Maksim Litvinov

The research focuses on the problem of interpretation of such a concept as the origin, which is ultimate for philosophical thought and bases existentially oriented constructions of Franz Rosenzweig and Martin Heidegger. It is argues in this paper the fundamental difference between the interpretations of the origin in “The Star of Redemption» and in «Being and Time”, despite all points of intersection and coincidences that bring closer together dialogical and existential-historical thinking. Such differentiation of positions is determined by the necessity both to neutralize romantic connotations, which expose the origin ( Ursprung ) as abyss ( Abgrund ), and to methodologically clarify the possibility not so much to think as to practically assert a limited and unclosed within itself integral being, including ontological and ethical dimensions. The origin of oblivion and renewal, imposed by Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity, is contrasted with Rosenzweig's origin of the “eternal overworld”, reconstructed on the basis of Herman Cohen's religio-philosophical intuitions and his analysis of the infinitesimal as a principle of reality. Rosenzweig’s position, which aims at a correlative consideration of the purely logical content of the infinitesimal quantity (almost-Nothing) and the existential experience of the finiteness of everything, is favorably distinguished by the absence of a one-sided focus on recalling, where fore-running although is declared, but it is immediately restrained by being-towards-death. As a result, Rosenzweig’s dialogism turns out to be free from overestimating what Heidegger’s interpretation calls resoluteness, which in fact is not much different from paralysis in the clearance of being. Cohen’s problem of an infinite task's realization, being actualized in Rosenzweig’s conception, allows to go beyond being-towards-death in juxtaposing the trajectories of initial elements into a true gestalt.

The research focuses on the problem of freedom from that point of view which puts captiveness by being and openness to being in the middle of non-dialectical examination. This perspective clarifies not only the major course of Bergson’s thought, but also the subsequent incorrect shift to the pole of openness in the hermeneutical interpretation of facticity, implemented by Heidegger. The work is conventionally divided into two parts. The first one inquires about specifics of the method used by Bergson. It is emphasized the proximity in between Bergson's orientation to the common sense and phenomenological research, despite all differences in these approaches. Also it’s gives a general analysis of Bergson’s concepts used in “Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness” and in “Matter and Memory” in order to adequately questioning about the freedom of a person, acting on the basis of specific practical conditions of his existence. Bergson draws the roads of freedom through the adaptability of the intelligible to the prose of life, establishing the plane of immanence with its unbreakable boundaries. The second part analyzes aesthetic consequences of Bergson’s theory of perception and memory, thus opening access to descending pathways in sensory data processing. The theory of duration and the emphasis it places on retrospection in clarifying what accompanies the act of perception, argues for the connection of creativity with the process of actualization of the virtual. With reference to Deleuze, it is criticized the irrational attempt to assert the beginning of creativity both in nothingness and in the realization of the possible by its limiting. Thus, the appeal to Bergson’s ontological intuitions allows to refuse both the aesthetics of the origin and the logic of the readiness-to-hand-being as primarily encountered in the world. In conclusion, it is considered Bergson's polemic with Einstein, in the resolution of which the logic of differentiation seems preferable to the logic of dialectical sublation.