Magdalena Smith

In this paper I argue that Christopher Kutz misapplies his theory of joint action when he attributes shareowners responsibilities on the basis of their intentional participation in the corporations in which they invest. Instead I propose that his theory of joint action should be used to attribute shareowners responsibilities on the basis of their intentional participation in the stock market. If shareholders’ accountability is grounded in their intentional participation in the stock market, then shareholders cannot take responsibility for corporation’s individual actions. Instead they are solely responsible for the benefits they gain from holding shares if these are a result of moral wrongdoing and for this they should be held accountable.

This paper looks at the specific proposed amendments to European directive 2007/36/EC and 2013/34/EU, and evaluates as to how such amendments alter shareholders’ moral responsibilities. To be responsible is here simply to be understood as being under an obligation, where an obligation is a requirement on an agent to either act or refrain from acting in a given way. In order to determine whether changes to the proposed directives alter shareholders’ moral responsibilities the following analysis argues that we need to look at three factors: whether such changes do in fact alter the subject matter of shareholders’ obligations, a closer look at the agent i.e. shareholders to whom the obligation is to apply and thirdly whether they do actually apply.