Maja Soboleva

The research is focused on the analysis of Paul Natorp’s work Plato’s Doctrine of Ideas. The paper consists of three sections: 1) a definition of Platonic idea; 2) an analysis of the dialogue Parmenides ; and 3) a commentary on Natorp’s interpretation of Parmenides. The first section discusses Natorp’s transcendental method, which he uses as a critical approach to philosophical problems. The application of this method to the history of philosophy is examined, and it is shown that, thanks to Natorp, transcendentalism finds its history beginning with Plato and leading through Descartes and Kant to Cohen and the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism. According to this method, the core of Plato’s doctrine is idealism. Natorp’s definition of the Platonic idea is examined. Parmenides dialogue, in which Plato attempts to formulate his concept of the idea. The analysis focuses on the problem of the scope of ideas, the interaction between ideas and things, and the relationship between empirical and pure ideas. It traces some of Natorp’s steps in defending his thesis that ideas are methods of apprehending the object of knowledge. The third section questions the adequacy of Natorp’s proposed epistemological treatment of Plato’s concept of idea. A counterargument to each of Natorp’s main arguments is presented in turn. Finally, with reference to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, an alternative interpretation of the discussion between Socrates and Parmenides in the dialogue is given. Its essence, in contrast to Natorp’s affirmative interpretation, which presents Parmenides’ deductions as a development of Plato’s theory, is summed up in the fact that this dialogue represents Plato’s criticism of Parmenides’ approach of taking the ultimate pure concepts as essences and then, on this basis, developing his doctrine of being based, as it were, on the internal logic of these essences themselves. The paper concludes with a discussion of Natorp’s historical-philosophical method, which predetermined his interpretation of Plato’s concept of idea.

Die Frage nach dem Wesen des Denkens gehört nicht nur zum Bestand der klassischen philosophischen Fragestellungen, sondern stellt auch ein wiederkehrendes Thema in aktuellen Diskussionen dar. Dieses Überblickswerk versammelt differenzierte Darstellungen des Denkens aus einer systematisch-historischen Perspektive. Die Beiträge untersuchen die Verhältnisse von Denken und Sprechen, Denken und Handeln, Denken und Wahrnehmen, Denken und Fühlen und beleuchten so die zentralen Aspekte des Begriffs »Denken« in vielfältiger Weise.

Ernst Machs Philosophie genoss außerordentliche Popularität in Russland anfangs des 20. Jahrhunderts. Seine Anhänger sind vor allem dank Lenins Kritik in seinem Buch „Materialismus und Empiriokritizismus“, in dem er sie als „Machisten“ bezeichnete, weltweit berühmt berüchtigt geworden. Allerdings wurden Lenins Vorwürfe des Idealismus sowohl von Mach selbst als auch von seinen russischen Nachfolgern als unbegründet zurückgewiesen. Tatsächlich hat der am Bekanntesten von ihnen, als Lenins „Rivale“, Aleksander Bogdanov, seine eigene Erkenntnistheorie entwickelt, die er „Empiriomonismus“ nannte. Mit dieser suchte er einen naturwissenschaftlich fundierten erkenntnistheoretischen Orientierungsrahmen für den sozialen und politischen Marxismus zu erarbeiten und hat dafür eine „sozial-genetische“ Auslegung Machs Lehre vorgeschlagen. Die systematischen Bezüge zwischen Bogdanovs und Machs Theorien rücken ins Zentrum der Analyse. Es wird gezeigt, wie Bogdanov inspiriert vom Machs „physikalisch-psychologischen Monadologie“ diese zu einer Art sozialen Epistemologie mit dem Begriff „sozial-organisierte Erfahrung“ als ihren Kern transformiert.

The article examines the concept of the ‘Russian idea’ and its transformation into a conservative political ideology for the establishing of the so-called ‘Russian world’ in contemporary Russia. The analysis focuses on three levels of conceptual development of this idea: at the level of political technologies—a state level, at the level of university philosophy, and at the level of militarized so-called Z-philosophy. At the state level, the author argues, this idea represents a specific set of values aimed at creating a state identity of Russians and emphasizing their exclusive position in the modern world. At the level of university philosophy, it turns out to be an ontological concept used to demonstrate the necessary teleological character of the Russian idea. The Russian idea of Z-philosophers appears as a purely ideological construct serving the political establishment and justifying the war against Ukraine. In this connection some ideas of Aleksandr Dugin concerning the concept of the Russian idea are discussed.

The study offers an overview of philosophical currents formed under the influence of Kant’s critical philosophy. Such directions of Kantianism as German Idealism represented by F. Jacobi, Neo-Kantianism represented by E. Cassirer and A. Riehl, ontological interpretation of Kant’s theory by M. Heidegger and analytical tradition of Neo-Kantianism represented by J. McDowell are considered in detail. These examples demonstrate different approaches to understanding Kant which have been developed throughout history. Among them, one can identify the epistemological approach that views Kant’s theoretical philosophy as a theory of knowledge and, above all, as a theory of experience. It can be contrasted with various metaphysical approaches developed against the background of an idealistic reading of the Critique of Pure Reason. From time to time, realistic interpretations of Kant’s theory of experience that try to avoid ontological dualism concerning the relation between “appearance” and “thing in itself” have arisen, which seem adequate to its spirit and letter. Within the analytic Kantian paradigm, a whole spectrum of interpretations of Kant’s concept of experience has emerged, for which the stumbling blocks are, above all, Kant’s theory on the cognitive faculties - sensibility and understanding, the deduction of categories and the transcendental unity of apperception. In the first case, the main issue is the question of the cooperation of cognitive faculties in the process of experience formation, which still causes difficulties for researchers; in the second case, the question of the role of non-discursive and discursive concepts in this process; in the third case, the question of the relationship of apperception, consciousness and self-consciousness and their functions in cognition. The study shows that all these questions still await their final resolution. The study is in fact an introduction to the block devoted to the reception of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason in connection with the approaching anniversary of the philosopher.

Metaphysics, understood as the first philosophy, that is, the science of the ultimate foundations and principles of being, has long been declared an anachronism in the postmodern period.1 The pluralistic character of being, the heterogeneity of types of philosophical discourse and their mutual irreducibility, the spatiotemporal discreteness of various ontologies and epistemologies, the understanding of tradition as a given that needs to be overcome rather than continued—all these indicators point to the paradigm of new thinking within which flows the mainstream of twentieth-century philosophical thought. Outside this stream stands the figure of K.-O. Apel, who is devoted to the idea of a single philosophy and continues to uphold it in the face of criticism from all sides. Apel's quixotic unwillingness to relinquish his stance is demonstrated by his new book, published in 1998, in which he continues to develop his ideas, which constitute a complete conception of transcendental pragmatism.2 Inasmuch as a theory that had apparently been relegated to books on the history of philosophy has become topical again, my task is to return to its sources and to reconstruct3 and analyze its basic propositions.

The paper focuses on the problem of constitution of our cognitive experience. Two approaches to this problem proposed by Cassirer and McDowell are central for the analysis. Both authors use Kant’s theory of cognition as a foundation for their own conceptions und they develop their independent interpretations of it according to the traditions they belong to. Although McDowell’s interpretation emerged within analytical philosophy, we can see similarity with Cassirer’s theory. Comparative studies of these theories will point out the convergences and divergences between them.

This paper seeks to reconstruct philosopher Aleksandr Bogdanov’s approach to the philosophy of Spinoza in the context of the debate against Plekhanov. I demonstrate that the Soviet interest in Spinoza’s theory has never been purely historical, but rather, it served an important function in developing the theoretical foundations for Marxist philosophy. However, Bogdanov was one of only a very few who objected strongly to Plekhanov’s attempt to relate Spinoza’s philosophy to Marxism in a direct way. Two principles underlie Bogdanov’s critique: one being methodological, the other—systematic. The methodological principle has a hermeneutical character, since it demands that we treat historical concepts by taking into account their context and their changes during the time. According to Bogdanov, failing to fulfil this principle results in the dogmatization and instrumentalization of philosophy, and transforms it into political doctrine. The systematic principle concerns Bogdanov’s radical rethinking of the relationship between extension and thought. I argue that by rethinking Spinoza’s concepts in the framework of “ideo-empirical parallelism”, Bogdanov develops his own theory of cognition, which he called “empiriomonism”. When considered in historical context, I argue that these debates can serve as a window into the foundational role the Spinoza’s philosophy has played in the formation of different versions of Russian Marxism, as well as in the development of Russian Marxism in general.

This paper focuses on the theoretical philosophy of Bukharin as developed in his book Filosofskie arabeski. I analyze three concepts—perception, being, and dialectics—and show that and how they deviate from the meaning that they commonly have among other Russian Marxists. In this work, Bukharin drafts a theory that can be interpreted as a “relational ontology,” since it focuses on the relations between entities and since these relations are considered to be more fundamental than the entities themselves and provide epistemic access to reality. My examination of Bukharin’s theoretical views shows that he continues Lenin’s tradition of materialist and dialectical thought. That is why, in spite of his innovative approach to some key problems of theoretical philosophy, Bukharin did not go far enough in his studies. His theoretical position appears to be an integral part of his political engagement.

The bibliography of works discussing Russian Marxism is huge, making it very difficult to give an original interpretation of this phenomenon. To distinguish myself from the interpretative mainstream, I do not focus on persons and chronology, but rather investigate the question whether there was a specific logic in the unfolding of Russian Marxism which led to its consolidation into a specific doctrine, focusing on dialectical and historical materialism, during the Soviet period, and transformed it from a pluralistic philosophy into the monolithic official ideology of the Russian Communist Party. I concentrate on some theoretical and epistemological problems discussed by Russian Marxists, such as whether dialectical materialism is a theory or a methodology, whether dialectics is a logical or ontological category, what the term “dialectical materialism” exactly means, and what the materialistic understanding of cognition and the core assumption of historical materialism are. Accordingly, my approach has a reconstructive character: I focus on some fundamental propositions of Soviet Marxism which are recorded in textbooks on philosophy and try to recover their philosophical genesis. Thus my scope is restricted to a selection of relevant discussion points, allowing me to keep the philosophical discussions separate from political controversies.

The article focuses on a phenomenological study of political action. The analysis includes three directions: the concept of action, paradigms that determine political actions, and the purpose of action. In the analysis of action, I first use the distinction between the concepts of “act” and “operate.” “To act” means a conscious, deliberate, rational action. In contrast, “operate” means to behave unconsciously, mechanically or automatically, passively or instinctively. The political implications of the distinction between an “acting” and “operating” person can be formulated in the terms “freedom of action” and “coercion to operate,” and the latter can be used as a criterion for determining the type of social system, as well as for evaluating the correlated psychological state of society. As the next step, I analyse the action as a process and a result. I argue that in the social sphere, action appears as the sum of these moments, and the social sphere is a derivate of action. The last aspect of the analysis of action is responsibility. I claim that responsibility can be interpreted as the awareness and recognition by the individual of her role in history. The second part of the work is the study of paradigms and rules of political action in so-called open and closed societies. I claim that political action within the framework of an open society is limited only by legislation. In a closed society, political action is practically impossible: citizens do not act, but “operate” since there are no conditions for actions. After that, I analyse the role of social myths as a factor affecting people’s political activities. In the last part, I analyse the ultimate goal of political action. Traditionally, political philosophy assumes that the goals of politics are exhausted by the problems of relationship between the state and the individual. However, based on the theory of Hannah Arendt, it is possible to formulate the task of political action as the achievement of humanism in a human being, taken not in her relation to the state but in relation to herself. I argue that the minimal political action that can be qualified as humanism consists of the ability and courage to use one’s own mind.