For Husserl, the ultimate criterion for knowledge and also for the establishment of phenomenology is apodicticity. An experience that has certain self-evidence reveals its object adequately and indubitably. The possibility of founding philosophy on the basis of apodictic evidence has been criticized by some later phenomenologists as “Cartesianism”. By understanding and expanding the concept of "horizon", not only has the idea of the accessibility of apodictic evidence in Husserl's earlier though…
Read moreFor Husserl, the ultimate criterion for knowledge and also for the establishment of phenomenology is apodicticity. An experience that has certain self-evidence reveals its object adequately and indubitably. The possibility of founding philosophy on the basis of apodictic evidence has been criticized by some later phenomenologists as “Cartesianism”. By understanding and expanding the concept of "horizon", not only has the idea of the accessibility of apodictic evidence in Husserl's earlier thoughts undergone a change, but also has made various interpretations of Husserl's phenomenological method. In this paper, by describing the concept of horizon in Ideas I and First Philosophy II, we will discuss the role of this concept in changing Husserl's attitude towards the apodictic beginning of phenomenology. By examining Landgerbe's interpretation of Husserl's Cartesianism, we will show that Husserl, revising the definition of apodicticity, finally, by discovering the psychological and life-world paths toward phenomenological reduction, understood the limitations of the Cartesian path of reduction, but he still believes in the absolute foundation of philosophy.
