Manuel Almagro Holgado

There has been a growing interest within analytic philosophy in addressing political and social issues, which has been referred to as the “political turn” in the discipline. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it discusses the very characterization of the political turn. In particular, it introduces the definition proposed by Bordonaba-Plou, Fernández-Castro, and Torices, suggests that we should not consider the turn a form of activism, and explores an additional benefit of the ideal/nonideal distinction for characterizing the turn. Second, it addresses the concern of what attitude we should take in the face of the different sensitivities we might have with respect to what constitutes an injustice. Which philosophical works should count as part of the political turn? The paper explores three different attitudes toward this dilemma, and favors what it calls the revisionist attitude, which emphasizes the fact that our perception of injustice is subject to error.

Several recent studies (see Knobe & Yalcin, 2014; Khoo, 2015; Marques, 2018; Kneer, 2021a) address linguistic retraction from an experimental perspective. In these studies, speakers’ intuitions regarding the mandatory nature of retraction are tested. Pace MacFarlane, competent speakers (of English) do not consider retraction to be obligatory. This paper examines two methodological features of the above-mentioned studies: they do not take into consideration the difference between public and private contexts; neither do they incorporate the distinction between evaluative and descriptive statements. In this paper, we report the results of two studies conducted to empirically test the hypothesis that retraction is, above all, a public phenomenon. Our findings show that context exerts a significant effect on speakers’ attitudes toward retraction.

According to the partisan cheerleading view, numerous political disagreements that appear to be genuine are not authentic disputes, because partisans _deliberately_ misreport their beliefs to show support for their parties. Recently, three arguments have been put forth to support this view. First, contemporary democracies are characterized by affective rather than ideological polarization. Second, financial incentives indicate that partisans often deliberately misreport their beliefs to express their attitudes. Third, partisans have inconsistent and unstable political beliefs, so we should not take these attitudes seriously. In this paper, I examine these arguments and present an alternative view, which I call the partisan conviction view. According to it, partisans are not necessarily insincere in their political judgments, and they are in genuine disagreement.

A population can be ideologically or affectively polarized. Ideological polarization relates to people’s political beliefs, while affective polarization deals with people’s feelings toward the ingroup and the outgroup. Both types of mental states, beliefs and feelings, are typically measured through direct self-report surveys. One philosophical assumption underlying this way of measuring polarization is a concrete version of the first-person authority thesis: the speaker’s sincerity guarantees the truth of their mental self-ascriptions. Based on various empirical studies, the first part of this paper argues that we are particularly bad at spotting our own mental states regard­ing political issues. This, in turn, raises doubts about the accuracy of direct self-report surveys in measuring polarization. In the second part, I introduce Michael Lynch’s notion of political meaning to argue that traditional surveys can still provide valuable information for detecting polarization. However, I suggest that this information pertains not to participants’ beliefs and feelings, but rather to their level of commitment to the core beliefs of the political groups they identify with, which is a relevant aspect of pernicious polarization.

Recent years have seen recurring episodes of tension between proponents of freedom of speech and advocates of the disenfranchised. Recent survey research attests to the ideological division in attitudes toward free speech, whereby conservatives report greater support for free speech than progressives do. Intrigued by the question of whether “canceling” is indeed a uniquely progressive tendency, we conducted a vignette-based experiment examining judgments of offensiveness among progressives and conservatives. Contrary to the dominant portrayal of progressives and conservatives, our study documented ideological symmetry in their evaluations of offensive speech. When faced with utterances whose content matters to them, both conservatives and progressives viewed outgroup speakers as more offensive than ingroup speakers. A second contribution of this chapter is to provide a deeper understanding of the cognitive mechanism implicated in evaluating outgroup speech as more offensive than ingroup speech. Our results suggest that perception of offensiveness is mediated by ascriptions of intent: we tend to attribute negative intent to the speaker whenever we deem their utterances to be offensive, even against the explicitly stated speaker’s background attitudes.

El pensamiento crítico parece ser la piedra de toque de la relevancia de la filosofía, aquello que nos permite mejorar nuestro modo de razonar. El propósito de este artículo es desarrollar una opinión extraordinariamente poco popular que nos parece, sin embargo, obviamente verdadera: El pensamiento crítico no es patrimonio exclusivo de la filosofía; probablemente ni siquiera es la filosofía la disciplina de la que cabe esperarse la contribución más crucial al desarrollo del pensamiento crítico. Sin embargo, la tesis principal de este trabajo no es negativa. Por el contrario, argumentamos aquí que hay ámbitos en los que la filosofía hace contribuciones genuinas y cruciales para el desarrollo del pensamiento crítico. El ejemplo que nosotros exploramos pertenece al ámbito del desacuerdo y del pensamiento conjunto. Para ello, proponemos pasar de una perspectiva exclusivamente individualista del pensamiento crítico a una perspectiva que incluya también la interacción con otros. La filosofía, defendemos, aporta herramientas útiles para pensar con otros, para que nuestros desacuerdos sean fructíferos, “cuidados”. En este sentido, como en otros, la filosofía sí contribuye al desarrollo del pensamiento crítico. El alcance de esta contribución, pensamos, solo puede verse cuando se presta atención a los detalles.

In this paper, we address the connection between deep disagreements and the rise of affective polarization. Many contemporary approaches to deep disagreement conceive it in atomistic terms, and their practical approaches only explore the consequences of their particular theories. In contrast, we offer a re-lational approach to the phenomenon, consistent with the recent political turn in analytic philosophy. Specifically, we argue that the notion of deep disagree-ment must be approached by taking into account the practical goal of detecting and intervening on social injustices related to situations of deep disagreement. In this line, we briefly discuss both an operationalization of the notion and a way to take care of our disagreements.

Las herramientas teóricas destinadas a señalar las injusticias que sufren ciertos grupos socialmente oprimidos pueden acabar siendo utilizadas con propósitos completamente opuestos a los iniciales. Modificar el alcance de una herramienta teórica no es necesariamente problemático: la popularización de un concepto abre las puertas a que se utilice estratégicamente para diferentes fines. La tesis que defendemos en este artículo es que algunos personajes públicos cultivan una imagen particular de sí mismos que parece satisfacer los requisitos de la noción de injusticia testimonial y utilizan esta situación como medio para obtener beneficio político de ella. Más concretamente, estos personajes públicos se benefician de esta condición para generar situaciones de desacuerdos cruzados, que están estrechamente relacionados con el aumento de la polarización.

Theoretical tools aimed at making explicit the injustices suffered by certain socially disadvantaged groups might end up serving purposes which were not foreseen when the tools were first introduced. Nothing is inherently wrong with a shift in the scope of a theoretical tool: the popularization of a concept opens up the possibility of its use for several strategic purposes. The thesis that we defend in this paper is that some public figures cultivate a public persona for whom the conditions of the notion of testimonial injustice might be taken to apply, and this situation is exploited to their advantage, as a means to advance their political agendas. More specifically, they take advantage of this to generate situations of crossed disagreements, which in turn foster polarization.

When public opinion gets polarized, the population’s beliefs can experience two different changes: they can become more extreme in their contents or they can be held with greater confidence. These two possibilities point to two different understandings of the rupture that characterizes political polarization: extremism and radicalism. In this article, I show that from the close examination of the best available evidence regarding how we get polarized, it follows that the pernicious type of political polarization has more to do with radicalism than with extremism. Reinforcing the confidence in the core beliefs of the group we identify with makes our beliefs immune to the reasons coming from the other political side. Finally, I also suggest that the rise of political polarization is not necessarily the result of an irrational process.

Miranda Fricker distinguishes two senses in which testimonial injustice is epistemic. In the primary sense, it is epistemic because it harms the victim as a giver of knowledge. In the secondary sense, it is epistemic, more narrowly, because it harms the victim as a possessor of knowledge. Her characterization of testimonial injustice has raised the following objection: testimonial injustice is not always an epistemic injustice, in the narrow, secondary sense, as it does not always entail that the victim is harmed as a knowledge-possessor. By adopting a perspective based on Robert Brandom's normative expressivism, we respond to this objection by arguing that there is a close connection, conceptual and constitutive rather than merely causal, between the primary and the secondary epistemic harms of testimonial injustice, such that testimonial injustice always involves both kinds of epistemic harm. We do so by exploring the logic and functioning of belief and knowledge ascriptions in order to highlight three ways in which the secondary epistemic harm caused by testimonial injustice crystallizes: it undermines the epistemic agency of the victim, the epistemic friction necessary for knowledge, and the possibility of occupying particular epistemic nodes.

The way digital information technologies work and, more specifically, the possibilities for action that technological devices offer to us affect our processes of political belief formation. In particular, there seems to be a close connection between our digital affordances and the increase of the sort of polarization that threatens the proper functioning of democracy. In this paper, we analyze whether the type of polarization linked to the use of digital technologies, and which endangers the health of public deliberation, has to do with the adoption of beliefs whose contents are increasingly extreme—extremism—or, on the contrary, has more to do with increasing our credence in the core beliefs of our political identity—radicalism.

Mindreading capacity has been widely understood as the human ability to gain knowledge about the inner processes and states of others that bring about the behavior of these agents. This paper argues against this epistemic view of mindreading on the basis of different empirical studies in linguistics and social and developmental psychology: we are systematically biased in attributing mental states, and many everyday uses of mental ascription sentences do not reflect an epistemic function in our social interactions. We introduce an alternative view of mental ascriptions, the social cover view, which is consistent with the evidence. The social cover view holds that the main function of mental ascriptions is to cover the social status and reputation of an agent rather than to gain knowledge about her inner processes and states. Finally, we discuss two possible objections to our proposal.

Testimonial injustices occur when individuals from particular social groups are systematically and persistently given less credibility in their claims merely because of their group identity. Recent “pluralistic” approaches to folk psychology, by taking into account the role of stereotypes in how we understand others, have the power to explain how and why cases of testimonial injustice occur. If how we make sense of others’ behavior depends on assumptions about how individuals from certain groups think and act, this can explain why speakers are given different degrees of credibility depending on their group identity. For example, if people assume that women are more emotional than men, they will systematically give less credibility to women’s claims. This explanation involves three empirical claims: people assume that women are more emotional than men, people assume that emotionality hinders credibility, and people give less credibility to women’s claims. While extant studies provide some support for and, no study to date has directly tested. In two different studies, we tested all these three claims. The results from both studies provide support for, as we found significant negative correlations between emotionality and credibility attributions. However, in contrast to what some accounts of folk psychology posit, we did not find any significant difference in people’s attributions of emotionality and credibility towards women versus men speakers. We hope that our studies here pave the way for further empirical studies testing the phenomenon of testimonial injustice in a context-sensitive way, in order to have a better understanding of the conditions in which testimonial injustices are likely to happen.

Ecological psychology has maintained that perception is a process in which the action of the subject and the physical features of the environment converge. The opportunities for action (affordances) perceived by a person depend on the interaction between subject and environment. However, perceiving certain affordances can be conditioned by the norms that govern our social practices: the unjust norms related to an unprivileged identity group can limit the set of affordances available for the people of that group.

The aim of this work is to comment and discuss some central ideas of Tim Crane’s book The Object of Thought (2013). In particular, I pose an objection for the reductionist solution to the problem of non-existence offered by the author. Tim Crane defends that the truth of sentences that contain terms referring to non-existent objects (like 'Pegasus') can be explained by appealing to the truth of sentences about things that do exist (Pegasus’ representation in the myth). I argue that this explanation does not work for sentences used in a normative or evaluative way.

‘Dogwhistle’ refers to a kind of political manipulation that some people carry out for political gains. According to Saul (2018), dogwhistles can be either intentional or unintentional depending on whether the speaker carried out the dogwhistle deliberately or not —although one cannot always recognize whether a particular case was intentional. In addition to being intentional or not, dogwhistles can also be overt or covert depending on whether the audience is aware or not of the dogwhistle. In the case of overt dogwhistles, the speaker addresses a message to an audience with two possible interpretations. One of these is coded and affects only a subset the audience (Witten 2014). Covert dogwhistles, on the other hand, are not really about sending a “coded message.” Instead, they raise attitudes to salience, so people will act on them without realizing they are being moved on them. As Stanley (2015) points out, these kinds of dogwhistles work as a strategy for undermining democratic ideals without immediate rejection. Our key question is whether covert dogwhistles constitute a special form of implicit communication or whether they can be reduced to already existing forms of implicit communication such as presuppositions or implicatures. We will focus on covert dogwhistles because they seem more difficult to accommodate within the traditional categories of presuppositions and implicatures. To carry out this task, we compare the features of each of the mentioned phenomena and analyse how they behave in the face of retraction.