Madelaine Angelova-Elchinova

A good theory of perception should be able to account for the epistemology as well as the phenomenology of perception. My paper has two main goals: a) to offer such theory by proposing an argument in favor of a modified version of Reid`s direct realism and b) to argue that there are no illusions and we should drop the distinction between seemings and seeings. The novelty of my approach is that, unlike existing arguments against illusions, I am going to treat illusions as a single category and will not adopt any form of anti-realism or phenomenalism. Instead, I am going to target the distinction between an object looking in a certain way and an object seeming to a perceiver to be such and such and show that it is unjustified to suppose that there are objective perceptual or looking properties of objects or phenomenal properties of experience. Perception is a relation and most of the properties that we are aware of while perceiving are relational properties.

The aim of this paper is to answer the question: „If to think rationally is to think right, then can we learn how to think rationally?“. I attempt to find an answer by providing a commentary on Rosen Lutskanov’s recent book – „A Handbook of Critical Thinking“ (2024). My central claim is that Lutskanov’s exposition clearly shows that thinking right is a matter of skill which can be exercised, educated, and expertized (EEE) and that it is subjected to rigorous logical rules, epistemic norms and pragmatic norms. In my analysis, I will presume that Lutskanov’s understanding of critical thinking allows us to use the conceptual apparatus of social epistemology and to examine critical thinking as closely related to peer disagreement. At the end of my paper, I propose some critical comments on the examined concept of critical thinking that concern the role of perceptual knowledge, the right order of reasons in an argument, and the wisdom of crowds.

Traditional normative theories of belief in epistemology presume that belief-forming includes a reflective component and a mental agency component. Beliefs are regarded as conscious doxastic attitudes with propositional contents. Let’s call this view the Transcendental View about Belief (TVB). First, I argue that reputed norms of belief as the truth norm, the knowledge norm and the rationality norm all incorporate TVB. Further, I argue that the empirical evidence concerning belief-forming collected in the last two decades by Rüdiger Seitz, Hans-Ferdinant Angel, Raymond Paloutzian and their colleagues suggests that primal beliefs do not correspond to the description provided by TVB. Primal beliefs are byproducts of perceptive and affective type 1 processing. As such, they are non-propositional multilayer relational states of a cognitive system S that do not presuppose conscious awareness. Thus, I maintain that TVB is normatively inadequate, because it is descriptively false. I presume that a good normative account of beliefs should be able to accommodate primal beliefs and provide a norm of primal belief. I conclude by attempting to outline such a positive account.

In the following paper I propose an argument against internalism about thought content. After a brief preview of the recent debate between Sarah Sawyer and Åsa Wikforss, the paper outlines the central issue in their discussion. I show that, even if Wikforss’ objections against Sawyer are granted, externalism about thought content can still prevail. For my argument, I use Wikforss` own objection against externalism and show how, if accepted, it binds one to the mythical figure of the perfect speaker – an infallible creature that possesses complete understanding of all of her concepts.

In the following paper, I address the worry that there is an increasing gap between the way the world is perceived by students and by their professors and teachers respectively. I argue that even if there is indeed a huge difference between our two generations, ‘the gap’ becomes irrelevant when we engage in philosophising. I will attempt to provide three short proposals on how to eradicate the gap when teaching philosophy. My hope is to show that, if we really want to make an attempt to eliminate the lack of understanding between the students and us, there are four basic rules that we could apply to our educational method. My argument makes use of the concepts of truth-value, consensus and epistemic normativity.