Macksood Aftab

This paper examines two Islamic ontologies of the human self as alternatives to dominant approaches in contemporary philosophy of mind. These approaches avoid some of the pitfalls of some of the modern approaches to the mind-body problem. The first is drawn from the kalām tradition of philosophical theology. Kalām posits a substantial soul, but its conception differs from both Aristotelian hylomorphism and Cartesian dualism. The soul is neither merely the form of the body nor a “thinking substance.” Rather, al-Ghazālī describes the soul as an immaterial substance possessing its own accidents, just as the material substance of the body possesses its own accidents or properties. This framework avoids both the inextricable union of form and matter in Aristotle and the radical separation of mind and matter in Cartesian dualism. Kalām atomism further provides a unified metaphysical system in which the same general ontological and causal principles apply to body, soul, and their respective accidents. By placing mental and physical realities within a single metaphysical framework, it allows scientific investigation of the body and brain to proceed without generating an inherent conflict with the reality of the soul or consciousness. The second model is drawn from the Akbarian tradition of Islamic philosophical Sufism, which is interpreted here as a form of hierarchical monism. This framework bears important similarities to idealism and Platonism while providing a more comprehensive metaphysical and ontological account than physicalism. Rather than treating body and soul as distinct substances requiring causal interaction, Akbarian metaphysics understands the body as a manifestation of the soul at a lower ontological level. The mind-body problem is thereby reframed as a relation between different levels of a unified reality rather than between separate substances. Whereas kalām provides a successful account of how the elements of reality function within an ordered system, Akbarian metaphysics seeks to explain what those realities ultimately are. Together, these traditions offer distinct but complementary Islamic approaches to consciousness, embodiment, causation, and the metaphysical nature of the human self.

Neuroimaging has advanced our understanding of the biological bases of consciousness. At the same time, it is vital that these technologies be kept in proper perspective to avoid unsupportable claims and public misperceptions of its capacities and utility in health care and research. This presentation provides a philosophical anthropological context in which to examine current neuroimaging knowledge of consciousness and then examines the science of neuroimaging and the neuroethical considerations it raises.