Madhu Mangal Chaturvedi

This paper explores the philosophical relationship between Immanuel Kant's transcendental idealism and Ludwig Wittgenstein's linguistic philosophy, particularly focusing on the echoes of Kant's ideas in Wittgenstein's work. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason argues that human cognition is shaped by a priori categories, which structure our experience of phenomena but leave the noumenal realm unknowable. Wittgenstein, in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, similarly examines the limits of what can be known; suggesting that language mirrors reality but also has its limits in expressing what lies beyond logic. In his later work, Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein emphasizes the social and contextual nature of meaning, developed through "language games" and "forms of life". This paper argues that while Wittgenstein shifts from Kant’s universal transcendental structures to a more pragmatic view of language, both philosophers share a concern with the limits of human knowledge and expression. Furthermore, both thinkers acknowledge the ineffable about Kant’s noumenal world and Wittgenstein’s mystical realm as crucial yet unreachable domains. This comparative analysis contributes to contemporary discussions in epistemology and philosophy of language, demonstrating the enduring relevance of Kant’s transcendental insights in Wittgenstein’s linguistic turn.

Practical reason is the use of reason to decide how to act and perform in a social reality. When someone deliberates about what to do, one puts all the reasons for the action, and then all the reasons against the action will determine the outcome of the action. In that situation, we can describe that practical action with reason because we will determine reason with the weight of different reasons not on the weighing reasons. In this paper, we analyze that reasons have weight against the theory that weights of reasons have no role in a theory of reasoning, and defend that reasons have weight with the evidence of practical reasons. The aim of this paper is to argue that weight of reasons has a role in the process of reasoning. In every situation of life, we can use have reason and weight of reason according to the practical situation of life.

This paper examines the enduring challenge of achieving objectivity in constitutional interpretation, a fundamental concern in legal theory and practice. Constitutions, as value-laden and often abstract documents, require interpretation that inevitably engages with complex questions of language, history, and moral reasoning. The paper begins by defining the constitution and the nature of constitutional interpretation, then examines the historical evolution of interpretive methodologies. It critically evaluates major theories—including originalism (intent and public meaning), textualism, purposivism, living constitutionalism, and moral readings—assessing their respective claims to objectivity and the extent to which they mitigate subjective judicial influence. In response to the limitations of existing theories, the paper proposes a synthesized framework of “Objectively Grounded Constitutionalism” (OGC). This approach emphasizes a hierarchical and verifiable method rooted in constrained textualism, original public meaning, objective systemic purpose, and doctrinal stability. OGC seeks to balance historical fidelity with methodological transparency, thereby offering a principled path toward minimizing subjectivity in judicial reasoning. Ultimately, the paper argues that while perfect objectivity may remain elusive, rigorous interpretive discipline and fidelity to foundational legal commitments can substantially constrain arbitrariness and preserve the legitimacy of constitutional adjudication.

In the present paper, we defend the thesis that outer-world-directed perceptual consciousness is always accompanied by an inner awareness (IAOA). This is contrary to the view that outer-world-directed conscious mental states are not accompanied by an inner awareness, which is held by Gennaro (2008) against Kriegel’s (2009a and 2009b) self-representationalism. We attempt to show why philosophers like Gennaro get it wrong when they deny the IAOA thesis by critically examining his arguments against it and by giving arguments in its favour.