Magnolia Nicole Sellars

This paper argues that there exists a general problem of authority in theorizing about gender. Starting from two general approaches to how one may attempt to define gender, we find two problems of authority emerge. Very roughly, these approaches can be described as the ‘societal’ and ‘identity’ approached to gender; each of these approaches seem to come with significant tradeoffs to one another; however, both approaches are integral to current understandings of gender. The proposed solution to these clashing approaches is a constitutive conception of gender. This working theory proposes that normative standards, when endorsed at the level of an individual, work to give authority to the ‘practical identity’ of gender. Further, an account of gender in everyday life is given by using the Heideggerian term of ‘thrownness’. With ‘thrownness’ and an argument for gender’s everyday constitution being achievable with practical understanding by an individual, the constitutive model of gender accounts for the role gender plays in everyday implicit judgments and even identity claims without rejecting the existent picture of social construction or gender being understood as a class distinction. With this, one can claim gender as authoritative for guiding action without denying its oppressive social structures.

The main point of disagreement between naturalist and social performists seems to be disagreements arising from and between the expressivist and the anti-expressivist then also the essentialist and non-essentialist. What I will claim is that these debates, as they currently sit, undo much of what feminists wish to accomplish in defining gender. A reformulation of the problems is necessary into terms of internal and externalism before clear progress can be made in the overarching positions I will discuss. Current models focus on the societal ramifications of gender and classify its existence within this framework. This is what I will suggest is an externalist approach to gender. I will also claim that the essentialist debate of thinkers such as Butler present a false dichotomy of choice between the essentialist theories such as gender and sex identicality and non-essentialist accounts such as Haslanger’s, Butler’s, and Young’s. Each of these theories take for granted the external nature of gender due to their commitment to non-essentialist accounts. What I will show is that this move not only lacks necessitation, but also limit’s further solutions to Haslanger’s problems of commonality and normativity. Through a constitutive approach to this debate, we may explain the variations in gender not expressed within current literature. Our adoption of gender constitutivism does not lack ability for social critique; It could be argued that it expands the limitations which plague both the normativity and commonality problems. This approach should serve to better represent the lived experience of individuals within a gendered society and explain the not yet further discussed downstream effects of gender upon identity and Self-conception