• How Mary defeated the Zombies; Destabilizing the Modal argument with the Knowledge argument
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6): 499-519. 2018.
    Several of the most compelling anti-materialist arguments are motivated by the supposed existence of an unbridgeable epistemic gap between first-person subjective knowledge about one’s own conscious experience and third-personally acquired knowledge. The two with which this paper is concerned are Frank Jackson’s ‘knowledge argument’ and David Chalmers’s ‘modal argument’. The knowledge argument and the modal argument are often taken to function as ‘two sides of the same coin … in principle each s…Read more
  • Illusionism and the Epistemological Problems Facing Phenomenal Realism
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12): 215-223. 2016.
    Illusionism about phenomenal properties has the potential to leave us with all the benefit of taking consciousness seriously and far fewer problems than those accompanying phenomenal realism. The particular problem I explore here is an epistemological puzzle that leaves the phenomenal realist with a dilemma but causes no trouble for the illusionist: how can we account for false beliefs about our own phenomenal properties? If realism is true, facts about our phenomenal properties must hold indepe…Read more