Manjari Chakrabarty

In his 1997 paper “Technology and Complexity” Dasgupta draws a distinction between systematic and epistemic complexity. Entities are called systematically complex when they are composed of a large number of parts that interact in complicated ways. This means that even if one knows the properties of the parts one may not be able to infer the behaviour of the system as a whole. In contrast, epistemic complexity refers to the knowledge that is used in, or generated by the making of an artefact and is embodied in it. Interestingly, a high level of systematic complexity does not entail a high level of epistematic complexity and vice versa. Prehistoric stone tools, for example, display a unique combination of systematic simplicity with epistemic complexity. In order to attract the attention of philosophers of technology and engineering to the domain of prehistoric technology or what is called “First Technology”, the present chapter aims to examine the epistemic complexity of, ancient Oldowan stone tools. The aim is addressed by critically reviewing and extending Karl Popper’s unconventional objective approach to epistemology and by drawing upon recent experimental-archaeological research on Oldowan stone tool production.

This paper aims to display the versatility of Karl Popper’s thesis of three worlds in the analysis of issues related to the ontological status and character of material artifacts. Despite being discussed over years and hit with numerous criticisms it was hardly ever noticed that Popper’s thesis provides excellent insights into the philosophical account of artifacts. There are two sections in this paper. The first section presents a critical exposition of Popper’s account of reality and (partial) autonomy of artifacts. The second section consists of two arguments. The first argument focuses on the composition and characteristics of material artifacts and the second one emphasizes their creative and epistemic aspects.

This paper aims to critically discuss the versatility of Popper’s theory of three worlds in the analysis of issues related to the ontological status and character of technical artifacts. Despite being discussed over years and hit with numerous criticisms it is still little known that Popper’s thesis has an important bearing on the philosophical characterization of technical artifacts. His key perspectives on the reality, autonomy, and ontological status of artifacts are rarely taken into consideration by scholars known to be engaged in the study of artifacts. This paper consists of two main sections. The first section attempts to present a critical exposition of Popper’s account of reality and autonomy of artifacts. Recent discussions about the longstanding distinction between natural objects and artifacts are brought up and the relevance of Popper’s pluralistic thesis to this debate is pointed out. In addition, attention is drawn towards how to read his notion of the autonomy of artifacts. The primary emphasis of the second section is the ontological position of artifacts. Two separate arguments are posed to challenge the dual ontological status of what Popper called ‘embodied’ World 3 objects or artifacts. The first argument is concerned with the material composition and characteristic features of artifacts. The second one addresses the creative and epistemic value of these artificial products.