Manuel Bremer

This essay outlines a basic Situation Theoretical Framework in the tradition of Situation Theory and Situation Semantics. It may serve as an introduction to the basic and some paradigmatic analyses in Situation Theory. After some general methodological reflection on the attitude with which to use an ontology-based framework of analysis in §1, §2 presents the notation and basic concepts employed in the framework, the basic ontological categories of which are presented in §3. The framework revises and streamlines variations of Situation Theory Frameworks presented so far, both in conceptual as well as in ontological matters. §4 and §5 outline the basic analyses of information flow and meaning as paradigms of Situation Theory (respectively Situation Semantics), which justify developing Situation Theory (including its formal and conceptual framework) further on. §4 also concerns the role Situation Theory can have for Cognitive Science with respect to information extraction by cognitive agents or information processors. §5 also relates Situation Semantics to current truth-conditional semantics. §6 collects basic logical principles of information units (infons) and the framework in general. Infons come with an infon logic, and some closure principles are assumed. Some key elements and open issues are discussed. Using the resources of §§4 – 6 a basic analysis of (propositional) attitudes and action is developed in §7. This paragraph exemplifies both the dominantly externalist approach of Situation Theory, as well as meta-representational infons in attitude reports. Action analysis extends §4 on information flow and extraction. The expressive power of the framework allows for circularity and self-reference, which benefits the expressive power of analyses, but, then, variants of the semantic paradoxes have to be considered, in §8. Situation Theory cannot avoid the debate around paraconsistency and restrictions in infon logic. Finally, in §9, one may ask how the framework may serve in computational analyses. The static character of analyses in formal ontology seems to stand in contrast to procedural computational models. The first Appendix takes up the remarks of §1 how one may reduce or forsake the controversial ontological posits of Situation Theory without renouncing the use of a Situation Theoretical Framework. A set theoretical and a nominalist reduction are hinted at. The second Appendix offers a preliminary evaluation of a Situation Theoretical Framework. Situation Theory came up as a promising ‘newest thing’ in the 1980s, in the 2020s it is – at best – recognized as one approach among others (besides older approach like Categorial Grammar, which it has not replaced, and recent trends like Cognitive Linguistics, which oppose its externalism). Do we need analyses of its format (e.g. in comparison to other approaches in semantics and Cognitive Science)? The framework is also basic in the sense that highly technical background theories and proofs are avoided. Not all issues raised (say, for infon logic) are resolved. A graduate level knowledge of meta-logic and formal ontology should suffice for understanding. Each paragraph refers at the end to some further sources.

Notes on Vagueness. A 3-valued approach to vagueness is defended. In contrast to other 3-valued approaches the logic is an extension of classical logic, due to the use of both a Boolean negation and a predicate negation. The view is justified by semantic considerations. Crucial issues (Sorites reasoning, higher order vagueness, existence of cut off points, 'penumbral truth') are discussed from the perspective developed, and some contrasts (mostly to supervaluationism) outlined. An extended version appeared as book in 2026 (Berlin: Logos).

The paper argues against a commitment to metaphysical necessity, semantic modalities are enough. The best approaches to elucidate the semantic modalities are (still) versions of lingustic ersatzism and fictionalism, even if only developed in parts. Within these necessary properties and the difference between natural and semantic laws can be accounted for. The proper background theory for this is an updated version of Logical Empiricism, which is congenial to recent trends in Structural Realism. The anti-metaphysical attitude of Logical Empiricism deserves revitalization. Another target besides metaphysical necessity are substantial forms of iterated modalities, as used, for instance, in the philosophy of religion. An extended version appeared as book in 2025 (Berlin: Logos)

Was ist Philosophische Semantik? Bedarf es neben der Linguistik uberhaupt noch einer "philosophischen" Semantik? Welche Rolle spielt diese Semantik fur die Philosophie im Allgemeinen? Welche methodische Rolle spielt die Klarung von "Bedeutung" fur die Sprachanalytische Philosophie? Tritt die philosophische Semantik an die Stelle der Erkenntnistheorie? In welchem Verhaltnis steht sie zur Ontologie und zur Philosophie des Geistes? Diesen Fragen geht das vorliegende Buch nach. In einem zentralen Verstandnis von Philosophischer Semantik ist das Wesentliche die Beziehung zwischen Bedeutungstheorie und Erkenntnistheorie (vermittels der Rechtfertigung von Satzverwendungen). Eine so verstandene Semantik hat z.T. einen eigenen Ansatz, der einen zentralen Stellenwert fur eine Philosophie in der Analytischen Tradition besitzt. Man kann diese Philosophische Semantik als eine "Erste Philosophie" ansehen."

This book gives an overview of paraconsistent logics - that is logics which allow for inconsistency. Although allowing for inconsistency, paraconsistent logics are worth considering: Logical systems are worth considering in their own right since we can learn about very abstract structural properties of logics and the concepts employed within them such as negation, necessity and consistency. Some non-classical logics are especially of interest from a philosophical perspective since they alone offer the possibility of solving or even stating some philosophical problems. These introductory lectures argue from a philosophical perspective that some paraconsistent logics are of interest or even the best candidates for dealing with specific philosophical problems. Although logic is seen from the point of view of its philosophical use, various formal systems are described, compared and employed.

In this talk I consider two problems for conceptual atomism. Conceptual atomism can be defended against the criticism that it seems to contend that all concepts are simply innate (even technical concepts to pre-technological humanoids) by specifying the innateness thesis as one of mechanisms of hooking up mental representations (concepts as language of thought types) to properties in the world (§1). This theory faces a problem with non-referring expressions/concepts, it seems. Conceptual atomism can, however, deal with non-referring expressions/concepts (§2). Hooking up concepts with properties raises, further on, broader metaphysical problems of making concepts correspond to (natural) properties. These questions are much harder to answer (§3)

In his recent paper in History and Philosophy of Logic, John Kearns argues for a solution of the Liar paradox using an illocutionary logic (Kearns 2007 ). Paraconsistent approaches, especially dialetheism, which accepts the Liar as being both true and false, are rejected by Kearns as making no ?clear sense? (p. 51). In this critical note, I want to highlight some shortcomings of Kearns' approach that concern a general difficulty for supposed solutions to (semantic) antinomies like the Liar. It is not controversial that there are languages which avoid the Liar. For example, the language which consists of the single sentence ?Benedict XVI was born in Germany? lacks the resources to talk about semantics at all and thus avoids the Liar. Similarly, more interesting languages such as the propositional calculus avoid the Liar by lacking the power to express semantic concepts or to quantify over propositions. Kearns also agrees with the dialetheist claim that natural languages are semantically closed (i.e. are able to talk about their sentences and the semantic concepts and distinctions they employ). Without semantic closure, the Liar would be no real problem for us (speakers of natural languages). But given the claim, the expressive power of natural languages may lead to the semantic antinomies. The dialetheist argues for his position by proposing a general hypothesis (cf. Bremer 2005 , pp. 27?28): ?(Dilemma) A linguistic framework that solves some antinomies and is able to express its linguistic resources is confronted with strengthened versions of the antinomies?. Thus, the dialetheist claims that either some semantic concepts used in a supposed solution to a semantic antinomy are inexpressible in the framework used (and so, in view of the claim, violate the aim of being a model of natural language), or else old antinomies are exchanged for new ones. One horn of the dilemma is having inexpressible semantic properties. The other is having strengthened versions of the antinomies, once all semantic properties used are expressible. This dilemma applies, I claim, to Kearns' approach as well

This paper looks at some aspects of semantic metarepresentation. It is mostly concerned with questions more formal, concerning the representation format in semantic metarepresentations, and the way they are processed. §1 distinguishes between metacognition and metarepresentation in a narrow and broad sense. §2 reminds the reader of some main areas where metarepresentations have to be used. The main part considers the ways that metarepresentations are built and processed. §3 introduces some general ideas how semantic metarepresentations are built and processed. §4 looks at some recent theories about ways that semantic metarepresentations are built and processed.

There are positive and negative lessons from Sartre: - Taking up some of his ideas one may arrive at a better model of consciousness in the analytic philosophy of mind; representing some of his ideas within the language and the models of a functionalist theory of mind makes them more accessible and inte¬grates them into the wider picture. - Sartre, as any philosopher, errs at some points, I believe; but these errors may be instruc¬tive, especially in as much as they mirror some errors in some current theories of consciousness. This paper, therefore, is not a piece of Sartre scholarship, but an attempt of a “friendly take¬over” of some ideas I ascribe to Sartre into current models in the philosophy of mind.