•  2
    The Normativity Problem for Rational Reductions of Morality
    Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 12 253-259. 2018.
    My goal in this paper is to point out that whatever difficulty evolutionary reductions have in capturing the normativity essential to moral talk, rational reductions face the same problem. My paper is arranged in two parts. In the first, I distinguish between rational and evolutionary reductions of morality, and highlight the basic normativity problem for evolutionists1. In the second, I offer a tu quoque against rationalists.
  •  1
    Morals and Consent: Contractarian Solutions to Ethical Woes
    Mcgill-Queen's University Press. 2017.
    How are we meant to behave? And how are we to defend whatever answer we give? Morals and Consent grounds our notion of morality in natural evolution, and from that basis, Malcolm Murray shows why contractarianism is a far more viable moral theory than is widely believed. The scope of Morals and Consent has two main parts: theory and application. In his discussion of theory, Murray defends contractarianism by appealing to evolutionary game theory and metaethical analyses. His main argument is tha…Read more
  •  24
    The Atheist's Primer
    Broadview Press. 2010.
    _The Athiest’s Primer_ is a concise but wide-ranging introduction to a variety of arguments, concepts, and issues pertaining to belief in God. In lucid and engaging prose, Malcom Murray offers a penetrating yet fair-minded critique of the traditional arguments for the existence of God. He then explores a number of other important issues relevant to religious belief, such as the problem of suffering and the relationship between religion and morality, in each case arguing that atheism is preferabl…Read more
  •  1
    Critical Reflection: A Textbook for Critical Thinking
    with Nebojsa Kujundzic
    Les Éditions du Septentrion. 2005.
    About the Author:Malcolm Murray is associate professor in the Department of Philosophy, University of Prince Edward Island.Nebojsa Kujundzic is associate professor in the Department of Philosophy, University of Prince Edward Island
  •  40
    Jan Narveson is one of the most significant contemporary defenders of the libertarian political position.
  •  10
    Unconsidered preferences
    South African Journal of Philosophy 17 (4): 346-353. 1998.
  •  17
    There is a problem within contractarian ethics that I wish to resolve. It concerns individualpreferences. Contractarianism holds that morality, properly conceived, can satisfy individualpreferences and interests better than amorality or immorality. W hat is unclear, however, iswhether these preferences are those individuals actually hold or those that they should hold. The goal of my thesis is to investigate this question. I introduce a version of contractarian ethicsthat relies on ind ividual p…Read more
  • Prejudice and Evolutionary Game Theory
    Public Affairs Quarterly 24 (2): 169-186. 2010.
    Let us define prejudice as a propensity to treat members of a particular outgroup as having less moral worth than members of one's own group. Racism and sexism are kinds of prejudice, but so, too, is homophobia, as well as some fervent nationalisms.1 Prejudice is viewed as a problem for evolutionary ethics: prejudice clearly exists in our world, yet we also deem prejudice immoral.2 How can an evolutionary account explain the fit of a trait x at the same time as explaining the fit of a trait that…Read more
  •  4
    How to Blackmail a Contractarian
    Public Affairs Quarterly 13 (4): 347-361. 1999.
  •  10
    Helping: A Two-tiered Baseline Theory
    Cogito 12 (1): 59-63. 1998.
  •  37
    Homosexuals and the Adoption Question
    International Journal of Applied Philosophy 13 (1): 105-111. 1999.
    In this paper, I claim there is nothing morally wrong with homosexuals adopting children. It is often argued that even if we ought to tolerate homosexuals in society, we must nevertheless forbid them from raising children. This is simply preposterous. There is no good argument for maintaining it, as I hope to demonstrate here
  •  3
    Helping: A Two-tiered Baseline Theory
    Cogito 12 (1): 59-63. 1998.
  •  5
    Concerned parties: When lack of consent is irrelevant
    Public Affairs Quarterly 18 (2): 125-140. 2004.
  •  11
    A catalogue of mistaken interests: Reflections on the desired and the desirable
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (1). 2003.
    To show that morality is in one's interest, the challenge put forward by Hobbes's Foole, we must first be clear what is meant by something's being in one's interest. Defining self-interest in an external or objective sense (so that claiming morality really satisfies her self-interest, albeit in ways she will never appreciate) will not placate the Foole. Self-interest, for the Foole, must be understood in terms that she will endorse. Are such terms possible? Subjective interpretations of self-int…Read more