Śabara, in the oldest known commentary to the Mīmāṃsā-sūtras states that the primary meaning of a word is ākr̥ ti, or form, different from both default answers to the question of meaning; individual and class. Śabara’s concept of ākr̥ ti is strictly connected with his word oriented towards metaphysics - just as the phenomenal world is derived from the Vedic Word, so is every cognition based on a verbal component. And ākr̥ ti is this very verbal component, present in every act of cognition and in…
Read moreŚabara, in the oldest known commentary to the Mīmāṃsā-sūtras states that the primary meaning of a word is ākr̥ ti, or form, different from both default answers to the question of meaning; individual and class. Śabara’s concept of ākr̥ ti is strictly connected with his word oriented towards metaphysics - just as the phenomenal world is derived from the Vedic Word, so is every cognition based on a verbal component. And ākr̥ ti is this very verbal component, present in every act of cognition and in every object. It is a base and a source of individual world-objects. It is also a medium that makes recognition of an individual possible. Thus every pramāṇa, method of cognition, is based on a verbal component; even perception. In Śloka-vārttika, a later commentary written by Kumarila Bhaṭṭa, ākr̥ ti is admittedly identified with jāti, or ‘class’, yet it is seen as more complex. Kumarila introduces an idea of a double character of objects and meanings. Every word’s meaning has two intermingled components; individual and common, just as objects are in fact dual - different from others and bearing some similarity to others. None of the two meanings can be treated as secondary. Thus ākr̥ ti becomes a single, yet not unitary, answer to the question of meaning. It keeps its verbal character, for a class, too, has for Kumarila a double character - linguistic and real. What is more, the existence of a class makes reasoning and verbal cognition possible, and the class itself is cognised in a basic, direct act of perception.