribes truth to each and every counterpossible, results in the claim that every necessarily false theory has exactly the same consequences. Accordingly, it is shown that taking every counterpossible to be true not only undermines the value of debates over various alternative theories and their consequences, but also puts into question the very possibility of such debates. In order to explicate this thesis, the close bond between counterpossibles and the so-called story prefix is explored. A number of possible responses to this criticism are also presented, and it is argued that none of them address the main problem.

According to the most popular theories, counterfactuals with impossible antecedents are vacuously true. Critiques of this view argue that contrary to this, we tend to consider only some of them true and others to be false. In his recent paper Timothy Williamson has ingeniously explained the motivations for the orthodox view and argued that although there are some heuristic reasons that may suggest the plausibility of the unorthodox view, they are fallible. The most important of Williamson’s arguments is that the unorthodox interpretation is inconsistent with the heuristic assumption that supposedly motivates this very view. The aim of this paper is to consider Williamson’s critique and to support the unorthodox approach towards counterpossibles. In order to do so, we argue in favor of the modified version of the heuristic assumption.

Celem tego artykułu było wykazanie, że ortodoksyjna analiza kontrmożliwych okresów warunkowych prowadzi do niepokojącej konsekwencji. Jest nią niemożność odróżnienia poszczególnych, z konieczności fałszywych teorii. Problem ten opiera się w dużej mierze na związku pomiędzy okresami warunkowymi oraz analizą wyrażeń zawierających operator opowieści. Nie musi to oznaczać, że zwolennik analizy ortodoksyjnej nie może dostarczyć alternatywnego sformułowania różnic pomiędzy teoriami z konieczności fałszywymi. Tym niemniej, nie może on tego dokonać poprzez użycie okresów warunkowych. Te natomiast – jak wskazują zarówno filozofowie oraz psycholodzy rozwoju poznawczego – stanowią naturalny środek wyrazu wnioskowania o konsekwencjach zajścia tego, co faktycznie nie zaszło. Niezależnie od tego, czy jest to konsekwencja zajścia czysto możliwego, czy niemożliwego stanu rzeczy. Podczas gdy analizy prezentowane w ramach podejścia nieortodoksyjnego dostarczają wyjaśnienia tego zjawiska, stanowisko ortodoksyjne nakazuje podważenie moż- liwości takich rozumowań. Stąd można uznać, że w kwestii sporu o adekwatną analizę okresów warunkowych przewaga znajduje się po stronie nieortodoksyjnej.

Przedmiotem prezentowanego artykułu jest spor o wartości logiczne kontrfaktycznych okresów warunkowych z niemożliwym poprzednikiem. Zgodnie z rozpowszechnionymi analizami każdy taki okres warunkowy jest prawdziwy. Pogląd ten określany jest mianem ortodoksyjnego i przeciwstawiany jest mu pogląd nieortodoksyjny, który uznaje, że tylko niektóre spośród kontrmożliwych okresów warunkowych są prawdziwe, a inne są fałszywe. W jednym ze swoich ostatnich tekstów Timothy Williamson argumentował na rzecz tezy, że konsekwencje poglądu nieortodoksyjnego są niespójne z motywacjami leżącymi u podstaw tego poglądu. Celem artykułu jest polemika z krytyką Williamsona oraz wskazanie na możliwość spójnego odczytania postulatów zwolenników stanowiska nieortodoksyjnego.

The subject of this article is the Principle of Characterization—the most controversial principle of Alexius Meinong’s Theory of Objects. The aim of this text is twofold. First of all, to show that Bertrand Russell’s well-known objection to the Principle of Characterization can be reformulated against contemporary unrestricted interpretations of it. Second, to propose an alternative formulation of this principle. This refers to the methodology of metaphysics and is based on the distinction between pre-theoretical and theoretical languages. The proposed formulation fits well with every type of contemporary interpretation of the Theory of Objects and helps to overcome Russell’s criticism.

The subject of this paper is a world-semantic analysis of counterpossibles, i.e., counterfactuals with impossible antecedents. We focus on the notion of similarity between worlds, which determines truth-value of counterfactuals. There are two commonly accepted assumptions about this notion. According to the first one, every possible world is more similar to the actual world than any impossible world. According to the second one, the trivial world (world where everything is true) is the most dissimilar to the actual world. Considering the notion of similarity we argue for a negative thesis and a positive thesis. The negative thesis is that both of these assumptions are false, and as such should not be taken as a “guide” to our understanding of similarity. The positive thesis is an alternative interpretation of the notion of similarity. The interpretation is based on an analogy of the inference to the best explanation and on the assumption that similarity is a ternary relation satisfied by the actual world, a non-actual world and a given factor of similarity. Similarity understood in this manner is a notion which requires an indication of a rule which supports the truth of the antecedent and explains its connection with the consequent.

Przedmiotem artykułu jest status ontologiczny światów możliwych oraz niemożliwych. Zgodnie z jedną ze współczesnych wersji meinongianizmu, o ile świat aktualny jest przedmiotem istniejącym, o tyle światy czysto możliwe oraz niemożliwe uznawane są za przedmioty nieistniejące. Zwolennicy tego podejścia twierdzą ponadto, że światom nieaktualnym nie przysługuje żaden inny rodzaj istnienia.Celem artykułu jest wskazanie na problematyczne konsekwencje wspomnianego stanowiska oraz zarysowanie poglądu alternatywnego, który oparty jest na pluralizmie ontologicznym, tj. na poglądzie uznającym wielość rodzajów istnienia.

The distinction between quantitative and qualitative parsimony is supposed to allow David Lewis to dismiss one of the charges against his modal realism: that is, the charge of bloated ontology. The aim of this paper is to undermine Lewis's response to this objection. In order to do this, a distinction between multipliable and nonmultipliable objects is introduced. Based on this it is argued that the acceptance of Lewis's response requires one to believe in modal realism in the first place—that is, one has to believe in the view that the existence of nonactual spatiotemporal worlds does not affect the quality of the ontological commitment. Although the paper focuses on the problem of the metaphysics of possible worlds, this should be regarded merely as a case study. Accordingly, the results of this analysis should find applications in other metaphysical debates as well.

The aim of this paper is to point out the limitations of Hybrid Modal Realism as a general theory of modalities, i.e. one that gives an analysis of possibilities as well as impossibilities. To do so we will firstly sketch the goals that theories of impossible worlds should achieve. Secondly we will briefly present the two most popular accounts of impossibilities—Extended Modal Realism and Extended Ersatzism. We will focus on the aspects of both theories which became the motivation for a hybrid view. In the last part of this paper we will analyze Francesco Berto’s Hybrid Modal Realism and present reasons why this account is an insufficient tool for analyzing impossibilities.

"The main aim of the paper is to compare two types of abstractionistic accounts of fictional objects, and to analyze their consequences for interpretation of existential quantification. According to a proponent of general abstractionistic theory, fictional objects have abstract nature in a way similar to contracts, marriages, and the likes. This view is an alternative to strongly realistic accounts of fictional objects, defended by Terence Parsons or David Lewis. Within abstractionistic theories, as in all philosophical areas, one can find divergences of opinions. The main differences between two of them – Peter van Inwagen's and Edward Zalta's – are connected with the interpretation of existential quantification. According to van Inwagen, “being” is the same as “existence” and its sense is captured by the existential quantifier. Edward Zalta's theory is much closer to the Meinongian Theory of Objects. He argues for the need of distinguishing between “being” and “existence” and for invoking nonexistent objects. Because of that he suggests an alternative interpretation of quantification. Admittedly, there is one abstractionistic source for both theories, but their ontological consequences are different - van Inwagen is a staunch opponent of nonexistent objects, and Zalta describes his own theory as "Meinongian"."

The subject of my article is the principle of characterization – the most controversial principle of Meinong’s Theory of Objects. The aim of this text is twofold. First of all, I would like to show that Russell’s well-known objection to Meinong’s Theory of Objects can be reformulated against a new modal interpretation of Meinongianism that is presented mostly by Graham Priest. Secondly, I would like to propose a strategy which gives uncontroversial restriction to the principle of characterization and which allows to avoid Russell’s argument. The strategy is based on the distinction between object- and metalanguage, and it applies to modal Meinongianism as well as to other so-called Meinongian theories.

The article outlines the main motivations for the Guise Theory and its intriguing theses concerning identity, predication, existence, and fiction. The second part of the article is devoted to assessment of Castañeda’s theory. It discusses the most influential critiques of the Guise Theory, as well as (important from a historical point of view) Russell’s objection to theories of nonexistent objects. The last section of the article contains a comparison of the Guise Theory with the Meinong’s Theory of Objects, and points out that despite various similarities, we should draw a distinction between original and moderate versions of Meinong’s theory. The main motivation for this distinction are differences between accounts of predications, which allow us to call the Guise Theory “quasi-Meinongian” rather than just “Meinongian”. This is because one of its main claims comes rather form the work of Meinong’s pupil Ernst Mally, and not from Meinong himself.

To solve the problem of counterpossibles, many philosophers have been arguing that one needs to invoke impossible worlds. This extension of the ontology of modality should save the analysis of counterfactuals from being insensitive to the problem of counterpossibles. Since theories of impossible worlds are extensions of original accounts of modalities, it is worth stressing that proper analyses of counterpossibles should not weaken the latter.In this paper I argue that these theories of impossible wolrds, which are based on D. Lewis' modal realism - Extended Modal Realism and Hybrid Modal Realism - might be consider as either an unattractive for modal realists or insufficient for analyzing counterpossibles.