My profile

Universitat de Barcelona
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2010
Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Biology
PhilPapers Editorships
Philosophy of Biology
  • Synergic Kinds
    Synthese 1-16. forthcoming.
    According to the *homeostatic property cluster* family of accounts, one of the main conditions for groups of properties to count as natural is that these properties be frequently co-instantiated. I argue that this condition is, in fact, not necessary for natural-kindness. Furthermore, even when it is present, the focus on co-occurrence distorts the role natural kinds play in science. Co-occurrence corresponds to what information theorists call *redundancy*: observing the presence of some of the …Read more
  • Travelling in Branching Time
    Disputatio 4 (31): 59-75. 2011.
    Miller (2005) and Miller (2008) argue that the branching picture of time is incompatible with the possibility of backwards time travel. In this paper I show that Miller’s conclusion is based on a hidden assumption which, while generally plausible, is unwarranted if time travel is possible. Branching time is, after all, compatible with time travel as Miller characterises it.
  • Ideal Negative Conceivability and the Halting Problem
    Erkenntnis 78 (5): 979-990. 2013.
    Our limited a priori-reasoning skills open a gap between our finding a proposition conceivable and its metaphysical possibility. A prominent strategy for closing this gap is the postulation of ideal conceivers, who suffer from no such limitations. In this paper I argue that, under many, maybe all, plausible unpackings of the notion of ideal conceiver, it is false that ideal negative conceivability entails possibility
  • Modalizing Mechanisms
    Journal of Philosophy 112 (12): 658-670. 2015.
    It is widely held that it is unhelpful to model our epistemic access to modal facts on the basis of perception, and postulate the existence of a bodily mechanism attuned to modal features of the world. In this paper I defend modalizing mechanisms. I present and discuss a decision-theoretic model in which agents with severely limited cognitive abilities, at the end of an evolutionary process, have states which encode substantial information about the probabilities with which the outcomes of a cer…Read more
  • Review of Truly Understood (review)
    Disputatio 3 (26): 117-125. 2009.
  • Communication and Common Interest
    PLOS Computational Biology 9 (11). 2013.
  • Imperativism and Pain Intensity
    In David Bain, Michael Brady & Jennifer Corns (eds.), The Nature of Pain, . forthcoming.
  • Informationally-connected property clusters, and polymorphism
    Biology and Philosophy 30 (1): 99-117. 2015.
    I present and defend a novel version of the homeostatic property cluster account of natural kinds. The core of the proposal is a development of the notion of co-occurrence, central to the HPC account, along information-theoretic lines. The resulting theory retains all the appealing features of the original formulation, while increasing its explanatory power, and formal perspicuity. I showcase the theory by applying it to the problem of reconciling the thesis that biological species are natural k…Read more
  • Pain signals are predominantly imperative
    Biology and Philosophy 31 (2): 283-298. 2016.
    Recent work on signaling has mostly focused on communication between organisms. The Lewis–Skyrms framework should be equally applicable to intra-organismic signaling. We present a Lewis–Skyrms signaling-game model of painful signaling, and use it to argue that the content of pain is predominantly imperative. We address several objections to the account, concluding that our model gives a productive framework within which to consider internal signaling
  • Response to Leahy
    Philosophical Psychology 29 (4): 517-519. 2016.
  • Deception in Sender–Receiver Games
    Erkenntnis 80 (1): 215-227. 2015.
    Godfrey-Smith advocates for linking deception in sender-receiver games to the existence of undermining signals. I present games in which deceptive signals can be arbitrarily frequent, without this undermining information transfer between sender and receiver
  • Common Interest and Signaling Games: A Dynamic Analysis
    Philosophy of Science 83 (3): 371-392. 2016.
    We present a dynamic model of the evolution of communication in a Lewis signaling game while systematically varying the degree of common interest between sender and receiver. We show that the level of common interest between sender and receiver is strongly predictive of the amount of information transferred between them. We also discuss a set of rare but interesting cases in which common interest is almost entirely absent, yet substantial information transfer persists in a *cheap talk* regime, a…Read more
  • La" P" de PANIC: representacionalismo y fenomenología del dolor
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 27 (3): 181-195. 2008.
  • Teleosemantics and Indeterminacy
    Dialectica 67 (4): 427-453. 2013.
    In the first part of the paper, I present a framework for the description and evaluation of teleosemantic theories of intentionality, and use it to argue that several different objections to these theories (the various indeterminacy and adequacy problems) are, in a certain precise sense, manifestations of the same underlying issue. I then use the framework to show that Millikan's biosemantics, her own recent declarations to the contrary notwithtanding, presents indeterminacy. In the second part,…Read more
  • Teleosemantics and productivity
    Philosophical Psychology 26 (1): 47-68. 2013.
    There has been much discussion of so-called teleosemantic approaches to the naturalization of content. Such discussion, though, has been largely confined to simple, innate mental states with contents such as ?There is a fly here.? Even assuming we can solve the issues that crop up at this stage, an account of the content of human mental states will not get too far without an account of productivity: the ability to entertain indefinitely many thoughts. The best-known teleosemantic theory, Millika…Read more
  • Imperative content and the painfulness of pain
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1): 67-90. 2011.
    Representationalist theories of phenomenal consciousness have problems in accounting for pain, for at least two reasons. First of all, the negative affective phenomenology of pain (its painfulness) does not seem to be representational at all. Secondly, pain experiences are not transparent to introspection in the way perceptions are. This is reflected, e.g. in the fact that we do not acknowledge pain hallucinations. In this paper, I defend that representationalism has the potential to overcome th…Read more
  • Disgusting Smells and Imperativism
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (5-6): 191-200. 2015.
    I sketch and defend an imperativist treatment of the phenomenology associated with disgusting smells. This treatment, I argue, allows us to make better sense than other intentionalist alter-natives both of the neuroanatomy of olfaction, and of a natural pre-theoretical stance regarding the sense of smell.
  • Pains as reasons
    Philosophical Studies 172 (9): 2261-2274. 2015.
    Imperativism is the view that the phenomenal character of the affective component of pains, orgasms, and pleasant or unpleasant sensory experience depends on their imperative intentional content. In this paper I canvass an imperativist treatment of pains as reason-conferring states