Maite Ezcurdia

(1966 - 2018)

Este libro tiene dos propósitos principales, uno explícito y otro implícito. El propósito explícito es completar la agenda semántica de Saul Kripke en El nombrar y la necesidad (en adelante, NN); en particular, desarrollar temas y responder a preguntas que surgen de las discusiones en NN. Dos grupos de temas le interesan a Soames. El primero concierne a los nombres propios, así como a las oraciones de identidad y a las atribuciones de actitudes proposicionales que los contienen; el segundo a los términos de clase natural y a las oraciones de identidad que los contienen. Las propuestas de Soames sobre estos temas corresponden al propósito implícito del libro: ofrecer una teoría semántica de corte milliano y russelliano sobre los nombres propios, los términos de clase natural, las oraciones de identidad y las atribuciones de actitudes roposicionales. Dicha teoría semántica es russelliana por cuanto asume que las proposiciones están constituidas por las referencias de las partes significativas de las oraciones estructuradas de cierta forma, y es milliana por cuanto supone que los significados de los nombres propios se agotan con sus referentes.

Cappelen and Lepore argue that moderate contextualism is not a stable position for the arguments that support it put it on a slippery slope to radical contextualism. My aim is to stabilize moderate contextualism by providing an account of the sorts of arguments it should rely on. These differ from standard contextualist arguments in that they rely on speakers’ intuitions about the truth-value of uttered sentences, and not about what such utterances say. Given certain conditions of systematicity, clarity and how widespread these intuitions are, I claim we have good evidence for determining whether an expression is context sensitive. Although this method does render quantifier expressions and ‘to rain’ context sensitive, it does not do so with ‘red’. We thus obtain prima facie motivation for moderate contextualism that does not lead to radical contextualism. However, the methodology does not distinguish contextualism from relativism. I thus run through different reasons for introducing elements into contexts of use and elements into circumstances of evaluation.Cappelen e Lepore argumentam que o contextualismo moderado não é uma posição estável, uma vez que os argumentos que o sustentam o colocam em uma encosta escorregadia que conduz ao contextualismo radical. Meu objetivo é estabilizar o contextualismo moderado provendo um tratamento dos tipos de argumentos nos quais ele deveria estar sustentado. Estes diferem dos argumentos contextualistas usuais porque eles partem das intuições dos falantes sobre o valor de verdade de sentenças proferidas, e não sobre o que estas sentenças dizem. Dadas certas condições de sistematicidade, claridade e quão difundidas estas intuições são, eu afirmo que temos boas evidências para determinar se uma expressão é sensível ao contexto. Ainda que este método identifique expressões quantificadoras e ‘chove’ como sensíveis ao contexto, ele não faz o mesmo com ‘vermelho’. Temos assim motivações prima facie para o contextualismo moderado que não leva ao contextualismo radical. No entanto, esta metodologia não distingue o contextualismo do relativismo. Assim, eu examino diferentes razões para introduzir elementos nos contextos de uso e nas circunstâncias de avaliação.

Al responder al reto que Donnellan les presenta a los russellianos de explicar los usos referenciales de las descripciones definidas, éstos recurren a la distinción entre el significado del hablante y el significado semántico. Suponiendo que, a diferencia de las descripciones definidas, los demostrativos sólo pueden usarse referencialmente, defiendo la idea de que aun en estos casos se puede distinguir el significado del hablante del significado semántico. Explico cómo puede establecerse la distinción en el caso de los demostrativos complejos y de los simples. La distinción depende, en parte, de distinguir las intenciones referenciales que completan al demostrativo de las intenciones comunicativas.

Las sensaciones constituyen el mayor obstáculo para dar una explicación satisfactoria de la mente en términos no mentales, y se distinguen por la manera como se sienten, esto es, por sus qualia o su carácter fenoménico, que se resiste a ser explicado y que hace patente el hiato entre lo físico y lo mental. Pero, ¿en qué consiste este aspecto de las sensaciones? ¿Lograremos alguna vez dar cuenta de él adecuadamente? Éstas son dos de las preguntas fundamentales que se discuten en los doce artículos de este volumen, los cuales, en particular, se sitúan en el debate actual sobre los problemas que los qualia presentan a las teorías fisicalistas, funcionalistas e intencionalistas de la mente. En el primero, las compiladoras ofrecen un panorama general de la discusión contemporánea en torno a las sensaciones y su carácter fenoménico; los demás son textos centrales en esta discusión, de T. Nagel, C. McGinn, F. Jackson, D. Lewis, G. Harman, N. Block, J. Fodor, M. Tye, D. Dennett y S. Shoemaker

En este trabajo argumento contra la explicación de la semántica y la pragmática de las adscripciones de actitudes proposicionales que Soames ofrece en Beyond Rigidity. Defiendo una restricción para la identificación del contenido semántico de las frases de un lenguaje basada en las condiciones de competencia semántica, y argumento que la falla de sustitutividad es un componente esencial de nuestras condiciones de competencia en los predicados de actitudes proposicionales. Dado que la explicación de Soames no respeta esta condición, concluyo que no es una explicación adecuada de las adscripciones de actitudes proposicionales.

In this paper I argue that, in order to make (T1) and (T2) compatible within a Fregean approach, we must reject the view that all modes of presentation are senses. (T1) There is a diversity of ways in which Venus may be presented to each subject, and which are associated with the name ‘Venus’. (T2) There is only one Fregean thought expressed by the sentence ‘Venus is a planet’. Modes of presentation are essentially psychological and have causal powers on minds. The mind of a subject is sensitive to differences in modes of presentation, so that if an object is presented to a subject under different modes of presentation and she has no reason to believe that they are modes of presentation of one and the same object, then she may take opposing attitudes involving those different modes of presentation. In contrast, senses are essentially semantic. For this reason, I propose that they be understood as certain ways of determining the reference of terms, and either are given by the semantic rules for those terms or are identical to those semantic rules. I agree with McDowell that an interpretive truth-theory for a language L gives us a theory of sense for L, and that something like (V) ‘Venus’ refers to Venus will give us the axiom which assigns the semantic value for ‘Venus’ within such a theory, and which is necessary in order to derive the interpretive truth-conditions of a sentence like ‘Venus is a planet’. An axiom like ‘Venus’ refers to Hesperus will not do within a theory of sense. Nonetheless, it will do within a theory of reference, a truth-theory which delivers not interpretive truth-conditions, but purely referential truth conditions. The purely referential truth-conditions for an indicative atomic sentence are, I claim, those which are specified by specifying those features in the world (objects, properties, etc.) to which the meaningful parts of the sentence refer, representing them as related in a certain way. For the specification of such truth-conditions, the difference in cognitive value between two sentences will not matter, whereas it will matter for the specification of interpretive truth-conditions. Now, senses are introduced to allow for an explanation of the difference in cognitive value between sentences with the same purely referential truth-conditions. An indication of when two sentences differ in cognitive value is when it is possible for a subject who is rational and understands the language in question to take opposing attitudes to those sentences (or their contents —whatever those contents are); and if there is in fact such a subject who takes opposing attitudes to those sentences, then those sentences differ in their cognitive value. Given this connection between cognitive value and a subject’s attitudes, and given the purpose for which senses are introduced, we must suppose that a subject’s mind must be sensitive to differences in senses, and so, that senses must be psychologically relevant. My proposal, which aims to establish some kind of identity between some modes of presentation under certain conditions and those ways of determination which are senses, is as follows: A psychological mode of presentation M is a way of determination which is a sense relative to a particular expression e in a public language L which aids in expressing propositional attitude P if and only if i the subject who has M and who is sufficiently competent in L knows (or realizes) that M goes with e in L; ii no other proposition e′ in L is more adequate for reporting the subject’s propositional attitude P; iii M is crucial in the subject’s rational failure to make certain identifications; and iv M is an appropriate function to an appropriate reference. Only the mode of presentation associated with ‘Venus’ that satisfies conditions i-iv relative to ‘Venus’ which aids in expressing a propositional attitude like the belief that Venus is a planet, will be the sense of ‘Venus’. I argue that only the mode of presentation of Venus as Venus will do, and that such mode of presentation is implicit in the way of determination shown by (V). Other modes of presentation of Venus as being big or appearing in the sky in the evenings or being the second planet in proximity to the sun will not satisfy conditions i–iv. Thus, although a subject may have all these modes of presentation of Venus and associate them with ‘Venus’ (i.e. (T1)), only the mode of presentation of Venus as Venus will do as the sense of ‘Venus’. Hence, only one thought will be expressed by a sentence like ‘Venus is a planet’ (i.e. (T2)).