Majid D. Beni

This paper critically examines the challenges in consciousness research, with a focus on natural kind (NK) reasoning. It proposes supplementing NK reasoning with a structural realist framework, shifting the focus from identifying a natural kind of consciousness to understanding invariant structural relationships across diverse theories, thereby addressing divergence and ensuring coherence. By using predictive processing as a formal framework that underlies the diversity of consciousness accounts and characterises common structural patterns, the structural realist approach aims to integrate divergent theories, offering a more robust, objective, and unified understanding of consciousness that can supplement and guide natural kind reasoning.

This paper critically examines the methodological strategy of iterative bootstrapping within marker-based natural kind reasoning, with specific application to the science of consciousness. By drawing an explicit parallel to its use in the domain of computation, the analysis demonstrates that bootstrapping procedures—particularly under assumptions of theory-neutrality—fail to generalise operational markers across divergent substrates. The failure to formalise computation across architectures (e.g., Turing machines and neuromorphic systems) undermines efforts to demarcate computation simpliciter. This methodological circularity is shown to replicate in consciousness science, where markers calibrated on human neurocognitive architecture undergo conceptual drift when applied to non-human systems. The apparent convergence of such markers thus reflects internal consistency with the human baseline rather than cross-substrate generalisability, ultimately casting doubt on the capacity of bootstrapping to identify consciousness simpliciter in a principled, non-anthropocentric manner.

This paper examines two approaches to the measurement problem in quantum mechanics, invoking the concept of consciousness and highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of each. The first approach is the model proposed by David Chalmers and Kelvin McQueen, based on the idea of the Consciousness Collapses Wave Function (CCWF), originally attributed to John von Neumann and Eugene Wigner. The second approach is the phenomenological framework known as the London-Bauer-French (LBF) approach. We contend that significant challenges have been raised against key features of the CCWF model. However, these criticisms require further arguments to effectively undermine its most crucial claim: that the model can be tested to determine whether consciousness collapses the wave function. We will demonstrate that while CCWF offers a mathematically defined collapse mechanism that yields straightforward, experimentally testable predictions about collapse per se, these tests do not, by themselves, establish that consciousness is the cause of collapse. Nevertheless, despite this limitation, their model provides conceptual clarity in addressing the measurement problem, as it utilizes a mathematically defined collapse mechanism that offers a straightforward and testable solution. In contrast, the LBF approach lacks conceptual clarity regarding the measurement problem, as it continues to depend on the standard quantum formalism.

This paper offers a scientifically informed reconstruction of the continuity argument in support of a modest version of a loosely panpsychist tenet: the continuity of mind. This approach does so by engaging with two closely connected recent proposals: the problem of the abruptness of the emergence of consciousness in the context of Dennett’s account of the emergence of comprehension from competence and Levin’s “technological approach to minds everywhere” (TAME), which illustrates how to reconstruct the continuity argument and to address the issue of abrupt emergence. The stance put forth advocates a view that holds its ground within an evolutionary narrative of consciousness. In conclusion, our proposal (i) aligns with the notion of smooth gradualism in the process of consciousness genesis and (ii) recognises the presence of diverse instances of collective intelligence throughout the evolutionary trajectory. Thus, the proposal remains valid irrespective of whether evolutionary progression occurred through natural selection or through alternative methods, such as designed or artefactual means, as in TAME.

We offer to extend structural realism into the field of mind and brain studies. The naturalised metaphysics of structural realism has been defined in terms of unification of sciences. The unification program has been carried out nicely in fields of Quantum Mechanics and General Relativity. But for the structural realist metaphysics to receive a recommendation, the unification program needs to be extended to the fields of especial sciences. Our aim in the paper is twofold. On the one hand, we present a structural realist theory of the brain that is well-supported by the best theories of computational neurosciences. On the other hand, and at the same time, we provide further reason for being optimistic about the structural realism metaphysical claim which is based on the idea of unification in sciences.

The paper aims to provide a detailed assessment of Tim Crane’s recent invocation of the notion of scientific models in the way of dealing with the issue of the brain’s representational states. In this paper, I assess Crane’s proposal under a charitable and a less charitable reading. I argue that Crane’s use of scientific models is at best (i.e. under a charitable reading) compatible with his expression of psychological realism. However, Crane’s use of model-based strategy by no means underlay, support, or strengthen his psychological realism. Rather, traditional reasons from the metaphysics of mind, acting quite separately from empirical scientific reasons, must be used to support this realism, and Crane has merely removed the threat posed to these metaphysical arguments by the existence of the so-called mereological fallacy in empirical neuroscience. Therefore, while he has saved the neuroscientific language from philosophical attack, he has perhaps even strengthened the divide between neuroscience and philosophy. I conclude the paper by outlining the sketch of a broadbrush scientifically informed strategy for defending psychological realism.

Building upon Brentano’s (in: McAlister LL (ed) Psychology from an empirical standpoint. Routledge, London, [1874] Brentano 1995) reintroduction of the concept of intentionality to the contemporary philosophy, Tim Crane has famously presented the intentionality as the mark of the mental. Accordingly, the problem of “intentional existence” (or rather “intentional inexistence”) has resurfaced in Crane’s revival of the Brentanoian theme (Crane in The objects of thought, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013; Aspects of psychologism, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2014). Here, I revise Crane’s construal of Brentano’s notion of intentional inexistence and reinterpret it in terms of a moderate version of relationalism. My relationalist theory of intentionality is inspired by what goes by the name of Noneliminativist Structural Realism (NSR) in the contemporary philosophy of science. NSR allows for a robust realist interpretation of the role of scientific models. The underlying insight of the paper is that it is best to be realist about the structure of the intentionality, which is the common element of the diverse theories of intentional objects. The Outcome is Structural Realist theory of Intentionality (SRI for short). I argue that SRI is not liable to the notorious objection of the impossibility of relata-less relations. I conclude that SRI fulfils the goal of robust psychological realism more economically and straightforwardly than Crane’s application of the notion of models.

This paper challenges traditional accuracy-centric accounts of rationality by synthesising the Free Energy Principle (FEP) with Charles Peirce’s pragmatist epistemology. Whereas the FEP frames cognition as a biological imperative to minimise surprise through predictive models, we argue that its normative force emerges when integrated with Peircean abduction and skill-based metrics. By reinterpreting rationality through skill scores—Peirce’s 1884 method for evaluating rare-event predictions—we demonstrate that survival-driven inference prioritises context-sensitive skill over abstract accuracy. The FEP’s variational free-energy minimisation aligns with abduction’s dynamic conjecture-making, revealing rationality as a pragmatic negotiation between organismic survival and environmental complexity. Critically, we show that Bayesian accuracy measures (e.g., Kullback–Leibler divergence) fail to capture the adequacy conditions for skillful forecasting, whereas Peirce’s skill score satisfies constraints such as error weighting and directionality. This fusion of FEP and pragmatism advances a naturalistic-normative framework in which rationality is grounded in adaptive, enactive inference rather than idealised coherence, bridging computational neuroscience and theoretical biology with philosophical accounts of inquiry.

This paper advances a naturalistic defence of Alexander Bird’s account of science as a form of social knowing, as well as his theory of scientific inference articulated through superobjective Bayesianism, by grounding them in recent developments in cognitive science and theoretical neuroscience. Drawing on the Free Energy Principle (FEP) and the methodology of Bayesian adversarial collaboration, the paper argues that scientific practice is irreducibly social and that scientific inference cannot be reduced to individual credences. Rather, inference arises from distributed, formalised practices that instantiate computationally tractable mechanisms for theory evaluation—mechanisms that balance empirical adequacy with explanatory virtues. Central to this framework is the use of generative models that encode theoretical virtues as priors and constrain model comparison. This approach links the biological plausibility of inference as free energy minimisation with the naturalistic plausibility of Bird’s notion of superobjective Bayesianism.

This paper seeks to advance the compatibilist theory of free will, particularly building upon contributions by Christian List (and also Daniel Dennett) regarding the agential capacity to act otherwise. Emphasizing the importance of genuine agential abilities, it aims to conceptualize these abilities in empirically grounded terms, avoiding reliance on modal notions and eschewing an insurmountable divide between physical and psychological levels. To achieve this, the paper conceptualizes agential states as functions of decision-making processes that dissolve the agent’s uncertainty about the consequences of its actions. By modeling the generation and evaluation of multiple potential actions, this approach explicates a form of operational freedom embedded within the physics of information processing. Consequently, it resolves the tension between free will and determinism without isolating psychology from physical processes.

This article seeks to define the genuine (functional) kind of agency by identifying its essential property. In the context of this article, the essential property, also termed super‐explanatory, is the ability of an agent to make counterfactual models of outcomes of its actions. This article adopts a naturalist approach, informed by advancements in computational neuroscience, to define the functional kind of agency. The offered definition is deliberately flexible and inclusive, encompassing manifestations of agency in both natural and artificial domains.

This chapter aims to show that the problem of metaphysical underdetermination, which has been introduced in the context of modern physics in the previous chapter, also arises in the field of philosophy of cognitive science. To be more precise, I show that the theoretical diversity that haunts neuroscientific accounts of the self leads to rival philosophical accounts of the self, for example, eliminativism and pluralism. The scientifically informed accounts of the self defy substantivalism. I argue that to defend a realist theory of the self, we must overcome the problem of metaphysical underdetermination, preferably without smuggling in substantivalism through the backdoor.

There are different accounts of the phenomenal aspects of the self. This chapter reviews three important accounts of the self. These are the Integrated Information Theory of consciousness (IIT), the resting-state-based theory of consciousness, and the Free Energy Principle (FEP)-based theory of (self-)consciousness. Firstly, I argue that all of these theories can be construed along the lines of SR. Moreover, I argue that because these theories could be related together in a meaningful way, together they form a comprehensive structural account of consciousness. I also present a structural account of intentionality. In this way, the chapter indicates that phenomenal aspects of the self could be construed along the lines of structural realism and in harmony with the structural realist theory of the self.

This chapter outlines some important stages in the history of the evolution of the philosophical conception of the self. It overviews the philosophical theories of Aristotle, Descartes, Hume, and Kant about notions of the mind, perception, cognition, and the self. In this chapter, I also introduce some important ideas of the book, for example, substantivalism about the self and structuralism. I show that the theories of Aristotle and Descartes line up with substantivalism, whereas views of Hume and Kant border on what is called a structural realist theory of the self in this book. The chapter also alludes to some scientific breakthroughs in psychology in the two last centuries and argues that the development of cognitive sciences occasions a break from the orthodox substantivalism about the self. I suggest that to give structure to the confusing pluralism that is caused by the divergence from substantivalism in scientific psychology, we may advocate a form of structural realism.

The chapter accounts for social and moral aspects of the self along structural terms. There are already fine neuroscientific theories that account for the embodiment of the relational self in the manifold of interpersonal relations. Vittorio Gallese has developed such a theory. Gallese’s theory indicates that the structure of the social self is based on the mirror neuron system’s information processing. In this chapter, I outline a comprehensive theory of structural self on the basis of a synthesis between Gallese’s relational self that is embodied in the web of social relations and structural realist theory of the self (SRS) which—according to what I said in previous chapters—thus far takes care of reflective and phenomenal aspects of the self. To consolidate the synthesis I draw attention to the integration (via dynamical interconnection) between the mirror neuron system, which embodies the social aspects of the self, and the Default Mode Network, which realises the reflective aspects of the self-structure. The chapter also deals with the moral aspects of the structural self. Firstly, I argue that recent findings in moral neuroscience can support a structural account of the moral aspects of the self. Then, by drawing on Peter Railton’s work, I argue that the SRS provides a chance for finding a middle ground between egotism and alienation, so as to develop a viable theory of moral judgements.

This chapter surveys the evolution of structural realism (SR), as a modified version of scientific realism. The problem of underdetermination of metaphysics by diverse theories of physics wreaks havoc with standard scientific realism. SR aims to overcome the problem of metaphysical underdetermination in a way that remains beyond the reach of object-oriented scientific realism. The chapter also outlines some important approaches to SR, for example, informational SR, and it elaborates on structural realists’ use of mathematical structures to regiment the representational content of the theories. Finally, I argue that because the theoretical diversity of the cognitive sciences distracts from realism about psychological phenomena, the projection of SR to the field of cognitive sciences as a strategy to reinforce realism about the self would be in order.

The chapter spells out the structural realist theory of the self (SRS). It builds upon what I said in Chaps. 10.1007/978-3-030-31102-5_2 and 10.1007/978-3-030-31102-5_3 to suggest that SRS can account for the issue of underdetermination of metaphysics of selfhood by the diversity of neuroscientific theories, without succumbing to the orthodox substantivalist theory of the self. SRS enables us to reconcile conflicting philosophical implications of diverse theories of the self. Thus SRS defends a modest form of realism about the self.

This chapter concludes the enterprise of this book. It briefly overviews some of the themes that are unfolded in the book. For example, it highlights the unificatory vocation of CSR, as a theory which seeks to reconcile structural realism to the cognitive models of science approach. This chapter also clarifies the ontological commitments of CSR. It asserts that CSR makes ontological commitments to embodied informational structures. These informational structures could be identified in terms of information processing in the biological, cognitive systems. Owing to the embodied nature of these mechanisms and their reciprocal dynamical interactions with the environment, they could be assumed to be entwined with the causal structure of the world. Finally, the chapter offers a comprehensive entropy-based informational framework for comprising the informational structure of CSR.

This chapter unfolds the background of Cognitive Structural Realism (CSR) and its account of scientific representation. This overviews the pursuit of the idea of the underlying structure of scientific theories in the history of the philosophy of science and elaborates on some of the central themes of this book, e.g., unification, the underlying structure, and scientific representation. It also canvasses two blooming theories of the philosophy of science. These are structural realism and Cognitive Models of Science Approach. These two theories have usually been understood as rivals. But CSR emerges as a synthesis between these two theories. By being unified, structural realism and the cognitive models of science approach amend one another’s shortcomings.

In this chapter, I survey an embodied, ecological, enactivist construal of PPT. Let us call this the embodied construal for short. Unlike the inferentialist construal of PPT that has been mentioned in the previous chapter, the embodied construal of PPT can accommodate direct realism. In this chapter, I argue that the embodied construal can be recruited by CSR, and it can be used to deal with the strong version of the problem of representation in a fundamental way. Given the possibility of associating the embodied construal of PPT with direct realism, CSR could rely on this construal of PPT to face the threat of the strong version of the problem of representation in a radical way. This is because the embodied, enactivist, and ecological construal does not recognise the existence of an inferential veil that could distort the relation between cognitive models on the one hand and their target in the world on the other. Hence the problem of representation could be suppressed fundamentally.

The chapter articulates weak and strong versions of the problem of representation. It also argues that enhancing the expressive power of logical systems does not result in a conclusive solution to the problem of representation. I examine structural realists’ reliance on ‘partial isomorphisms’ and ‘pragmatic truth’ to substantiate the message of this chapter. The message is that the set/model-theoretic framework cannot account for the biologically explicable relationship between the structure of the scientific theories and reality.

The chapter launches a new attempt at addressing the problem of representation. In this chapter, I shall argue that to deal with the problem, we may specify the underlying structure of scientific theories in terms of cognitive structures. To introduce the desirable cognitive structures, I shall rely on the preceding work of Churchland and construe it as a new version of structural realism. My construal of Churchland’s work paves the way for a synthesis between CMSA and SR. The chapter outlines a rudimentary version of Cognitive SR and its solution to the problem of representation. A more advanced version that includes further details regarding the underpinning neurological mechanisms and their biological viability will be presented in the next chapters of this book.

This chapter surveys a different version of SR that does not rely on set/model-theoretic structures. Ladyman J, Ross D, Collier J, Spurrett D (Every thing must go. Oxford University Press, Oxford. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276196.001.0001, 2007) version of Informational SR (ISR) (ISR is usually used to refer to Floridi’s version of Informational Structural Realism. Here, I extend the term to also include Ladyman and Ross’ version.) offers an information-theoretic account of the underlying structure of scientific theories. At times it seems that Ladyman and Ross’ version of ISR relies on John Collier’s development of the notion of physical information. This may facilitate connecting the underlying informational structures to the physical world. However, as I will discuss in this chapter, despite its promising approach, Ladyman and Ross’ version of ISR cannot tell us a full story about grounding the representational relation between theories and the world. I shall argue that this version of Informational SR cannot address the problem of representation satisfactory either.

The book aims to provide a radically naturalistic account of scientific representation in the field of philosophy of science and within the context of structural realism. The book’s account of scientific representation is presented within the context of a new (Cognitive) version of Structural Realism. This new theory, i.e., Cognitive Structural Realism (or CSR), is inspired by two rival approaches in the contemporary philosophy of science. These are (orthodox) Structural Realism and Cognitive Models of Science Approach. Also, CSR draws on resources of computational neuroscience, theoretical biology, as well as embodied and enactivist interpretations of theories of cognitive psychology, to provide a fresh theory of scientific representation and defend a naturalistically plausible and down-to-earth version of structural realism.

In this chapter, I draw on the resources of contemporary computational neuroscience to provide an updated version of CSR. I shall argue that the resources of the Predictive Processing Theory (PPT) can be used to account for both structuralist and realist components of CSR. I argue that PPT provides the necessary inferential links for accounting for CSR’s notion of scientific representation. Since the implemented Bayesian framework that PPT invokes has a natural propensity for being grounded, this version of CSR provides a solution to the problem of representation. But I will conclude the chapter by pointing out that the inferential nature of the invoked inferential links could still harbour the strong version of the problem of representation.

We critically examine the intersection of developmental bioelectricity within the context of the Peircean philosophy of science. We address the criticism of Peirce’s objective idealism and synechism, contest the conflation of semiotic and physical laws, and scrutinise Peirce’s recovery of physical from psychological laws. The upshot is a nonmechanistic, nonreductive interpretation of the evolution of cognition in the bioengineering realm. The work of Kull and others is leveraged to demarcate semiotics and physics, emphasising the irreducibility of bioelectric phenomena to mechanistic explanations. Our paper advocates for methodological synechism in evolutionary biology, highlighting the heightened roles of bioelectricity in morphogenesis and basal cognition. We propose the free-energy principle as a unifying arbiter that sets an explanatory pathway toward integrated cognition and meaning in developmental bioelectricity.

This book draws on advances in computational neuroscience and theoretical biology to provide a clear and accessible agentive account of the nature of causality and scientific explanations. Instead of attempting to establish the elements of scientific explanation, such as causality, in a reality unadulterated by a human perspective, this book relies on scientific facts about cognition to describe the structure of agency at from a distinctly human perspective. The book draws on the Free Energy Principle to reinforce the agency theory of causality and extend it to an account of explanation as well. This principle The FEP not only provides a theoretical account of how self-organising systems engage with the causal structure of the environment, but it also offers a viable notion of agency and is compatible with the projectivist aspects of the agency theory. Scientific Explanation, Causality, and Agency will appeal to researchers and advanced students working in philosophy of science, philosophy of cognitive science, epistemology, computational neuroscience, and theoretical biology.