Manohar Kumar

How should one qualify political whistleblowing within a democratic system, governed by the rule of law? Whistleblowing is often considered a form of principled, sometimes even democratic dissent. In this last chapter, we discuss what kind of dissent whistleblowing is. We discuss various forms of dissent and argue that whistleblowing is neither a case of conscientious objection nor a case of civil disobedience. However—we conclude—it is a distinctive form of civil dissent against the threat of unruled government secrecy.

National security and strategic interests of the modern state require a certain amount of secrecy. However, state secrecy poses a dilemma for constitutional democracies, whose legitimacy depends on the transparency of democratic decision-making. In this chapter, we defend the argument that citizens’ right to know limits the prerogatives of state secrecy. We start from the debate on the balance between liberty and security and provide some criticisms of the idea that striking a balance is always justified in a democracy. We pay particular attention to the role secrecy plays in matters of national security and the effects of unrestrained secrecy on the enjoyment of rights. We then introduce the notion of epistemic entitlement of rights and argue that secrecy is legitimate within a constitutional democracy only when citizens enjoy a specific right to know in which circumstances their rights can be legitimately limited or restricted. We call this the right of assessment.

In this book we have argued that whistleblowing is an act of civil dissent, insisting on the function of dissent in exposing the abuse of corporate and political power, and the limitations of the democratic procedures that undermine considerations of public interest, equality of rights, and accountability. In this conclusion we briefly reassess the main arguments presented in the book and conclude that, while there is no such a thing as a right to whistleblowing, whistleblowers are entitled to a robust protection against retaliatory actions. We argue that such a right corresponds a duty of the state. While a growing national legislation provide some legal protections for civic whistleblowers, little or no safeguard is still recognized to political whistleblowers.

In this article we argue that governmental practices of secrecy threaten the epistemic dimension of rights. We defend the view that possessing a right entitles its holder to the largest extent of available knowledge of the circumstances that may impede the enjoyment of that right. We call this the ‘epistemic entitlement’ of rights. Such an entitlement holds in ideal conditions once full transparency is assumed. However, under non-ideal conditions secrecy is a fact that should be accounted for. We argue that, under such conditions, interference due to secrecy is legitimate when the circumstances under which it occurs are open to assessment by the right-holder. We call this the ‘right of assessment’. It ensures the ex-post fulfillment of the epistemic entitlement under non-ideal conditions of partial compliance where full transparency is unattainable due to the fact of secrecy. The right of assessment shields against arbitrary interference by imposing an obligation on the government to provide justification for any interference in the sphere of fundamental rights.

It is common to note some emerging forms of dissent to make claims of civil disobedience. Against them, sceptics argue that these protests should be seen in their own right, and sometimes as instances of uncivil disobedience, because they neither meet the demanding requirements of civil disobedience nor adequately capture the nature of dissent. The chapter examines the sceptical claim against one emerging form of dissent, whistleblowing, and argues that it is a form of civil disobedience. Additionally, it argues that the sceptical claims rest on a conception of civility borrowed from the Rawlsian theory of civil disobedience that is demanding for forms of dissent that, though democracy-enhancing, need not demonstrate features similar to classic forms of civil disobedience. Whistleblowing challenges us to reconsider the shifting lines between civil and uncivil forms of disobedience and demands that theories of civil disobedience are sensitive to the changing contexts of political action. The deviance of whistleblowing from standard models is no testimony to a lack of sincerity and seriousness but a response to the demands of the specific situation, the changing nature and forms of political engagement and governance, and a regard for personal circumstances.

This paper deploys the containment principle by Della Croce and Nicole-Berva (2021) to adjudicate COVID-19 non-conformity in India. The paper argues that the containment principle offers a guide to evaluating pandemic legislation and outlines the duties of the state. It then evaluates the Indian Pandemic response and legislation against the containment principles and finds it arbitrary, arguing that the discretionary power vested in the state enables it to treat two instances of COVID-19 non-conformities, the Tablighi Jamaat and the Kumbh, differently. The non-conformity of the devotees and the deviance of the state can be read within a framework of exceptionalism, collective irrationality, and conspiracy theories that firstly enables the devotees to maintain a sense of invulnerability, and secondly, allows the state to blame the minority community for threatening its exceptional status. These acts of non-conformities constitute disobedience against containment principles that are unjustifiable and demonstrate a moral failure to not harm others and a failure of the state to equally distribute benefits and burdens of pandemic policies.

There has been a recent spike in interest in the concept of incivility in political theory. The question is: when are democratic citizens justified in engaging in uncivil behaviour with their fellow citizens? This turn reflects an anguish against the constraints of morality on political action. This chapter takes issue with the turn towards incivility within democratic theory, using the case of civil disobedience to highlight its limitations. It discusses the concept of civility and its role in a democracy, showing that this turn poses larger problems for democracy than it resolves. This paper attempts to bring back the concept of civility and highlight the crucial role that it can play in the heavily polarised contemporary political discourse

The book explores the stakes for the social sciences around four central problems: the challenges of context; modes of intervention; involvement; and the ethical dilemmas for the scholar in a democratic space. The first, challenges of the context, examines the variety of situations confronted by scholars since the beginning of the 20th century. These include their interventions in key judicial affairs, the impact of technological developments like the introduction of big data, or even the positionality of the scholar. Second, the book investigates the modalities according to which social scientists may intervene in the civic space: in particular as specialists, as experts, or in the media. A third problem brings together some cases illustrative of researchers' involvement in critical issues, such as food policies, major social reforms, or gender-related questions. Finally, the book concludes with a reflection on the modes of exercising critique or dissent in democratic societies and on the ethical dimensions of involvement in the civic space. A searing examination of the role of social scientists, as they are called upon to address the multiple critical issues faced by contemporary societies, from pandemics to climatic change, sustainable development, migration, ethnicity, or the place of religion. This volume will be of great interest not just to scholars, students, and researchers of the social sciences but to the general reader as a concerned citizen.

This chapter presentsa principled view that grounds the need for whistleblowing protection, often missing in the literature. They argue that whistleblowers have a right to protection because of their role in ensuring accountability against wrongdoings that go unnoticed due to unrestrained practices of secrecy. This right derives from the crucial role of whistleblowing in exposing right limitations, in absence of procedures of redress, and information of public interest. Given this role, absence of procedures of protection and fair hearing of disclosure claims puts unfair burdens on whistleblowers so much as to, in some instances, preclude the very possibility of disclosure. In this regard, a cognizance of their role in ensuring protection of rights and structure of accountability demands a system of protection extended to human rights defendants. Santoro and Kumar argue that the European Union should stand up for the legal protection of whistle-blowers and encourage their contribution towards more transparent institutions and economic transactions.

Recent advancements in socially assistive robotics (SAR) have shown a significant potential of using social robotics to achieve increasing cognitive and affective outcomes in education. However, the deployments of SAR technologies also bring ethical challenges in tandem, to the fore, especially in under-resourced contexts. While previous research has highlighted various ethical challenges that arise in SAR deployment in real-world settings, most of the research has been centered in resource-rich contexts, mainly in developed countries in the ‘Global North,’ and the work specifically in the educational setting is limited. This research aims to evaluate and reflect upon the potential ethical and pedagogical challenges of deploying a social robot in an under-resourced context. We base our findings on a 5-week in-the-wild user study conducted with 12 kindergarten students at an under-resourced community school in New Delhi, India. We used interaction analysis with the context of learning, education, and ethics to analyze the user study through video recordings. Our findings highlighted four primary ethical considerations that should be taken into account while deploying social robotics technologies in educational settings; (1) language and accent as barriers in pedagogy, (2) effect of malfunctioning, (un)intended harms, (3) trust and deception, and (4) ecological viability of innovation. Overall, our paper argues for assessing the ethical and pedagogical constraints and bridging the gap between non-existent literature from such a context to evaluate better the potential use of such technologies in under-resourced contexts.

Human opacity is the intrinsic quality of unknowabil- ity of human beings with respect to machines. The descriptive rela- tionship between humans and machines, which captures how much information one can gather about the other, can be explicated using an opacity-transparency relationship. This relationship allows us to describe and normatively evaluate a spectrum of opacity where humans and machines may be either opaque or transparent. In this paper, we argue that the advent of Affective Computing (AC) has begun to shift the ideal position of humans on this spectrum towards greater transparency, while much of this technology is shifting towards opacity. We explore the implications of this shift with regard to the affective information of humans and how the threat to human opacity by AC systems has various adverse repercussions, such as infringement of one’s autonomy, deception, manipulation, and increased anxiety. There are also distributive consequences that expose vulnerable groups to unjustified burdens and reduce them to mere profiles. We further provide an assessment of current AC technology, which follows the descriptive relationship between humans and machines from the lens of opacity and transparency. Finally, we foresee and address three possible objections to our claims. These are the beneficence of AC systems, their relation to privacy, and their restrictive capacity to capture human affects. Through these arguments, the paper aims to bring attention to the ontological relationship between humans and machines from the perspective of opacity and transparency while emphasizing on the gravity of the ethical concerns raised by their threat to human opacity.

In this article we argue that governmental practices of secrecy threaten the epistemic dimension of rights. We defend the view that possessing a right entitles its holder to the largest extent of available knowledge of the circumstances that may impede the enjoyment of that right. We call this the ‘epistemic entitlement’ of rights. Such an entitlement holds in ideal conditions once full transparency is assumed. However, under non-ideal conditions secrecy is a fact that should be accounted for. We argue that, under such conditions, interference due to secrecy is legitimate when the circumstances under which it occurs are open to assessment by the right-holder. We call this the ‘right of assessment’. It ensures the ex-post fulfillment of the epistemic entitlement under non-ideal conditions of partial compliance where full transparency is unattainable due to the fact of secrecy. The right of assessment shields against arbitrary interference by imposing an obligation on the government to provide justification for any interference in the sphere of fundamental rights.

Whistleblowing is the public disclosure of information with the purpose of revealing wrongdoings and abuses of power that harm the public interest. This book presents a comprehensive theory of whistleblowing: it defines the concept, reconstructs its origins, discusses it within the current ethical debate, and elaborates a justification of unauthorized disclosures. Its normative proposal is based on three criteria of permissibility: the communicative constraints, the intent, and the public interest conditions. The book distinguishes between two forms of whistleblowing, civic and political, showing how they apply in the contexts of corruption and government secrecy. The book articulates a conception of public interest as a claim concerning the presumptive interest of the public. It argues that public interest is defined in opposition to corporate powers and its core content identified by the rights that are all-purposive for the distribution of social benefits. A crucial part of the proposal is dedicated to the impact of security policies and government secrecy on civil liberties. It argues that unrestrained secrecy limits the epistemic entitlement of citizens to know under which conditions their rights are limited by security policies and corporate interests. When citizens are denied the right to assess when these policies are prejudicial to their freedoms, whistleblowing represents a legitimate form of political agency that safeguards the fundamental rights of citizens against the threat of unrestrained secrecy by government power. Finally, the book contributes to shifting the attention of democratic theory from the procedures of consent formation to the mechanisms that guarantee the expression of dissent. It argues that whistleblowing is a distinctive form of civil dissent that contributes to the demands of institutional transparency in constitutional democracies and explores the idea that the way institutions are responsive to dissent determines the robustness of democracy, and ultimately, its legitimacy. What place dissenters have within a society, whether they enjoy personal safety, legal protection, and safe channels for their disclosure, are hallmarks of a good democracy, and of its sense of justice.

Whistleblowing is the act of disclosing information from a public or private organization in order to reveal cases of corruption that are of immediate or potential danger to the public. Blowing the whistle involves personal risk, especially when legal protection is absent, and charges of betrayal, which often come in the form of legal prosecution under treason laws. In this article we argue that whistleblowing is justified when disclosures are made with the proper intent and fulfill specific communicative constraints in addressing issues of public interest. Three communicative constraints of informativeness, truthfulness and evidence are discussed in this regard. We develop a ‘harm test’ to assess the intent for disclosures, concluding that it is not sufficient for justification. Along with the proper intent, a successful act of whistleblowing should provide information that serves the public interest. Taking cognizance of the varied conceptions of public interest, we present an account of public interest that fits the framework of whistleblowing disclosures. In particular, we argue that whistleblowing is justified inter alia when the information it conveys is of a presumptive interest for a public insofar as it reveals an instance of injustice or violation of a civil or political right done against and unbeknown to some members of a polity.